Results for ' scepticism about self-knowledge'

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  1. Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent?William Lane Craig - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):291-295.
  2. Why scepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining.Gary Ebbs - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):237-244.
    In two previous papers I explained why I believe that a certain sort of argument that seems to support skepticism about self-knowledge is actually self-undermining, in the sense that no one can justifiably accept all of its premises at once. Anthony Brueckner has recently tried to show that even if the central premises of my explanation are true, the skeptical argument in question is not self-undermining. He has also suggested that even if the skeptical argument (...)
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  3. Scepticism about Self-Knowledge of Motives.Pablo Hubacher Haerle - 2025 - The Monist 108 (1):92-104.
    Many philosophers claim that we have a duty to know our motives. However, prominent theories of the mind suggest that we can’t. Such scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives is based on psychological evidence. I show that this evidence only mandates scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives if we rely on a mistaken assumption which I call ‘the myth of the one true motive’. If we reject this myth, we see that there is space (...)
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  4. Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent?Anthony L. Brueckner - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):287-290.
    Gary Ebbs has argued that skepticism regarding knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states cannot even be coherently formulated. This articles is a reply to that argument.
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  5. The coherence of scepticism about self-knowledge.A. Brueckner - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):41-48.
  6. Scepticism about self-knowledge redux.Anthony Brueckner - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):311-315.
  7. Is skepticism about self-knowledge coherent?Gary Ebbs - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (1):43-58.
    In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility ofanti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner isnot convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained inprint. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person'sself-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from herfirst-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner'sacceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning – hisattempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our (...)
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  8. Scepticism about knowledge of content.Anthony Brueckner - 1990 - Mind 99 (395):447-51.
    Focuses on the arguments that show the externalism of mental content. Discussion on the principle of knowledge identification; Account of basic self-knowledge; Interpretations of sentence content; Skepticism of knowledge content.
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  9.  63
    Debating Self-Knowledge.Anthony Brueckner & Gary Ebbs - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Gary Ebbs.
    Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self- (...). In this book, Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs debate how to characterize this problem and develop opposing views of what it shows. Their discussion is the only sustained, in-depth debate about anti-individualism, scepticism and knowledge of one's own thoughts, and will interest both scholars and graduate students in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology. (shrink)
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  10. A Problem for Self-Knowledge: The Implications of Taking Confabulation Seriously.Robin Scaife - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):469-485.
    There is a widespread assumption that we have direct access to our own decision-making processes. Empirical demonstrations of confabulation, a phenomenon where individuals construct and themselves believe plausible but inaccurate accounts of why they acted, have been used to question this assumption. Those defending the assumption argue cases of confabulation are relatively rare and that in most cases, we still have direct insight into our own decision-making. This paper reviews this debate and introduces two novel points. Firstly, I will point (...)
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  11.  97
    Realism and self-knowledge: A problem for Burge.Michael Hymers - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (3):303-325.
    Tyler Burge says that first-person authority can be reconciled with anti-individualism about the intentional by denying part of the "Cartesian conception" of authority, which claims that I am actually authoritative about my intentional attitudes in counterfactual situations. This clause, he says, wrongly conflates the evaluation-conditions for sceptical doubts about the "external" world with the conditions for classifying intentional attitudes in counterfactual situations. This paper argues that the kind of possibility needed to understand external-world scepticism justifies the (...)
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  12. Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.
    Putnam’s vat argument is intended to show that I am not a permanently envatted brain. The argument holds promise as a response to vat scepticism, which depends on the claim that I do not know that I am not a permanently envatted brain. However, there is a widespread idea that the vat argument cannot fulfil this promise, because to employ the argument as a response to vat scepticism I would have to make assumptions about the content of (...)
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  13. A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self-Knowledge Problems.Darren Bradley - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (7):379-393.
    The main argument given for relevant alternatives theories of knowledge has been that they answer scepticism about the external world. I will argue that relevant alternatives also solve two other problems that have been much discussed in recent years, a) the bootstrapping problem and b) the apparent conflict between semantic externalism and armchair self-knowledge. Furthermore, I will argue that scepticism and Mooreanism can be embedded within the relevant alternatives framework.
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  14.  33
    The Ubiquity of Self‐Deception.Rick Fairbanks - 1998 - Philosophical Investigations 21 (1):1–23.
    My paper is a discussion of Bas van Fraassen’s important, but neglected, paper on self‐deception, “The Peculiar Effects of Love and Desire.” Paradoxes of self‐deception are widely thought to follow from the ease with which we know ourselves. For example, if self‐deception were intentional, how could we fail to know as target of our own deception just those things necessary to undermine the deception? Van Fraassen stands that reasoning on its head, arguing that is the ease with (...)
