Current debates about the replication crisis in psychology take it for granted that direct replication is valuable and focus their attention on questionable research practices in regard to statistical analyses. This paper takes a broader look at the notion of replication as such. It is argued that all experimentation/replication involves individuation judgments and that research in experimental psychology frequently turns on probing the adequacy of such judgments. In this vein, I highlight the ubiquity of conceptual and material questions in research, (...) and I argue that replication is not as central to psychological research as it is sometimes taken to be. (shrink)

Many philosophers of science and methodologists have argued that the ability to repeat studies and obtain similar results is an essential component of science. A finding is elevated from single observation to scientific evidence when the procedures that were used to obtain it can be reproduced and the finding itself can be replicated. Recent replication attempts show that some high profile results – most notably in psychology, but in many other disciplines as well – cannot be replicated consistently. These replication (...) attempts have generated a considerable amount of controversy, and the issue of whether direct replications have value has, in particular, proven to be contentious. However, much of this discussion has occurred in published commentaries and social media outlets, resulting in a fragmented discourse. To address the need for an integrative summary, we review various types of replication studies and then discuss the most commonly voiced concerns about direct replication. We provide detailed responses to these concerns and consider different statistical ways to evaluate replications. We conclude there are no theoretical or statistical obstacles to making direct replication a routine aspect of psychological science. (shrink)

The idea of replication is based on the premise that there are permanent laws to be replicated and verified, and the scientific method is adequate for doing so. Scientific truth, however, is not absolute but relative to time and context, and the method used. Time and context are inextricably interwoven, in that time creates different contexts and contexts (e.g., Christmas Day vs. New Year’s Day) create different experiences of time, rendering psychological phenomena inherently variable. This means that internal and external (...) conditions fluctuate and are different in a replication study vs. the original. Thus, a replication experiment is just another empirical investigation that has no special status in the establishment of scientific truth. It is not the final arbiter of whether or not something exists. In their pursuit of homogeneous external conditions, replications have ignored the homogeneity of internal conditions. There is not a single replication reported in the literature that would have shown participants’ feelings and thoughts—both conscious and nonconscious—to be identical to those of the original participants. Experimental instructions can create varying ratios of conscious over nonconscious processing from one study to another. Ironically, every replication is a failure at the fundamentals of human psychology. While patterns can be discovered, they are not permanent or unchangeable laws of human behavior to be proven by the pinpoint statistical verification through replication. As scientific knowledge in physics is temporary and incomplete, should it be any surprise that science can only provide “temporary winners” for psychological knowledge of human behavior? (shrink)

The replication crisis is perceived by many as one of the most significant threats to the reliability of research. Though reporting of the crisis has emphasized social science, all signs indicate that it extends to many other fields. This paper investigates the possibility that the crisis and related challenges to conducting research also extend to philosophy. According to one possibility, philosophy inherits a crisis similar to the one in science because philosophers rely on unreplicated or unreplicable findings from science when (...) conducting philosophical research. According to another possibility, the crisis likely extends to philosophy because philosophers engage in similar research practices and face similar structural issues when conducting research that have been implicated by the crisis in science. Proposals for improving philosophical research are offered in light of these possibilities. (shrink)

Replications are often taken to play both epistemic and demarcating roles in science: they provide evidence about the reliability of fields’ methods and, by extension, about which fields “count” as scientific. I argue that, in a field characterized by a high degree of theoretical openness and uncertainty, like comparative cognition, replications do not sit well in these roles. Like other experiments conducted under conditions of uncertainty, replications are often equivocal and open to interpretation. As a result, they are poorly placed (...) to deliver clear judgments about the reliability of comparative cognition’s methods or its scientific bona fides. I suggest that this should encourage us to take a broader view of both the nature of scientific progress and the role of replication in comparative cognition. (shrink)

There are many layers of regulation governing DNA replication to ensure that genetic information is accurately transmitted from mother cell to daughter cell. While much of the control occurs at the level of origin selection and firing, less is known about how replication fork progression is controlled throughout the genome. In Drosophila polytene cells, specific regions of the genome become repressed for DNA replication, resulting in underreplication and decreased copy number. Importantly, underreplicated domains share properties with common fragile sites. The (...) Suppressor of Underreplication protein SUUR is essential for this repression. Recent work established that SUUR functions by directly inhibiting replication fork progression, raising several interesting questions as to how replication fork progression and stability can be modulated within targeted regions of the genome. Here we discuss potential mechanisms by which replication fork inhibition can be achieved and the consequences this has on genome stability and copy number control. (shrink)

