Public versus private is an ongoing concern in communication. This book examines this phenomenon through self-representational writing and the philosophical lens of Hannah Arendt’s public versus private theory, the Boundary Management theory, and the Parasocial Framework theory to examine the first social networking platform: personal blogs.

Albert Einstein's most important public and private political writings are put into historical context in this firsthand view of how one of the twentieth century's greatest minds responded to the political challenges of his day.

This article examines the design and situated employment of reported `private thoughts' in both everyday and institutional interaction. By reported `private thoughts' we mean the `active voicing' of utterances characterized as `private thought' done in the first place for the speaker-feeler, rather than the listener. Examples are drawn from a large UK collection of over 240 instances from domestic telephone calls, interview talk, therapy sessions, and patient—provider interactions. Instead of treating reported `private thoughts' (...) as neutral and transparent descriptions of the inner mind, we focus on their `brought off ' nature. Drawing on the cumulative resources of conversation analysis and discursive psychology, we focus on lexical and non-lexical features of their design and its similarity to direct reported speech. We go on to illustrate the flexibilities of positioning reporting `private thoughts' affords, that is, how they can be done for the self as a `one-off ', as generalized or hypothetical and how they can be done for others. Our analyses draw attention to how `private thoughts' might be considered as a speaker's resource for handling everyday rational accountability in reporting and explaining actions and events. (shrink)

A critical study of the private, homoerotic, interracial photographs taken by Carl Van Vechten, a patron of the arts of black America, presents an array of sixty duotone photographs that celebrate the sensuality of the nude male form, accompanied by an analysis of the relationship of the images to the photographer's private desires and the underground gay culture of the era.

It has gone largely unnoticed that when Deleuze opposes the “private thinker” to the “public professor,” he is invoking the existential thought of Lev Shestov. The public professor defends established values and preaches submission to the demands of reason and the State; the private thinker opposes thought to reason, “idiocy” to common sense, a people to come to what exists. Private thinkers are solitary, singular and untimely, forced to think against consensus and “the crowd.” Deleuze takes from (...) Shestov and Kierkegaard the idea that genuine thinking manifests itself in a thinking which rebels against rational necessity, a theme central to Shestov’s leading French interpreter, Benjamin Fondane. Although Deleuze at first expresses doubts as to whether Shestov’s critique of reason can overcome the legislative reason of Kant, or whether it is entirely free of ressentiment, I argue that Shestov and Fondane’s anti-rationalism is more radical than Deleuze sometimes admits, and show how Deleuze’s attitude toward Shestov became more unreservedly positive over the years. On the other hand, against Shestov and Fondane, I agree with Deleuze that the private thinker is in solidarity with the “strange powers” which can remake the world, and thus with “the people to come.” Nonetheless, I argue that Deleuze’s philosophy cannot form the basis of a politics of egalitarian consensus, but that “the people to come” can only be a “broken chain” of untimely and singular exceptions. (shrink)

These essays, by widely respected scholars in fields ranging from social and political theory to historical sociology and cultural studies, illuminate the significance of the public/private distinction for an increasingly wide range of ...

One of the most perceptive and ambidextrous social commentators of our day, Augustinian scholar Jean Bethke Elshtain furnishes in ever fresh ways through her writings a bridge between the ancient and the modern, between politics and ethics, between timeless moral wisdom and cultural sensitivity. To read Elshtain seriously is to take the study of culture as well as the "permanent things" seriously. But Elshtain is no mere moralist. Neither is she content solely to dwell in the domain of the theoretical. (...) For it is Elshtain the citizen - the creatively engaged and contributing citizen - whom the reader encounters on virtually every page of her writings. But reader beware: Elshtain does not shy away from controversy. At the same time, she is anything but a controversialist. In the essay that follows, several prominent themes that emerge from Elstain's writings - civic responsibility, justice, gender, and war - are considered afresh. Whether one agrees with her positions or not, one is forced to confess in the end that she cares deeply about the common good. And this alone makes her required reading for any engaged citizen of the republic. (shrink)

The philosophical risks of politics -- Reflective simplification: the questions of a philosophical life -- Poverty eternal -- Life near the bone -- Wildness: the phenomenology of freedom -- How to mind your own business -- The fullness of life.

