Relevance logics are a misunderstood lot. Despite being the subject of intense study for nearly a century, they remain maligned as too complicated, too abstruse, or too silly to be worth learning much about. This Element aims to dispel these misunderstandings. By focusing on the weak relevant logic B, the discussion provides an entry point into a rich and diverse family of logics. Also, it contains the first-ever textbook treatment of quantification in relevance logics, as well as an (...) overview of the cutting edge on variable sharing results and a guide to further topics in the field. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Non‐Sequiturs are Bad The Real Use of Premises Implication From Proof Theory to Semantics Adding Conjunction The Problem of Disjunction Routley and Meyer's Ternary Relation Rules for Disjunction The Semantics of Negation Rules for Negation Disjunctive Syllogism Logics Stronger than R Logics Weaker than R Relevant Logics and Natural Language Conditionals Theory of Properties Summary.

This book introduces the reader to relevant logic and provides the subject with a philosophical interpretation. The defining feature of relevant logic is that it forces the premises of an argument to be really used in deriving its conclusion. The logic is placed in the context of possible world semantics and situation semantics, which are then applied to provide an understanding of the various logical particles and natural language conditionals. The book ends by examining various (...) applications of relevant logic and presenting some interesting open problems. It will be of interest to a range of readers including advanced students of logic, philosophical and mathematical logicians, and computer scientists. (shrink)

The logician's central concern is with the validity of argument. A logical theory ought, therefore, to provide a general criterion of validity. This book sets out to find such a criterion, and to describe the philosophical basis and the formal theory of a logic in which the premises of a valid argument are relevant to its conclusion. The notion of relevance required for this theory is obtained by an analysis of the grounds for asserting a formula in a (...) proof. (shrink)

Relevant logics have traditionally been viewed as paraconsistent. This paper shows that this view of relevant logics is wrong. It does so by showing forth a logic which extends classical logic, yet satisfies the Entailment Theorem as well as the variable sharing property. In addition it has the same S4-type modal feature as the original relevant logic E as well as the same enthymematical deduction theorem. The variable sharing property was only ever regarded as (...) a necessary property for a logic to have in order for it to not validate the so-called paradoxes of implication. The Entailment Theorem on the other hand was regarded as both necessary and sufficient. This paper shows that the latter theorem also holds for classical logic, and so cannot be regarded as a sufficient property for blocking the paradoxes. The concept of suppression is taken up, but shown to be properly weaker than that of variable sharing. (shrink)

In this article, I consider the positive logic of Boolean groups (i.e. Abelian groups where every non-identity element has order 2), where these are taken as frames for an operational semantics à la Urquhart. I call this logic BG. It is shown that the logic over the smallest nontrivial Boolean group, taken as a frame, is identical to the positive fragment of a quasi-relevance logic that was developed by Robles and Méndez (an extension of this result (...) where negation is included is also discussed). It is proved that BG satisfies the variable sharing property and is Halldén complete, while failing to satisfy the disjunction property. Sound and complete subscripted tableaux are presented for BG. An axiomatization (in the positive language extended with fusion) is presented, which is sound with respect to BG and, with respect to a related ternary relational semantics, complete; the problem of identifying a complete axiomatization for BG itself is left open. Connections between BG and the quasi-relevance logic KR are also discussed. (shrink)

Here, I combine the semantics of Mares and Goldblatt [20] and Seki [29, 30] to develop a semantics for quantified modal relevant logics extending ${\bf B}$. The combination requires demonstrating that the Mares–Goldblatt approach is apt for quantified extensions of ${\bf B}$ and other relevant logics, but no significant bridging principles are needed. The result is a single semantic approach for quantified modal relevant logics. Within this framework, I discuss the requirements a quantified modal relevant (...) class='Hi'>logic must satisfy to be “sufficiently classical” in its modal fragment, where frame conditions are given that work for positive fragments of logics. The roles of the Barcan formula and its converse are also investigated. (shrink)

In the early seventies, several logicians developed a semantics for propositional systems of relevance logic. The essential ingredients of this semantics were a privileged point o, an ‘accessibility’ relation R and a special operator * for evaluating negation. Under the truth- conditions of the semantics, each formula A(Pl,…,Pn) could be seen as expressing a first order condition A+(pl,…,pn, o, R,*) on sets p1,…,pn and o, R, *, while each formula-scheme could be regarded as expressing the second-order condition ∀p1,…,∀pn A+(p1,…,pn, (...) o, R, *). It could then be shown that many standard systems of propositional relevance logic were complete in the sense that their theorems were just those formulas true in all models whose components o, R and * conformed to the second-order conditions expressed by the axioms of the system. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. First, it sets out an interpretation of the relevant logic E of relevant entailment based on the theory of situated inference. Second, it uses this interpretation, together with Anderson and Belnap’s natural deduc- tion system for E, to generalise E to a range of other systems of strict relevant implication. Routley–Meyer ternary relation semantics for these systems are produced and completeness theorems are proven. -/- .