Replication of the main chromosome in the halophilic archaeon Haloferax volcanii was recently reported to continue despite deletion of all active replication origins. Equally surprising, the deletion strain grew faster than the parent strain. It was proposed that origin‐less H. volcanii duplicate their chromosomes via recombination‐dependent replication. Here, we recall our present knowledge of this mode of chromosome replication in different organisms. We consider the likelihood that it accounts for the viability of H. volcanii deleted for its main specific replication (...) origins, as well as possible alternative interpretations of the results. The selective advantages of having defined chromosome replication origins are discussed from a functional and evolutionary perspective. (shrink)

A lot of Indian research is replicative in nature. This is because originality is at a premium here and mediocrity is in great demand. But replication has its merit as well because it helps in corroboration. And that is the bedrock on which many a fancied scientific hypothesis or theory stands, or falls. However, to go from replicative to original research will involve a massive effort to restructure the Indian psyche and an all round effort from numerous quarters. The second (...) part of this paper deals with the essence of scientific temper, which need not have any basic friendship, or animosity, with religion, faith, superstition and other such entities. A true scientist follows two cardinal rules. He is never unwilling to accept the worth of evidence, howsoever damning to the most favourite of his theories. Second, and perhaps more important, for want of evidence, he withholds comment. He says neither yes nor no. Where will Science ultimately lead Man is the third part of this essay. One argument is that the conflict between Man and Science will continue till either of them is exhausted or wiped out. The other believes that it is Science which has to be harnessed for Man and not Man used for Science. And with the numerous checks and balances in place, Science will remain an effective tool for man's progress. The essential value-neutrality of Science will have to be supplemented by the values that man has upheld for centuries as fundamental, and which religious thought and moral philosophy have continuously professed. (shrink)

Replicability and reproducibility of computational models has been somewhat understudied by “the replication movement.” In this paper, we draw on methodological studies into the replicability of psychological experiments and on the mechanistic account of explanation to analyze the functions of model replications and model reproductions in computational neuroscience. We contend that model replicability, or independent researchers' ability to obtain the same output using original code and data, and model reproducibility, or independent researchers' ability to recreate a model without original code, (...) serve different functions and fail for different reasons. This means that measures designed to improve model replicability may not enhance (and, in some cases, may actually damage) model reproducibility. We claim that although both are undesirable, low model reproducibility poses more of a threat to long-term scientific progress than low model replicability. In our opinion, low model reproducibility stems mostly from authors' omitting to provide crucial information in scientific papers and we stress that sharing all computer code and data is not a solution. Reports of computational studies should remain selective and include all and only relevant bits of code. (shrink)

The history and theoretical role of the concept of a ``replicator''is discussed, starting with Dawkins' and Hull's classic treatmentsand working forward. I argue that the replicator concept is still auseful one for evolutionary theory, but it should be revised insome ways. The most important revision is the recognition that notall processes of evolution by natural selection require thatsomething play the role of a replicator.

Formulation of a general model of evolution is presented which is based upon the recognition of the ?biosocial? entity, that is the biosphere and human society, as a component?system. It can be demonstrated that the interactions of the components (moleculas, cells, organisms, ecosystems in the biological realms and people, artifacts and ideas in the societies) have replicative organization. We suggest an explanation for the spontaneous emergence of replicative function and organization, a process called autogenesis. During autogenesis, hierarchical levels of replicative (...) organization emerge and compartmentalization and convergence of replicative information occurs. Questions of the origin and evolution of life are discussed. The replicative paradigm can also be applied to the processes of cultural evolution, in which complex replicative networks of people, ideas, and man?made artifacts show all stages and phenomena of autogenesis. Finally, the present state of evolution of the whole global biosocial system is discussed. (shrink)