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  15. Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge II: Lagadonian Judging.T. Parent - manuscript
    This draft now appears (in revised form) as Chapter 7 of _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.
     
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  16. About self-knowledge.Fred Dretske - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 425.
  17. An intuition about self-knowledge: A challenge to Fodor.Sandy Goldberg - 1993 - Conference 4 (1):50-63.
     
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  18.  62
    ‘Kant our Contemporary’? Kitcher on the Fruitfulness of Kant's Theory of the Cognitive Subject.Thomas Sturm - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (1):135-141.
    In chapter 15 of Kant's Thinker, Patricia Kitcher claims that we can treat Kant as , and that his theory of apperception new. I question this with respect to two of her four chosen topics. First, I address her attempt to show that Kant's theory of apperceptive self-knowledge is immune to sceptical doubts of the sort Barry Stroud presents. Second, I turn to her argument that this theory is superior to current accounts of the special authority of (...)-knowledge. Over and above specific weaknesses, it seems that Kitcher's considerations generally lack sufficient reflection on how philosophical arguments of the past can be relevant to current agendas. (shrink)
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  19. Infallibilism about self-knowledge.T. Parent - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):411-424.
    Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here (...)
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  20. Self-knowledge and scepticism.Jeff Malpas - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (2):165-184.
    Donald Davidson has argued that 'most of our beliefs must be true' and that global scepticism is therefore false. Davidson's arguments to this conclusion often seem to depend on externalist considerations. Davidson's position has been criticised, however, on the grounds that he does not defeat the sceptic, but rather already assumes the falsity of scepticism through his appeal to externalism. Indeed, it has been claimed that far from defeating the sceptic Davidson introduces an even more extreme version of (...)
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  21.  78
    More than Just a Passing Cognitive Show: a Defence of Agentialism About Self-knowledge.Adam J. Andreotta - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):353-373.
    This paper contributes to a debate that has arisen in the recent self-knowledge literature between agentialists and empiricists. According to agentialists, in order for one to know what one believes, desires, and intends, rational agency needs to be exercised in centrally significant cases. Empiricists disagree: while they acknowledge the importance of rationality in general, they maintain that when it comes to self- knowledge, empirical justification, or warrant, is always sufficient. In what follows, I defend agentialism. I (...)
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  22. What’s So Special about Self-Knowledge?Jose Medina - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):575-603.
    This is a critical discussion of selected chapters of the first volume of Scott Soames's _Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. It is argued that this volume falls short of the minimal standards of scholarship appropriate to a work that advertises itself as a history, and, further, that Soames's frequent heuristic simplifications and distortions, since they are only sporadically identified as such, are more likely to confuse than to enlighten the student. These points are illustrated by reference to Soames's discussions (...)
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  23. A century of deflation and a moment about self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1999 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (2):25-46.
  24.  27
    Self-knowledge, Externalism and Scepticism, II.David Owens - 2000 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1):119-142.
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  25. SelfKnowledge and Externalism about Empty Concepts.Ted Parent - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (2):158-168.
    Several authors have argued that, assuming we have apriori knowledge of our own thought-contents, semantic externalism implies that we can know apriori contingent facts about the empirical world. After presenting the argument, I shall respond by resisting the premise that an externalist can know apriori: If s/he has the concept water, then water exists. In particular, Boghossian's Dry Earth example suggests that such thought-experiments do not provide such apriori knowledge. Boghossian himself rejects the Dry Earth experiment, however, (...)
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  26.  33
    Memory Scepticism: Demystified and Defanged.Changsheng Lai - 2024 - Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology 41 (2):26-32.
    Memory is ordinarily taken to be one of the most fundamental sources of knowledge. However, memory sceptics argue that memory is unable to provide us with knowledge about the past. In the existing literature, there are two most discussed forms of memory sceptical arguments, namely, the argument from memory reliability and the argument from underdetermination. Correspondingly, the two most representative anti-sceptical proposals nowadays attempt to disarm the two sceptical arguments by employing explanationism and disjunctivism respectively. This paper (...)
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  27. Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    "Self-knowledge" is commonly used in philosophy to refer to knowledge of one's particular mental states, including one's beliefs, desires, and sensations. It is also sometimes used to refer to knowledge about a persisting self -- its ontological nature, identity conditions, or character traits. At least since Descartes, most philosophers have believed that self-knowledge is importantly different from knowledge of the world external to oneself, including others' thoughts. But there is little agreement (...)