In this paper, I motivate the addition of an actuality operator to relevant logics. Straightforward ways of doing this are in tension with standard motivations for relevant logics, but I show how to add the operator in a way that permits one to maintain the intuitions behind relevant logics. I close by exploring some of the philosophical consequences of the addition.

This paper proposes a new topic in substructural logic for use in research joining the fields of relevance and fuzzy logics. For this, we consider old and new relevance principles. We first introduce fuzzy systems satisfying an old relevance principle, that is, Dunn’s weak relevance principle. We present ways to obtain relevant companions of the weakening-free uninorm systems introduced by Metcalfe and Montagna and fuzzy companions of the system R of relevant implication and its neighbors. The algebraic (...) structures corresponding to the systems are then defined, and completeness results are provided. We next consider fuzzy systems satisfying new relevance principles introduced by Yang. We show that the weakening-free uninorm systems and some extensions and neighbors of R satisfy the new relevance principles. (shrink)

This paper discusses three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes (...) complete sequent calculi for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fdeand the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this work we argue for relevant logics as a basis for paraconsistent epistemic logics. In order to do so, a paraconsistent nonmonotonic multi-agent epistemic logic, MDR (for Modal Defeasible Relevant), is briefly introduced. In MDR each agent has two kinds of belief: an absolute belief that P, represented by AiP, and a defeasible belief that P, represented by DiP. Therefore, an agent can reason with his own absolute and defeasible beliefs about the world and also (...) reason about his beliefs about other agents' beliefs both absolute and defeasible. A theorem is presented showing some patterns of reasoning in MDR. Avron's relevant logic RMI? s compared proof theoretically with Anderson and Belnap's relevant logics R and RM and also with Da Costa's paraconsistent logic CI, with respect to some desired properties of absolute and defeasible beliefs. Then we can understand why RMI was chosen to be the underlying logic for the monotonie part (the absolute beliefs) of MDR, and had to be modified and integrated with a nonmonotonic logic in order to be the underlying logic for the nonmonotonic part (defeasible beliefs). (shrink)

I develop and defend a truthmaker semantics for the relevant logic R. The approach begins with a simple philosophical idea and develops it in various directions, so as to build a technically adequate relevant semantics. The central philosophical idea is that truths are true in virtue of specific states. Developing the idea formally results in a semantics on which truthmakers are relevant to what they make true. A very natural notion of conditionality is added, giving us (...) relevant implication. I then investigate ways to add conjunction, disjunction, and negation; and I discuss how to justify contraposition and excluded middle within a truthmaker semantics. (shrink)

It is proved that the relevance logic \ has no structurally complete consistent axiomatic extension, except for classical propositional logic. In fact, no other such extension is even passively structurally complete.

This paper introduces the inquisitive extension of R, denoted as InqR, which is a relevant logic of questions based on the logic R as the background logic of declaratives. A semantics for InqR is developed, and it is shown that this semantics is, in a precisely defined sense, dual to Routley-Meyer semantics for R. Moreover, InqR is axiomatized and completeness of the axiomatic system is established. The philosophical interpretation of the duality between Routley-Meyer semantics and the (...) semantics for InqR is also discussed. (shrink)

Relevance logic is ordinarily seen as a subsystem of classical logic under the translation that replaces arrows by horseshoes. If, however, we consider the arrow as an additional connective alongside the horseshoe, then another perspective emerges: the theses of relevance logic, specifically the system R, may also be seen as the output of a conservative extension of the relation of classical consequence. We describe two ways in which this may be done. One is by defining a suitable (...) closure relation out of the set of theses of relevance logic; the other is by adding to the usual natural deduction system for it further rules with ‘projective constraints’, whose application restricts the subsequent application of other rules. The significance of the two constructions is also discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate neighbourhood semantics for modal extensions of relevant logics. In particular, we combine the neighbourhood interpretation of the relevant implication (and related connectives) with a neighbourhood interpretation of modal operators. We prove completeness for a range of systems and investigate the relations between neighbourhood models and relational models, setting out a range of augmentation conditions for the various relations and operations.