Replicability is a term that not only comes with different meanings in the literature of many domains but is often associated or confused with other terms such as ‘reproducibility,’ ‘repeatability,’ ‘reliability,’ ‘validity,’ and so on. To add to the confusion, it can even be used differently across diverse disciplines. Though all named concepts are important, what makes them barely advantageous is that they do not cover some peculiar aspects of the replicability and validation processes, i.e., appropriateness of conceptualization; trustworthiness of (...) operational definition and operational acts; accuracy of researcher’s description, categorization and/or measurement; successfulness of observational (or field) relation. Moreover, in social sciences and organization studies, the concept of validity of data is highly questionable due to the quite frequent shortage of real statuses of the observed objects. The present paper aims to challenge the received view on the concept of ‘replicability,’ by proposing a “situational approach” based on the idea that replicability works under certain organizational and socio-technic conditions, and that it is heavily influenced by the way that different stakeholders (scientists, technicians, participants artifacts, and technologies) respond to them. Consequently, it is important to understand how and why replicability works in different contexts. Its main purpose, without denying the importance of current conventional perspectives on replicability and its siblings, is to widen and change them to include an organizational setting and a reflexive epistemology. This implies the pursuit of a third way of replicability, between the postmodernist negation of its possibility and its opposite, i.e., a naïve naturalism. A way asserting that replicability is a jigsaw puzzle or a mosaic, constituted by discursive practices (poetics) and organizational achievements guiding the politics of accountability, validation and legitimation. The domain here considered pertains to the social and organizational sciences. However, though going beyond the aim of this essay, many issues could be reframed and adapted to medical, natural and physical sciences, as some of the following examples can show. (shrink)

A large number of scientists and several news platforms have, over the last few years, been speaking of a replication crisis in various academic disciplines, especially the biomedical and social sciences. This paper answers the novel question of whether we should also pursue replication in the humanities. First, I create more conceptual clarity by defining, in addition to the term “humanities,” various key terms in the debate on replication, such as “reproduction” and “replicability.” In doing so, I pay attention to (...) what is supposed to be the object of replication: certain studies, particular inferences, of specific results. After that, I spell out three reasons for thinking that replication in the humanities is not possible and argue that they are unconvincing. Subsequently, I give a more detailed case for thinking that replication in the humanities is possible. Finally, I explain why such replication in the humanities is not only possible, but also desirable. (shrink)

Replication protein A (RPA), the major single‐stranded DNA‐binding protein in eukaryotic cells, is required for processing of single‐stranded DNA (ssDNA) intermediates found in replication, repair, and recombination. Recent studies have shown that RPA binding to ssDNA is highly dynamic and that more than high‐affinity binding is needed for function. Analysis of DNA binding mutants identified forms of RPA with reduced affinity for ssDNA that are fully active, and other mutants with higher affinity that are inactive. Single molecule studies showed that (...) while RPA binds ssDNA with high affinity, the RPA complex can rapidly diffuse along ssDNA and be displaced by other proteins that act on ssDNA. Finally, dynamic DNA binding allows RPA to prevent error‐prone repair of double‐stranded breaks and promote error‐free repair. Together, these findings suggest a new paradigm where RPA acts as a first responder at sites with ssDNA, thereby actively coordinating DNA repair and DNA synthesis. (shrink)

Recent studies based on next‐generation DNA sequencing have revealed that the female inactive X chromosome is replicated in a rapid, unorganized manner, and undergoes increased rates of mutation. These observations link the organization of DNA replication timing to gene regulation on one hand, and to the generation of mutations on the other hand. More generally, the exceptional biology of the inactive X chromosome highlights general principles of genome replication. Cells may control replication timing by a combination of intrinsic replication origin (...) properties, local chromatin states and global levels of replication factors, leading to a functional separation between the activity of genes and their mutation. (shrink)

The regulation of DNA replication is a fascinating biological problem both from a mechanistic angle—How is replication timing regulated?—and from an evolutionary one—Why is replication timing regulated? Recent work has provided significant insight into the first question. Detailed biochemical understanding of the mechanism and regulation of replication initiation has made possible robust hypotheses for how replication timing is regulated. Moreover, technical progress, including high‐throughput, single‐molecule mapping of replication initiation and single‐cell assays of replication timing, has allowed for direct testing of (...) these hypotheses in mammalian cells. This work has consolidated the conclusion that differential replication timing is a consequence of the varying probability of replication origin initiation. The second question is more difficult to directly address experimentally. Nonetheless, plausible hypotheses can be made and one—that replication timing contributes to the regulation of chromatin structure—has received new experimental support. (shrink)