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  28.  80
    The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes.Nicholas Jolley - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
    The Light of the Soul examines the debate between Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes on the nature of ideas, which was crucial to the development of early modern thinking about the mind and knowledge. Nicholas Jolley guides the reader through the debate and considers its implications for a broad range of issues, such as innate ideas, self-knowledge, scepticism, the mind-body problem, and the creation of the eternal truths, which are as important to philosophy today as they (...)
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  29.  51
    The Value of Emotions for Knowledge.Laura Candiotto (ed.) - 2019 - Springer Verlag.
    This innovative new volume analyses the role of emotions in knowledge acquisition. It focuses on the field of philosophy of emotions at the exciting intersection between epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science to bring us an in-depth analysis of the epistemological value of emotions in reasoning. With twelve chapters by leading and up-and-coming academics, this edited collection shows that emotions do count for our epistemic enterprise. Against scepticism about the possible positive role emotions play in (...)
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  30. Self-knowledge about attitudes: rationalism meets interpretation.Franz Knappik - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):183-198.
    Recently influential “rationalist” views of self-knowledge about our rational attitudes hold that such self-knowledge is essentially connected to rational agency, and therefore has to be particularly reliable, immediate, and distinct from third-personal access. This approach has been challenged by “theory theory” or “interpretationist” views of self-knowledge: on such views, self-knowledge is based on the interpretation of information about ourselves, and this interpretation involves the same mindreading mechanisms that we use to (...)
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  31. Scepticism about intuition.David Sosa - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (4):633-648.
    Contemporary philosophy’s antipathy to intuition can come to seem baffling. There is inadequate reason to move away from the intuitively attractive view that we have a faculty of intuition, in many ways akin to our faculties of perception and memory and introspection, that gives us reason for belief, and with it, often enough, gives us knowledge. The purpose here is to consider whether scepticism about intuition is more reasonable than a corresponding scepticism about other epistemic (...)
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  32.  28
    Scepticism about Morals and Scepticism about Knowledge.W. H. Walsh - 1960 - Philosophy 35 (134):218 - 233.
    Can we ever know that something—some state of affairs, or some action taken or contemplated—is evil or wrong, or is it always at best a matter of opinion? It is curious that analytic philosophers, despite their preoccupation with the issue of scepticism and their many discussions of sceptical doubts, have given so little attention to this question. If we look, for example, at Professor Ayer's recent volume The Problem of Knowledge , which consists in effect of a prolonged (...)
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  33. Self-knowledge: Discovery, resolution, and undoing.Richard Moran - 1997 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):141-61.
    remarks some lessons about self-knowledge (and some other self-relations) as well as use them to throw some light on what might seem to be a fairly distant area of philosophy, namely, Sartre's view of the person as of a divided nature, divided between what he calls the self-as-facticity and the self-as-transcendence. I hope it will become clear that there is not just perversity on my part in bringing together Wittgenstein and the last great Cartesian. (...)
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  34.  25
    Introspection — One or More? Pluralism about Self-Knowledge.Joanna Komorowska-Mach - 2019 - Filozofia Nauki 27 (1):5-25.
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  35. Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism.Kevin Falvey & Joseph Owens - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):107-37.
    Psychological externalism is the thesis that the contents of many of a person's propositional mental states are determined in part by relations he bears to his natural and social environment. This thesis has recently been thrust into prominence in the philosophy of mind by a series of thought experiments due to Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge. Externalism is a metaphysical thesis, but in this work I investigate its implications for the epistemology of the mental. I am primarily concerned with the (...)
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  36. SelfKnowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism.Brie Gertler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):91-109.
    How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self-knowledge, (...)
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  37.  76
    Self-Knowledge of Desire: When Inference Is Not Enough.Uku Tooming - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (4):381-398.
    According to inferentialism about self-knowledge of desire, the basic way in which we come to know what we want is through inference. In this paper, I argue that in a wide range of cases of knowing one’s desire, inference is insufficient. In particular, I look at two inferentialist models, one proposed by Krista Lawlor and the other by Alex Byrne and look at the challenges that they face in securing safe self-ascriptions. In response to these difficulties, (...)
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  38. Difficulties in generating scepticism about knowledge of content.A. Brueckner - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):59-62.