In this paper I critically examine recent developments in intellectual property law. In particular, from a point of view informed primarily by Marx and Foucault, I study (a) the rhetoric surrounding the Metallica lawsuit against Napster; (b) a pair of conflicting trademark cases surrounding the ownership of a word on the Internet; and (c) the software industry's move to win approval for “shrink-wrap” or “click here” licenses. I conclude that these developments indicate a new form of disciplinary power, where people (...) are individuated ex ante as consumers. Despite the celebrations of market cyberlibertarians, this move actually masks an increase in overt state power as the state apparatus is invoked to force individuals to agree to behave as disciplined consumers and accede to the system in the first place. (shrink)

This article argues that the notion that state and religion should be strictly separated, resulting in a condition that is often captured by the metaphor of the “public-private divide,” is both unfounded and dangerous. It is unfounded in the sense that at least in modern functional democracies, the state and religion are not actually separated but are in fact constantly interacting and affecting one another. It is dangerous in the sense that if church and state could truly be separated, (...) it would pose an existential threat to modern democratic-constitutional governance. (shrink)

What is the moral, spiritual, and educative function of philosophy and literature in modern lives? Such a large question is rarely posed by philosophers or literary theorists these days, but one philosopher who has put it at the top of his agenda is Richard Rorty. His general answer is that both literature and philosophy serve distinct ends: the private end of personal fulfilment through the redescription of experiences and the possibility of self-creation, and the public end of expanded horizons (...) of moral imagination and spheres of solidarity. In what follows I will take a closer look at Rorty’s proposal. I begin by situating it as a contribution to philosophical discussions of the ‘problems of modernity’. Second, I draw attention to an important but sometimes neglected thought that underscores Rorty’s proposal: the alliance of philosophy and literature in making sense of modern lives. With this background in place, in the third section I consider the distinctive version of the private/public split that Rorty invokes, which can be regarded as his version of worldmaking in modernity. I argue that Rorty’s version of the distinction has more going for it than some critics have been prepared to grant, and that it at least provides a basis for further reflection on the important question it helps to answer. (shrink)

In this book, Gobetti combines political theory with the history of political thought to question the conceptual conventions and tacit assumptions which surround the concepts of private and public. In seeking the foundations of the modern liberal conception of private and public, she traces it to modern Natural Law thinkers, in particular Locke and Hutcheson. By developing a revised interpretation of 17th century natural jurisprudence, which recognizes that every adult controls an individual or private domain, as well (...) as engaging in political, community or public interaction, Gobetti raises interesting questions about the politics of participation in modern society. (shrink)

Near the end of 'Naming the Colours', Lewis (1997) makes an interesting claim about the relationship between linguistic and mental content; we are typically unable to read the content of a belief off the content of a sentence used to express that belief or vice versa. I call this view autonomism. I motivate and defend autonomism and discuss its importance in the philosophy of mind and language. In a nutshell, I argue that the different theoretical roles that mental and linguistic (...) content play suggest these kinds of content should be understood as sensitive to different things. (shrink)

For behavior analysis, ontological concerns are linked with pragmatism, rather than any stance on the inherent nature of the thing studied. Thus, behavior analysis regards as troublesome ontological commitments that formulate certain covert events as "mental" rather than behavioral because those commitments are antithetical to the effective prediction and control of natural phenomena. Moreover, a helpful recognition is that neither behavior nor environment need be publicly observable. Rather, they may be accessible to only one, but nevertheless in the behavioral dimension.

The cases of corruption reported by the media tend almost always to involve a private party (a citizen or a corporation) that pays, or promises to pay, money to a public party (a politician or a public official, for example) in order to obtain an advantage or avoid a disadvantage. Because of the harm it does to economic efficiency and growth, and because of its social, political and ethical consequences, private-to-public corruption has been widely studied. Private-to-private (...) corruption, by contrast, has been relatively neglected and only recently has started to receive the attention it deserves. The purpose of this paper is to offer some thoughts on the nature and importance of private-to-private corruption; the legal treatment it receives in some of the world''s leading countries; and the measures that companies can take to combat it, with special consideration of its ethical aspects. (shrink)