According to a once influential view of selection, it consists of repeated cycles of replication and interaction. It has been argued that this view is wrong: replication is not necessary for evolution by natural selection. I analyze the nine most influential arguments for this claim and defend the replication–interaction conception of selection against these objections. In order to do so, however, the replication–interaction conception of selection needs to be modified significantly. My proposal is that replication is not the copying of (...) an entity, the replicator, but the copying of a property. Thus, we can have a replication process without there being a replicator that is being copied. (shrink)

The Developmental Systems approach to evolution is defended against the alternative extended replicator approach of Sterelny, Smith and Dickison (1996). A precise definition is provided of the spatial and temporal boundaries of the life-cycle that DST claims is the unit of evolution. Pacé Sterelny et al., the extended replicator theory is not a bulwark against excessive holism. Everything which DST claims is replicated in evolution can be shown to be an extended replicator on Sterelny et al.s definition. (...) Reasons are given for scepticism about the heuristic value claimed for the extended replicator concept. For every competitive, individualistic insight the replicator theorist has a cooperative, systematic blindspot. (shrink)

During replication, the topology of DNA changes continuously in response to well‐known activities of DNA helicases, polymerases, and topoisomerases. However, replisomes do not always progress at a constant speed and can slow‐down and even stall at precise sites. The way these changes in the rate of replisome progression affect DNA topology is not yet well understood. The interplay of DNA topology and replication in several cases where progression of replication forks reacts differently to changes in DNA topology ahead is discussed (...) here. It is proposed, there are at least two types of replication fork barriers: those that behave also as topological barriers and those that do not. Two‐Dimensional (2D) agarose gel electrophoresis is the method of choice to distinguish between these two different types of replication fork barriers. (shrink)

In bacteria, PriA protein, a conserved DEXH‐type DNA helicase, plays a central role in replication restart at stalled replication forks. Its unique DNA‐binding property allows it to recognize and stabilize stalled forks and the structures derived from them. Cells must cope with fork stalls caused by various replication stresses to complete replication of the entire genome. Failure of the stalled fork stabilization process and eventual restart could lead to various forms of genomic instability. The low viability of priA null cells (...) indicates a frequent occurrence of fork stall during normal growth that needs to be properly processed. PriA specifically recognizes the 3′‐terminus of the nascent leading strand or the invading strand in a displacement (D)‐loop by the three‐prime terminus binding pocket (TT‐pocket) present in its unique DNA binding domain. Elucidation of the structural basis for recognition of arrested forks by PriA should provide useful insight into how stalled forks are recognized in eukaryotes. (shrink)

Replication protein A (RPA) is the main eukaryotic single‐stranded DNA (ssDNA) binding protein, having essential roles in all DNA metabolic reactions involving ssDNA. RPA binds ssDNA with high affinity, thereby preventing the formation of secondary structures and protecting ssDNA from the action of nucleases, and directly interacts with other DNA processing proteins. Here, we discuss recent results supporting the idea that one function of RPA is to prevent annealing between short repeats that can lead to chromosome rearrangements by microhomology‐mediated end (...) joining or the formation of hairpin structures that are substrates for structure‐selective nucleases. We suggest that replication fork catastrophe caused by depletion of RPA could result from cleavage of secondary structures by nucleases, and that failure to cleave hairpin structures formed at DNA ends could lead to gene amplification. These studies highlight the important role RPA plays in maintaining genome integrity. (shrink)

The replicability of experiment is routinely offered as the gold standard of evidence. I argue that it is not supported by a universal principle of replicability in inductive logic. A failure of replication may not impugn a credible experimental result; and a successful replication can fail to vindicate an incredible experimental result. Rather, employing a material approach to inductive inference, the evidential import of successful replication of an experiment is determined by the prevailing background facts. Commonly, these background facts do (...) support successful replication as a good evidential guide and this has fostered the illusion of a deeper, exceptionless principle. (shrink)

A published simulation model Riolo et al. 2001 ) was replicated in two independent implementations so that the results as well as the conceptual design align. This double replication allowed the original to be analysed and critiqued with confidence. In this case, the replication revealed some weaknesses in the original model, which otherwise might not have come to light. This shows that unreplicated simulation models and their results can not be trusted - as with other kinds of experiment, simulations need (...) to be independently replicated. (shrink)

The replication crisis has spawned discussions on the meaning of replication. In fact, in order to determine whether an experiment fails to replicate, it is necessary to establish what replication is. This is, however, a difficult task, as it is possible to attribute different meanings to it. This paper offers a solution to this problem of ambiguity by engineering a concept of replication that, if compared to other proposals, stands out for being not only broadly applicable but also sufficiently specific. (...) It features a minimal level of operationalism, which would otherwise limit its applicability, while it heavily relies on replication’s specific epistemic functions, which are inter-disciplinary. Another merit is its context sensitivity, which enables it to differentiate instances of replication from non-instances of replication in every scientific discipline according to the discipline’s own standards. (shrink)

Nowadays, almost everyone seems to agree that science is facing an epistemological crisis – namely the replicability crisis – and that we need to take action. But as to precisely what to do or how...