  39. Inferential Self-Knowledge Reimagined.Benjamin Winokur - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    In the epistemology of self-knowledge, Inferentialism is the view that one’s current mental states are normally known to one through inferences from evidence. This view is often taken to conflict with widespread claims about normally-acquired self-knowledge, namely that it is privileged (essentially more secure than knowledge of others’ minds) and peculiar (obtained in a way that fundamentally differs from how others know your mind). In this paper I argue that Inferentialism can be reconceived so (...)
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  40. Externalism, self-knowledge, and inner observation.Harold Langsam - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):42-61.
    There is a continuing debate as to whether externalism about mental content is compatible with certain commonly accepted views about the nature of self-knowledge. Both sides to this debate seem to agree that externalism is _not compatible with the traditional view that self-knowledge is acquired by means of observation. In this paper, I argue that externalism is compatible with this traditional view of self-knowledge, and that, in fact, we have good reason to (...)
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  41.  50
    Self-knowledge: Privileged in access or privileged in authority?Keya Maitra - 2005 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2):101-114.
    Our claims of knowledge about our own mental states are considered epistemically privileged. This paper deals with the issue of whether there is a feature that is most typical of this epistemological phenomenon. I will first introduce a distinction between two kinds of privilege that a knowledge claim can enjoy, namely, in epistemic access and in epistemic authority. While privilege in epistemic access (P-access) deals with how we make these claims, privilege in epistemic authority (P-authority) deals with (...)
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  42.  23
    Self-Knowledge in and outside of Illness.Tuomas K. Pernu & Sherrilyn Roush (eds.) - 2017 - Palgrave Communications.
    Self-knowledge has always played a role in healthcare since a person needs to be able to accurately assess her body or behaviour in order to determine whether to seek medical help. But more recently it has come to play a larger role, as healthcare has moved from a more paternalistic model to one where patients are expected to take charge of their health; as we realise that early detection, and hence self-examination, can play a crucial role in (...)
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  43.  52
    The epicurean argument: Determinism and scepticism.Christopher Hookway - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):79 – 94.
    This paper examines Honderich's attempt to make sense of the widespread view that acceptance of determinism undermines reason and knowledge. Since I am largely in sympathy with Honderich's approach to these issues, the paper develops a theme suggested by his discussion and disagrees with some details of the focus of his argument rather than challenging the general principles he employs. After introducing the issue and sketching Honderich's version of the argument from determinism to scepticism, I present an alternative (...)
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  44. Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Content.Åsa Maria Wikforss - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):399-424.
    The question of whether content externalism poses a threat to the traditional view of self-knowledge has been much debated. Compatibilists have tried to diffuse the threat by appealing to the self-verifying character of reflexive judgments about our own thoughts, while incompatibilists have strenuously objected that this does not suffice. In my paper I argue that this debate is fundamentally misconceived since it is based, on both sides, on the problematic notion of ‘knowledge of content’. What (...)
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  45.  69
    Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I argue that the method of transparency --determining whether I believe that p by considering whether p -- does not explain our privileged access to our own beliefs. Looking outward to determine whether one believes that p leads to the formation of a judgment about whether p, which one can then self-attribute. But use of this process does not constitute genuine privileged access to whether one judges that p. And looking outward will not provide for (...)
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  46. Self-knowledge and commitments.Annalisa Coliva - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):365 - 375.
    In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order (...)
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  47.  71
    Extended Self-Knowledge.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - In Julie Kirsch Patrizia Pedrini (ed.), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 31-49.
    We aim to move the externalism and self-knowledge debate forward by exploring two novel sceptical challenges to the prospects of self-knowledge of a paradigmatic sort, both of which result from ways in which our thought content, cognitive processes and cognitive successes depend crucially on our external environments. In particular, it is shown how arguments from extended cognition ; Clark A. Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford: Oxford University Press ) and situationism, Alfano M. (...)
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  48. Privileged self-knowledge and externalism are compatible.Ted A. Warfield - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):232-37.
    I argue that externalism about mental content is consistent with the thesis that individuals need not investigate their environment to come to know the contents of their thoughts. In particular, externalism is consistent with the thesis that we come to know the contents of our thoughts on the basis of introspection.
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  49.  92
    Awareness and Authority: Skeptical Doubts about Self-Knowledge.Fred Dretske - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 49.
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  50. Self-Knowledge in a Predictive Processing Framework.Lukas Schwengerer - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):563-585.
    In this paper I propose an account of self-knowledge based on a framework of predictive processing. Predictive processing understands the brain as a prediction-action machine that tries to minimize error in its predictions about the world. For this view to evolve into a complete account of human cognition we ought to provide an idea how it can account for self-knowledgeknowledge of one’s own mental states. I provide an attempt for such an account (...)
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