Mark S. Cladis pinpoints the origins of contemporary notions of the public and private and their relationship to religion in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His thesis cuts across many fields and issues-philosophy of religion, women's studies, democratic theory, modern European history, American culture, social justice, privacy laws, and notions of solitude and community-and wholly reconsiders the political, cultural, and legal nature of modernity in relation to religion. Turning to Rousseau's Garden, its inhabitants, the Solitaires, and the question of (...) restoration and redemption that preoccupied much of Rousseau's thought, Cladis examines how Rousseau addressed the tension between the joys and moral obligations of social engagement and the desire for solitude. He was caught between two possibilities: active involvement in the creation of an enlightened and humane society or extrication from social entanglements in favor of cultivating a spiritual interior life. Yet Rousseau did not view this conflict as a desperate division. Rather, for him it was a moral struggle to be endured by those who had fallen from the Garden. For this edition Cladis has added a substantive introduction that discusses the role of religion in contemporary democratic societies, particularly in American public life. Cladis proposes four models of thinking about religion in public and champions what he calls spiritual democracy-a dynamic, culturally specific, and progressive democracy. Cladis argues that spiritual democracy refers not only to a society's legal codes and principles but also to its democratic culture and symbols and its daily practices and institutions. It encompasses the nation's character, diverse identities, and a distinctivel exchange between the nation's public vision and citizens' complex, private lives. (shrink)

Patricia Werhane synthesizes much of later Wittgensteinian thought, bringing together disparate arguments into a coherent text. Keeping in mind what Wittgenstein set out to accomplish in his later writings, the introduction of new material on the private language arguments, and the philosophical significance of these claims, Werhane develops the thesis that the notion of a rule is such a constitutive of language that a private language is impossible. Such a conclusion challenges many contemporary readings of the Philosphical Investigations (...) by bringing into question conventionalism, linguistic relativism, and idealism while defending the thesis that the notion of a private psychological experience makes sense. (shrink)

'Thoughts on Life and Religion' is a compilation of essays by F. Max Müller, a renowned scholar who lived with the belief that everything in life happens for our own good, even if we cannot always understand it. This collection includes passages from his published works, as well as his private letters and unfinished writings. Müller's unwavering trust in a higher power gave him strength through difficult times, including the loss of loved ones and his own illness. The (...) book covers a wide range of topics, from Christianity and the Bible to language and music, providing insights into Müller's views on life and religion. (shrink)

This article deals with the issue of the abolition of both property and family for the Guardians in Plato's Republic. My aim is to show that such abolition answers to the problem of the art of ruling raised in Book I: how can the rulers rule not in their own interest, but rather in the interest of the ruled? The abolition of property and family changes the very economic and social framework of the city, leading to an identity of the (...) private interests of the rulers and of the common interests of the polis, by establishing a koinÜnia among the Guardians and a relationship of interdependence between them and the producers. Nevertheless, the exclusion of the lower class from the abolition of property and family creates a situation of fundamental asymmetry in the relationship between the classes and renders ambiguous the manner in which the producers belong to the city, creating in this way a 'differential inclusion into citizenship'. (shrink)

It is often said that the claims of man and citizen are irreconcilable in the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This view, most famously articulated by Judith Shklar, holds that the making of a man and the making of a citizen are to be understood as rival enterprises or competing alternatives. This reading has recently been challenged by Frederick Neuhouser. He argues that one can make a man and a citizen, but only if the education of each is performed in the (...) absence of the other. In his view, Emile is raised to be a man first (Books I–IV) before his subsequent instruction in citizenship (Book V). This paper challenges both views. I argue that the making of man and citizen are, in principle, neither rival enterprises nor competing alternatives, and that although Neuhouser is indeed correct to argue for a successive system of education, the making of a citizen is not completed in Emile, but extends into the Social Contract. His account diminishes the crucial role the Lawgiver plays in the fashioning of citizens capable of discerning the general will. I show that although raising individuals under a system of private instruction does not preclude their transformation into citizens but makes such a transformation possible, it is on its own incapable of making citizens. (shrink)

A company of buccaneers invites comparison with states founded on the social contracts of Hobbes and Locke. These companies were formed by an explicit contract, the articles of agreement, and transgressors risked being marooned in a literal state of nature. Buccaneers were relatively powerful and their authority structure and share system was relatively democratic. The role of venture capitalists in organizing buccaneering may explain why parallels with Locke's social contract are particularly striking. Matthew Tindall attempted to exclude pirates and include (...) privateers in the social contract, but conceded that sufficiently powerful pirates themselves formed states. These comparisons highlight the problem of basing human rights on contract theory. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument holds that language requires rule-following, rule following requires the possibility of error, error is precluded in pure introspection, and inner mental life is known only by pure introspection, thus language cannot exist entirely within inner mental life. Fodor defends his Language of Thought program against the Private Language Argument with a dilemma: either privacy is so narrow that internal mental life can be known outside of introspection, or so broad that computer language serves as (...) a counter-example. I suggest that the developing field of artificial intelligence (deep learning neural networks) tends to vitiate Fodor’s defense and hence vindicate the Private Language Argument. The first horn of Fodor’s dilemma requires language to encompass genuinely internal mental life, i.e. non-projected intentional states, which are not exhibited in classical machine learning but only by deep learning neural networks (artificial intelligence). Such networks act as black boxes, however, whose state cannot be understood by tracking the changes in their supervenience bases without shared context, and that shared context introduces the possibility of error. The language of artificial intelligence is not private. (shrink)