I argue that there is no distinction between allographic and autographic representations. One consequence of this is that replicative forgeries have the same aesthetic and artistic value as originals, and are accurate records of actions. I end with some reflections on the pragmatic structure of forgery.

An idea is not a replicator because it does not consist of coded self-assembly instructions. It may retain structure as it passes from one individual to another, but does not replicate it. The cultural replicator is not an idea but an associatively-structured network of them that together form an internal model of the world, or worldview. A worldview is a primitive, uncoded replicator, like the autocatalytic sets of polymers widely believed to be the earliest form of life. (...) Primitive replicators generate self-similar structure, but because the process happens in a piecemeal manner, through bottom-up interactions rather than a top-down code, they replicate with low fidelity, and acquired characteristics are inherited. Just as polymers catalyze reactions that generate other polymers, the retrieval of an item from memory can in turn trigger other items, thus cross-linking memories, ideas, and concepts into an integrated conceptual structure. Worldviews evolve idea by idea, largely through social exchange. An idea participates in the evolution of culture by revealing certain aspects of the worldview that generated it, thereby affecting the worldviews of those exposed to it. If an idea influences seemingly unrelated fields this does not mean that separate cultural lineages are contaminating one another, because it is worldviews, not ideas, that are the basic unit of cultural evolution. (shrink)

The role or function of experimental and observational replication within empirical science has implications for how replication should be measured. Broadly, there seems to be consensus that replication’s central goal is to confirm or vouchsafe the reliability of scientific findings. I argue that if this consensus is correct, then most of the measures of replication used in the scientific literature are actually poor indicators of this reliability or confirmation. Only meta-analytic measures of replication align functionally with the goals of replication. (...) I conclude by addressing some objections to meta-analysis. (shrink)

Since the advent of the twenty-first century, science has experienced a crisis pertaining to the replicability of quantitative research findings, which has become known as the ‘replication crisis’. The replication crisis has particularly afflicted research in the behavioural sciences, and psychology in particular. Given the relevance of psychology to education, it is unsurprising that the replication crisis also presents an issue for quantitative educational research, thus potentially compromising its practical usefulness. This article outlines the replication crisis in psychology, and highlights (...) its significance for quantitative educational research. Greater methodological rigour, aimed at addressing methodological deficiencies in the conduct of scientific research, has been suggested as a response to the replication crisis. Following a review of various calls for greater methodological rigour, the current article argues that, whilst methodological deficiencies may be a contributory factor, there is potentially a more fundamental reason for the replication crisis. The case is made that the non-separability of a measured attribute from the measurement instrument, and the irreducible uncertainty in unmeasured attributes, may be the principal reasons for the replication crisis in psychology and education. Implications of such an explanation for the crisis are articulated in relation to the evidence-based policy agenda in education. (shrink)

Before replication becomes mainstream, the potential for generating theoretical knowledge better be clear. Replicating statistically significant nonrandom data shows that an original study made a discovery; replicating a specified theoretical effect shows that an original study corroborated a theory. Yet only in the latter case is replication a necessary, sound, and worthwhile strategy.