This paper gives an account of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria for an adequate theory of entailment. The criteria are grouped into three categories: criteria pertaining to modality, those pertaining to relevance, and those related to expressive strength. The leitmotif of both this paper and its prequel is the relevant legitimacy of disjunctive syllogism. Relevant logics are commonly held to be paraconsistent logics. It is shown in this paper, however, that both E and R can be extended to (...) explosive logics which satisfy all of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria, provided the truth-constant known as the Ackermann constant is available. One of the selection criteria related to expressive strength is having an “enthymematic” conditional for which a deduction theorem holds. I argue that this allows for a new interpretation of Anderson and Belnap’s take on logical consequence, namely as committing them to pluralism about logical consequence. (shrink)

The Mares-Goldblatt semantics for quantified relevant logics have been developed for first-order extensions of R, and a range of other relevant logics and modal extensions thereof. All such work has taken place in the the ternary relation semantic framework, most famously developed by Sylvan and Meyer. In this paper, the Mares-Goldblatt technique for the interpretation of quantifiers is adapted to the more general neighbourhood semantic framework, developed by Sylvan, Meyer, and, more recently, Goble. This more algebraic semantics allows (...) one to characterise a still wider range of logics, and provides the grist for some new results. To showcase this, we show, using some non-augmented models, that some quantified relevant logics are not conservatively extended by connectives the addition of which do conservatively extend the associated propositional logics, namely fusion and the dual implication. We close by proposing some further uses to which the neighbourhood Mares-Goldblatt semantics may be put. (shrink)

At the end of the 1980s, Tennant invented a logical system that he called “intuitionistic relevant logic”. Now he calls this same system “Core logic.” In Section 1, by reference to the rules of natural deduction for $\mathbf{IR}$, I explain why $\mathbf{IR}$ is a relevant logic in a subtle way. Sections 2, 3, and 4 give three reasons to assert that $\mathbf{IR}$ cannot be a core logic.

Here I show that the one-variable fragment of several first-order relevant logics corresponds to certain S5ish extensions of the underlying propositional relevant logic. In particular, given a fairly standard translation between modal and one-variable languages and a permuting propositional relevant logic L, a formula $$\mathcal {A}$$ A of the one-variable fragment is a theorem of LQ (QL) iff its translation is a theorem of L5 (L.5). The proof is model-theoretic. In one direction, semantics based on (...) the Mares-Goldblatt [15] semantics for quantified L are transformed into ternary (plus two binary) relational semantics for S5-like extensions of L (for a general presentation, see Seki [26, 27]). In the other direction, a valuation is given for the full first-order relevant logic based on L into a model for a suitable S5 extension of L. I also discuss this work’s relation to finding a complete axiomatization of the constant domain, non-general frame ternary relational semantics for which RQ is incomplete [11]. (shrink)

It is shown how to model propositional constants within the simplified Routley-Meyer semantics. Various axioms and rules allowingthe definition of modal operators, implicative negations, enthymematical conditionals, and propositions expressing various infinite conjunctions anddisjunctions are set forth and shown to correspond to specific frame conditions. Two propositional constants which are both often designated as “the Ackermann constant” are shown to capture two such “infinite” propositions: The conjunction of every logical law and the conjunction of every truth – what Anderson and Belnap (...) called the “world” constant. (shrink)

Once upon a time, modal logic was castigated because it ‘had no semantics.’ Kripke, Hintikka, Kanger, and others changed all that. In a similar way, when Relevant Logic was introduced by Anderson and Belnap, it too was castigated for ‘having no semantics.’ The present overview marks a culmination of that effort. The semantic approach described here brings together a number of hitherto disparate efforts to set out formal systems for logics of relevant implication and entailment. It (...) also makes clear (despite some of our hopes and utterances) that the One True Logic does not exist. This is as true for relevant logics as Kripke et al., showed it to be for modal logics. In both cases, subtle (and not so subtle) variations on semantical postulates produce different logics in the same family. The question of which semantical postulates are correct makes no sense without further context, i.e., the questioner needs to answer the question: Correct for what? The question that does remain is: What motivates the relevant family of logics? And this is the question that is the main job for this chapter to investigate. (shrink)

Relevant Logics and their Rivals, Volume II extends the material of the first volume in two ways.