This essay offers a standard by which to assess the feasibility of market anarchism. In anarchist thought, the concept of feasibility concerns both the ability and the willingness of private defense agencies to liberate their clients from state oppression. I argue that the emergence of a single stateless pocket of effective, privately-provided defense for a “reasonable” length of time is sufficient to affirm feasibility. I then consider the failure of private defense agencies to achieve even this standard. Furthermore, (...) I identify five possible explanations for the conspicuous absence of private defense agencies. These explanations are entrepreneurial, technological, or economic in nature, or result from a lack of consumer demand or a lack of incentive for violence specialists to refrain from aggression. Of these, only an economic deficiency renders anarchism intrinsically unworkable. (shrink)

Contemplating the nature, practice and study of private law, this comprehensive book offers a detailed overview of private law's theoretical dimensions. It promotes a reflective attitude towards the topic, encouraging the reader to question how private law is practiced and studied, what this implies for their own engagement in the field and what kind of private lawyer they want to be. Marc Loth explores the central notion that private law is a multi-layered system which can (...) only be fully apprehended in context. This thought-provoking book draws on examples from a range of legal systems to provide philosophical perspectives on the diverse dimensions of private law. Chapters examine the concept, history, language, values, methods and discipline of private law, as well as legal professionalism and the expertise of the private lawyer. Private Law in Context will be a key resource for scholars and postgraduate students interested in legal theory, legal philosophy, law and society and the nature of private law as a system and a practice. (shrink)

I will defend the claim that we need to differentiate between thinking and reasoning in order to make progress in understanding the intricate relation between language and mind. The distinction between thinking and reasoning will allow us to apply a structural equivalent of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument to the domain of mind and language. This argumentative strategy enables us to show that and how a certain subcategory of cognitive processes, namely reasoning, is constitutively dependent on language. The final (...) outcome and claim of this paper can be summarized as follows: We can think without language, but we cannot reason without language. While this still leaves several questions about the relation between mind and language unanswered, I hold that the insights defended in this paper provide the basis and proper framework for further investigation about the relationship between language and the mind.Keywords: Private language argument, Wittgenstein, thought/mind and language, reasoning, linguistic relativity, non-linguistic cognition. (shrink)

Lingualism claims there is no thought without language. At the other end of the theoretical spectrum, strong nativist 'Language of Thought' theories hold that public language is inessential to private thought. For an adequate empirical description of the ontogeny of thought and language, however, we need an intermediate position recognizing the dialectical interplay between pre-linguistic thought, language acquisition and the development of full-fledged linguistic reason. In this article recent findings from developmental and comparative psychology are reviewed that highlight the (...) need for such a dialectical picture. These findings concern basic cognitive capacities common to pre-linguistic infants and many non-linguistic animals, specific social-cognitive abilities in human infants that enable language acquisition, and the influence of language on the subsequent cognitive development. (shrink)

Many scholars of early China agree that the fourth century bce witnessed a surge in intellectual interest in concepts that have been dubbed the self, “subjectivity,” the private realm, and the body. As such a sphere came into greater focus in intellectual circles, so did a new discourse that evaluated what it meant to benefit or deprive the self and its related parts. The famous statement purportedly by Yang Zhu 楊朱 (or Yangzi 楊子) that claims he was not willing (...) to pluck out a single hair in order to benefit the world reminds us of such a discourse.2 Around the same time, there also emerged discussions that polarized various ideas of self and the private sphere (si 私), on the one hand, ver- sus the state and the public sphere (gong 公), on the other, especially in circles that concerned themselves with public policy and statecraft, but also more generally. These discussions formed a forceful counterpoint to the discourses involving human subjectivity and the body. Indeed, their open dislike of the influence of private, individual, and personal realms in politics strongly suggests that the statecraft writers were re- acting to and in dialog with those intellectuals who engaged discussion of subjectivity, the self, and its agencies. (shrink)