Cancer cells accumulate widespread local and global chromatin changes and the source of this instability remains a key question. Here we hypothesize that chromatin alterations including unscheduled silencing can arise as a consequence of perturbed histone dynamics in response to replication stress. Chromatin organization is transiently disrupted during DNA replication and maintenance of epigenetic information thus relies on faithful restoration of chromatin on the new daughter strands. Acute replication stress challenges proper chromatin restoration by deregulating histone H3 lysine 9 mono‐methylation (...) on new histones and impairing parental histone recycling. This could facilitate stochastic epigenetic silencing by laying down repressive histone marks at sites of fork stalling. Deregulation of replication in response to oncogenes and other tumor‐promoting insults is recognized as a significant source of genome instability in cancer. We propose that replication stress not only presents a threat to genome stability, but also jeopardizes chromatin integrity and increases epigenetic plasticity during tumorigenesis. (shrink)

Popper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with that of Lakatos (1978) as well as with a related but problematic approach called naïve methodological falsificationism (NMF; Lakatos, (...) 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutations, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, potentially lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach considers causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, NMF represents a hybrid approach that subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its tactic of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that the replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that the failure to replicate a previously corroborated theory represents a logical refutation of that theory. In contrast, such replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be temporarily ignored or used to motivate theory development. (shrink)

Replication forks inevitably stall at damaged DNA in every cell cycle. The ability to overcome DNA lesions is an essential feature of the replication machinery. A variety of specialized polymerases have recently been discovered, which enable cells to replicate past various forms of damage by a process termed translesion synthesis. Alternatively, homologous recombination can be used to restart DNA replication across the lesion. Genetic and biochemical studies have shed light on the impact of these two post‐replication repair pathways in bacteria (...) and yeast. In vertebrates, however, a genetic approach to study post‐replication repair has been compromised because many of the genes involved appear to be essential for embryonic development. We have taken advantage of the chicken cell line DT40 to perform a genetic analysis of translesion synthesis and homologous recombination and to characterize genetic interactions between these two pathways in vertebrates. In this article, we aim to summarize our current understanding of post‐replication repair in DT40 in the perspective of bacterial, yeast and mammalian genetics. BioEssays 26:151–158, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

A classic finding reported in Beck (1966a) is that observers tend to indicate a more natural texture break between a set of T’s and tilted T’s than between a set of T’s and backward L’s. This finding has played a prominent role in discussions about the properties of texture segmentation and in the development of computational theories of texture segmentation. Due to the small sample size of the original study, we replicated the original experiment with a larger sample. Regrettably, we (...) discovered that the description in Beck (1966a) is insufficient to allow us to reproduce the stimuli. For our replication, we created stimuli that seem consistent with the spirit of the original study. The results of the replication study partly matchBeck’s original data (r = .59), but conclusions indicated by these results deviate from some of Beck’s key conclusions.We also further explored the influential claim derived from a second experiment in Beck (1966a) that texture segmentation was not related to the perceived similarity of elements. Contrary to this claim, a re-analysis of Beck’s data indicates the counterintuitive conclusion that observers tend to indicate stronger texture segmentation between regions that are rated as being more similar. In a replication of the second experiment, this relation flipped so that the replication observers indicated stronger texture segmentation for regions with lower similarity ratings. Despite being influential, we conclude that there are substantial problems with the stimuli, analyses, and conclusions in Beck (1966a). (shrink)

The reward system of science is the priority rule. The first scientist making a new discovery is rewarded with prestige, while second runners get little or nothing. Michael Strevens, following Philip Kitcher, defends this reward system, arguing that it incentivizes an efficient division of cognitive labor. I argue that this assessment depends on strong implicit assumptions about the replicability of findings. I question these assumptions on the basis of metascientific evidence and argue that the priority rule systematically discourages replication. My (...) analysis leads us to qualify Kitcher and Strevens’s contention that a priority-based reward system is normatively desirable for science. (shrink)

he theory o f natural selection provides a mechanistic, causal account of how living things came to look as if they had been designed for a purpose. So overwhelming is the appearance of purposeful design that, even in this Darwinian era when we know "better," we still find it difficult, indeed boringly pedantic, to refrain from teleological language when discussing adaptation. Birds' wings are obviously "for" flying, spider webs are for catching insects, chlorophyll molecules are for photosynthesis, DNA molecules are (...) for... What are DNA molecules for? The question takes us aback. In my case it touches off an almost audible alarm siren in the mind. If we accept the view of life that I wish to espouse, it is the forbidden question. DNA is not "for" anything. If we wish to speak teleologically, all adaptations are for the preservation of DNA; DNA itself just is. Following Williams, I have advocated this view at length, and I do not want to repeat myself here. Instead I shall try to clear up an important misunderstanding of the view, a misunderstanding that has constituted an unnecessary barrier to its acceptance. (shrink)