The idea that impossibilities have an important semantic role to play is becoming widely accepted on various grounds, including grounds of relevance. I argue that this is a mistake, that it has led to various foundational objections to relevance logic, and that these objections are avoidable given a semantics that clearly distinguishes two types of conditional or inferential fallacies, namely, those concerning truth preservation from those concerning a relation between content or subject matter. I argue that we should avoid (...) the use of impossibilities in favor of a coarse-grained notion of content, and argue for the benefits of such an approach. (shrink)

Alasdair Urquhart’s work on models for relevant logics is distinctive in a number of different ways. One key theme, present in both his undecidability proof for the relevant logic R and his proof of the failure of interpolation in R, is the use of techniques from geometry. In this paper, inspired by Urquhart’s work, I explore ways to generate natural models of R+\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$^+$$\end{document} from geometries, and different constraints that (...) an accessibility relation in such a model might satisfy. I end by showing that a set of natural conditions on an accessibility relation, motivated by geometric considerations, is jointly unsatisfiable. (shrink)

A propositional logic has the variable sharing property if φ → ψ is a theorem only if φ and ψ share some propositional variable. In this note, I prove that positive semilattice relevance logic and its extension with an involution negation have the variable sharing property. Typical proofs of the variable sharing property rely on ad hoc, if clever, matrices. However, in this note, I exploit the properties of rather more intuitive arithmetical structures to establish the variable sharing (...) property for the systems discussed. (shrink)

This paper shows that the relevant logics E and Π′ are strongly sound and complete with regards to a version of the “simplified” Routley-Meyer semantics. Such a semantics for E has been thought impossible. Although it is impossible if an admissible rule of E – the rule of restricted assertion or equivalently Ackermann’s δ-rule – is solely added as a primitiverule, it is very much possible when E is axiomatized in the way Anderson and Belnap did. The simplified semantics (...) for E and Π′ requires unreduced frames. Contra what has been claimed, however, no additional frame component is required over and above what’s required to model other relevant logics such as T and R. It is also shown how to modify the tonicity requirements of theternary relation so as to allow for the standard truth condition for both fusion – the intensional conjunction◦ – as well as the converse conditional ←. (shrink)

It is shown that the classes of Routley-Meyer models which are axiomatizable by a theory in a propositional relevant language with fusion and the Ackermann constant can be characterized by their closure under certain model-theoretic operations involving prime filter extensions, relevant directed bisimulations and disjoint unions.

The logic B+ is Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic. Wedefine the logics BK+ and BK′+ by adding to B+ the K rule and to BK+the characteristic S4 axiom, respectively. These logics are endowed witha relatively strong non-constructive negation. We prove that all the logicsdefined lack the K axiom and the standard paradoxes of consistency.

In relevant logics, necessary truths need not imply each other. In justification logic, necessary truths need not all be justified by the same reason. There is an affinity to these two approaches that suggests their pairing will provide good logics for tracking reasons in a fine-grained way. In this paper, I will show how to extend relevant logics with some of the basic operators of justification logic in order to track justifications or reasons. I will define (...) and study three kinds of frames for these logics. For the first kind of frame, I show soundness and highlight a difficulty in proving completeness. This motivates two alternative kinds of frames, with respect to which completeness results are obtained. Axioms to strengthen the justification logic portions of these logics are considered. I close by developing an analogy between the dot operator of justification logic and theory fusion in relevant logics. (shrink)

This paper concerns the interface between relevant logics and recent developments in semantics for hyperintensional operators. In the latter area, the notion of topicality or aboutness has begun to play an explicit modeling role, with classes of models being studied which incorporate representations of topics, and of operations on topics. The idea is to use these topics in the evaluations of formulas including hyperintensional operators in order to explain why classically equivalent formulas may not be intersubstitutable in contexts using (...) those operators—though classically equivalent, if a pair of formulas can be interpreted to concern totally unrelated topics, then we should not be able to substitute one for the other in contexts which are sensitive to topics. Relevant logics, and the central relevance property of Variable Sharing, have been read as concerning something like topics in the past, and recently this angle on relevance has seen renewed interest. In this paper, I’ll develop and motivate a method for representing topics in the matrix models of logics, and apply this method to _R_ and its matrix models (given by De Morgan monoids) to argue that there is a clear semantic perspective on topicality according to which _R_ is topic-sensitive as a logic. (shrink)

I discuss a collection of problems in relevance logic. The main problems discussed are: the decidability of the positive semilattice system, decidability of the fragments of R in a restricted number of variables, and the complexity of the decision problem for the implicational fragment of R. Some related problems are discussed along the way.