The present paper attempts to define an experimental ethnography as an approach to the understanding of scientific thinking. Such an ethnography relies upon the replication of contemporary and historical scientific practices as a means of capturing the cultural and cognitive meanings of the practices in question. The approach is contrasted to the typical kind of laboratory experiment in psychology, and it is argued that replications of scientific practices can reveal dimensions of the microstructure of science and of its context that (...) otherwise may remain invisible. An extended example is presented, based upon replications of the experimental procedures used by Michael Faraday in 1856 during his examination of the optical properties of gold. (shrink)

The information contained within the linear sequence of bases (the genome) must be faithfully replicated in each cell cycle, with a balance of constancy and variation taking place over the course of evolution. Recently, it has become clear that additional information important for genetic regulation is contained within the chromatin proteins associated with DNA (the epigenome). Epigenetic information also must be faithfully duplicated in each cell cycle, with a balance of constancy and variation taking place during the course of development (...) to achieve differentiation while maintaining identity within cell lineages. Both the genome and the epigenome are synthesized at the replication fork, so the events occurring during S‐phase provide a critical window of opportunity for eliciting change or maintaining existing genetic states. Cells discriminate between different states of chromatin through the activities of proteins that selectively modify the structure of chromatin. Several recent studies report the localization of certain chromatin modifying proteins to replication forks at specific times during S‐phase. Since transcriptionally active and inactive chromosome domains generally replicate at different times during S‐phase, this spatiotemporal regulation of chromatin assembly proteins may be an integral part of epigenetic inheritance. BioEssays 25:647–656, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Philosophers of science and metascientists alike typically model scientists’ behavior as driven by credit maximization. In this article I argue that this modeling assumption cannot account for how scientists have a default level of trust in each other’s assertions. The normative implication of this is that science policy should not focus solely on incentive reform.

The replicability crisis refers to the apparent failures to replicate both important and typical positive experimental claims in psychological science and biomedicine, failures which have gained increasing attention in the past decade. In order to provide evidence that there is a replicability crisis in the first place, scientists have developed various measures of replication that help quantify or “count” whether one study replicates another. In this nontechnical essay, I critically examine five types of replication measures used in the landmark article (...) “Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science” (Open Science Collaboration, Science, 349, ac4716, 2015) based on the following techniques: subjective assessment, null hypothesis significance testing, comparing effect sizes, comparing the original effect size with the replication confidence interval, and meta-analysis. The first four, I argue, remain unsatisfactory for a variety of conceptual or formal reasons, even taking into account various improvements. By contrast, at least one version of the meta-analytic measure does not suffer from these problems. It differs from the others in rejecting dichotomous conclusions, the assumption that one study replicates another or not simpliciter. I defend it from other recent criticisms, concluding however that it is not a panacea for all the multifarious problems that the crisis has highlighted. (shrink)

Data collection in psychology increasingly relies on “open populations” of participants recruited online, which presents both opportunities and challenges for replication. Reduced costs and the possibility to access the same populations allows for more informative replications. However, researchers should ensure the directness of their replications by dealing with the threats of participant nonnaiveté and selection effects.

Does cultural evolution happen by a process of copying or replication? And how exactly does cultural transmission compare with that paradigmatic case of replication, the copying of DNA in living cells? Theorists of cultural evolution are divided on these issues. The most important objection to the replication model has been leveled by Dan Sperber and his colleagues. Cultural transmission, they argue, is almost always reconstructive and transformative, while strict ‘replication’ can be seen as a rare limiting case at most. By (...) means of some thought experiments and intuition pumps, I clear up some confusion about what qualifies as ‘replication’. I propose a distinction between evocation and extraction of cultural information, applying these concepts at different levels of resolution. I defend a purely abstract and information-theoretical definition of replication, while rejecting more material conceptions. In the end, even after taking Sperber’s valuable and important points on board, the notion of cultural replication remains a valid and useful one. This is fortunate, because we need it for certain explanatory projects. (shrink)

Just as the faithful replication of DNA is an essential process for the cell, chromatin structures of active and inactive genes have to be copied accurately. Under certain circumstances, however, the activity pattern has to be changed in specific ways. Although analysis of specific aspects of these complex processes, by means of model systems, has led to their further elucidation, the mechanisms of chromatin replication in vivo are still controversial and far from being understood completely. Progress has been achieved in (...) understanding: 1. The initiation of chromatin replication, indicating that a nucleosome‐free origin is necessary for the initiation of replication; 2. The segregation of the parental nucleosomes, where convincing data support the model of random distribution of the parental nucleosomes to the daughter strands; and 3. The assembly of histones on the newly synthesized strands, where growing evidence is emerging for a two‐step mechanism of nucleosome assembly, starting with the deposition of H3/H4 tetramers onto the DNA, followed by H2A/H2B dimers. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss cases of replication in the visual arts, with particular focus on paintings. In the first part, I focus on painted copies, that is, manual reproductions of paintings created by artists. Painted copies are sometimes used for the purpose of aesthetic education on the original. I explore the relation between the creation of painted copies and their use as aesthetic surrogates of the original artwork and draw a positive conclusion on the aesthetic benefits of replica production (...) by artists. A skeptical conclusion follows regarding the use of such replicas as surrogates for the original painting. The second part of the paper concerns mechanically produced replicas, such as photographs and 3-D prints. On the basis of some of the claims made in the first part, I set conditions that mechanically produced replicas need to meet in order to function as aesthetic surrogates of an original. I argue that perfect aesthetic surrogates are either already available or at least possible. I conclude by considering two possible objections. (shrink)

The dynamics of eukaryotic DNA polymerases has been difficult to establish because of the difficulty of tracking them along the chromosomes during DNA replication. Recent work has addressed this problem in the yeasts Schizosaccharomyces pombe and Saccharomyces cerevisiae through the engineering of replicative polymerases to render them prone to incorporating ribonucleotides at high rates. Their use as tracers of the passage of each polymerase has provided a picture of unprecedented resolution of the organization of replicons and replication origins in the (...) two yeasts and has uncovered important differences between them. Additional studies have found an overlapping distribution of DNA polymorphisms and the junctions of Okazaki fragments along mononucleosomal DNA. This sequence instability is caused by the premature release of polymerase δ and the retention of non proof‐read DNA tracts replicated by polymerase α. The possible implementation of these new experimental approaches in multicellular organisms opens the door to the analysis of replication dynamics under a broad range of genetic backgrounds and physiological or pathological conditions. (shrink)

Discussions about a replicability crisis in science have been driven by the normative claim that all of science should be replicable and the empirical claim that most of it isn’t. Recently, such crisis talk has been challenged by a new localism, which argues a) that serious problems with replicability are not a general occurrence in science and b) that replicability itself should not be treated as a universal standard. The goal of this article is to introduce this emerging strand of (...) the debate and to discuss some of its implications and limitations. I will in particular highlight the issue of demarcation that localist accounts have to address, i.e. the question of how we can distinguish replicable science from disciplines where replicability does not apply. (shrink)

This commentary takes issue with the idea that replication is a “fundamental element” in natural selection. Such an assumption is based on a traditional, mechanistic view of evolution. A symbiogenetic theory of evolution offers an alternative to traditional theories, emphasizing reproduction and qualitative development rather than replication and quantitative development. The issues raised by the symbiogenetic alternative may be extended to discussions of behavioral development.

In this paper, I articulate an argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. My argument comes in the form of an extended story, modeled loosely on Peter van Inwagen’s “rollback argument” scenario. I thus call it “the replication argument.” As I aim to bring out, though the argument is inspired by so-called “manipulation” and “original design” arguments, the argument is not a version of either such argument—and plausibly has advantages over both. The result, I believe, is a more convincing (...) incompatibilist argument than those we have considered previously. (shrink)

This fascinating study in the sociology of science explores the way scientists conduct, and draw conclusions from, their experiments. The book is organized around three case studies: replication of the TEA-laser, detecting gravitational rotation, and some experiments in the paranormal. "In his superb book, Collins shows why the quest for certainty is disappointed. He shows that standards of replication are, of course, social, and that there is consequently no outside standard, no Archimedean point beyond society from which we can lever (...) the intellects of our fellows. "- -Donald M. McCloskey, Journal of Economic Psychology "Collins is one of the genuine innovators of the sociology of scientific knowledge.... Changing Order is a rich and entertaining book. "- - Isis "The book gives a vivid sense of the contingent nature of research and is generally a good read. "- -Augustine Brannigan, Nature "This provocative book is a review of [Collins's] work, and an attempt to explain how scientists fit experimental results into pictures of the world.... A promising start for new explorations of our image of science, too often presented as infallibly authoritative. "- -Jon Turney, New Scientist. (shrink)