There is an intuition, notoriously difficult to formalise, that only some predicates express real properties. J. M. Dunn formalises this intuition with relevance logic, proposing a notion of relevant predication. For each first order formula Ax, Dunn specifies another formula that is intuitively interpreted as "Ax expresses a real property". Chapter I calls such an approach an object language approach, since the claim that Ax expresses a real property is rendered as a formula in the object language. On (...) a metalanguage approach, on the other hand, the claim that Ax expresses a real property would be metalinguistic, mentioning but not using the formula Ax. ;Our Introduction begins by investigating Dunn's motivation for relevant predication, and argues that it implicitly presupposes some interpretation of identity. Indeed, part of the dissertation's work is to use relevant predication as a key to a coherent account of relevant identity. ;Chapter I re-motivates relevant predication. We consider P. Geach's distinction between real and "Cambridge" change, and suggest that there is an underlying distinction between real and Cambridge predicates. We further argue that no classical object language approach can formalise this distinction. So we turn to relevance logic, remotivating relevant predication, with Geach's distinction in mind. ;In light of this new motivation, we argue that relevant prediction relies on a logically weak notion of identity, according to which "x = y" means "x and y share all relevant properties". Identity is taken up in a more technical setting in Chapters IV and V. ;Subsequent chapters investigate technical issues that flow from Chapter I. Chapter II investigates metalinguistic grammatical characterisations of relevant predication. Chapter III concerns the semantics of first order relevance logic. Chapter IV investigates the identity in R and its relationship to relevant predication. In particular, Chapter IV argues against introducing the axiom, $\to$ Ay), in relevance logic, since the resulting systems are unstable, in a sense motivated by the notion of relevant identity underlying Dunn's notion of relevant predication. Finally Chapter V investigates the possibility of a coherent theory of identity in R's modal relatives ${\bf R}\sp\square$ and E. (shrink)

In this paper, the positive fragment of the logic math formula of contraction-less relevant implication is extended with the addition of a paraconsistent negation connective similar to the strong negation connective in Nelson's paraconsistent four-valued logic math formula. This extended relevant logic is called math formula, and it has the property of constructible falsity which is known to be a characteristic property of math formula. A Gentzen-type sequent calculus math formula for math formula is introduced, (...) and the cut-elimination and decidability theorems for math formula are proved. Two extended Routley-Meyer semantics are introduced for math formula, and the completeness theorems with respect to these semantics are proved. (shrink)

This paper surveys important work done in relevant logic in the past 10 years.

This paper provides an interpretation of the Routley-Meyer semantics for a weak negation-free relevant logic using Israel and Perry's theory of information. In particular, Routley and Meyer's ternary accessibility relation is given an interpretation in information-theoretic terms.

The semantics I develop extend an approach to logic called preservationism. The preservationist approach to logic interprets non-classical consequence relations as preserving something other than truth. I specifically extend a preservationist approach, due to Bryson Brown, which interprets various paraconsistent consequence relations as preserving measures of ambiguity. Relevant logics are constructible by extending one of these logics with an implication connective. I develop a formal semantics which I show to be adequate for interesting relevant logics. I (...) argue that the semantics I develop extend the preservationist approach to relevant logic by showing how the approach treats the implication connective. I conclude by arguing that some of the most pressing objections to the standard semantics for relevant logics do not apply to the ambiguity preservation account. (shrink)

We show that provability in the implicational fragment of relevance logic is complete for doubly exponential time, using reductions to and from coverability in branching vector addition systems.

Relevance logics came of age with the one and only International Conference on relevant logics in 1974. They did not however become accepted, or easy to promulgate. In March 1981 we received most of the typescript of IN MEMORIAM: ALAN ROSS ANDERSON Proceedings of the International Conference of Relevant Logic from the original editors, Kenneth W. Collier, Ann Gasper and Robert G. Wolf of Southern Illinois University. 1 They had, most unfortunately, failed to find a publisher - (...) not, it appears, because of overall lack of merit of the essays, but because of the expense of producing the collection, lack of institutional subsidization, and doubts of publishers as to whether an expensive collection of essays on such an esoteric, not to say deviant, subject would sell. We thought that the collection of essays was still (even after more than six years in the publishing trade limbo) well worth publishing, that the subject would remain undeservedly esoteric in North America while work on it could not find publishers (it is not so esoteric in academic circles in Continental Europe, Latin America and the Antipodes) and, quite important, that we could get the collection published, and furthermore, by resorting to local means, published comparatively cheaply. It is indeed no ordinary collection. It contains work by pioneers of the main types of broadly relevant systems, and by several of the most innovative non-classical logicians of the present flourishing logical period. We have slowly re-edited and reorganised the collection and made it camera-ready. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out a semantics for identity in relevant logic that is based on an analogy between the biconditional and identity. This analogy supports the semantics that Priest has set out for identity in basic relevant logic and it motivates a version of the Routley–Meyer semantics in which identities can be viewed as constraints on the ternary relation that is used to treat implication.