The case of highland Yemen up to around the middle of the twentieth century involves a history different from most Muslim societies in that, from 1919, the Yemeni state was independent. The problem I address concerns the utility of thinking about the highland property regime in this era in relation to the categories of "private" and "public." What sort of antecedents existed, at the level of property relations, for later commercial transformations that would culminate in such things as Pizza (...) Hut franchises? In Yemen, the polity of the period was a type of Islamic state, one based on the shari`a in ideology and in application and headed by a classical form of jurist-leader, a figure known as an imam. Prior to the twentieth century, this Yemeni form of a shari`a-based Islamic polity had a thousand year history in the highlands. Shari`a courts had exclusive competence as state tribunals, and judges, trained on old-style law books, heard the full gamut of litigation. By contrast, colonial changes in other Muslim societies typically entailed a sharp alteration and restriction of the sphere of the shari`a, often limiting application to the domain of "family law" alone. At the same time, the highlands had yet to commence the other great and, elsewhere, ongoing modern transformation of the shari`a, codification and legislation, which would not begin in Yemen until after the Revolution of 1962.Highland society at mid-century was agrarian, based primarily on settled plow cultivation, and the associated property regime was almost exclusively "private." In Yemen, the "private" property regime centered conceptually on milk, a category of individual ownership of immoveable property, and on the concept of mal, a commercial commodity. As a form of private, landed property, milk involved rights that could be acquired, alienated and inherited, and the associated agricultural production was based on lease contracts between landlords and sharecroppers. Pious endowments were the basis for one of the great Muslim "public" institutions, which supported mosques, schools, water systems, etc. Another fundamental "public" institution was an extension of the "private" commercial notion of mal into the state institution of the 'House of Mal,' or Treasury. Other key "public" institutions were the imamate itself, a form of Islamic state, and the shari`a court. This shari`a system can be thought of in terms of three levels of legal texts. At the highest level, shari`a doctrine, the jurisprudence of the period, constituted an ideology of the property regime. The doctrine provided models for both the range of substantive undertakings and for court processes, but the relationship of these models to the property relations and to litigation on the ground is a key question. At the lowest level, the routine documents of ongoing, uncontested practice proliferated. These included ordinary sale documents, leases, marriage contracts, endowment instruments, wills and estate inheritance instruments. Between high doctrine and low instruments were the records of shari`a court judgments, records in which the conflicts and contradictions of the property system were expressed, argued and ruled upon. In certain problem areas of the law, the ruling imams's personal doctrinal "choices" were designed to guide court judges in their rulings. (shrink)

Efforts to protect endangered species by regulating the use of privately owned lands are routinely resisted by appeal to the private property rights of landowners. Recently, the 'wise-use' movement has emerged as a primary representative of these landowners' claims. In addressing the issues raised by the wise-use movement and others like them, legal scholars and philosophers have typically examined the scope of private property rights and the extent to which these rights should influence public policy decisions when weighed (...) against other moral considerations. Whether from an anthropocentric standpoint or from a perspective of moral extensionism, the key question seems to be the extent to which prima facie property rights are overridden by other moral interests, not whether such rights claims can reasonably be appealed to at all in public discussions of environmental justice. I argue, however, that a morally extensionist perspective not only introduces more potential defeaters of prima facie property rights, but actually strips appeals to private property rights of their moral significance. Hence, I argue on Rawlsian grounds that appealing to private property rights in the way that the wise-use movement does is unreasonable in a pluralistic society. In so doing, I show that a Rawlsian perspective may be more congenial to the interests of moral extensionists than is typically thought. (shrink)

In reflecting about experience, philosophers are prone to fall into a dualism of conceptual scheme and pre-conceptual given, according to which the most basic judgments of experience are grounded in non-conceptual impingements on subjects of experience. This idea is dubiously coherent: relations of grounding or justification should hold between conceptually structured items. This thought has been widely applied to 'outer' experience; at least some of the Private Language Argument can be read as applying it to 'inner' experience. In this (...) light, Wittgenstein's suggestion that a sensation is 'not a something' seems infelicitous. The main point of this reading of Wittgenstein is in Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature', but Rorty locates the point in the context of a subtle materialism, and a 'communitarian' substitute for first-person authority, which seem non-Wittgensteinian. (shrink)

There are two common reactions to Frege’s claim that some senses and thoughts are private. Privatists accept both private senses and thoughts, while intersubjectivists don’t accept either. Both sides agree on a pair of tacit assumptions: first, that private senses automatically give rise to private thoughts; and second, that private senses and thoughts are the most problematic entities to which Frege’s remarks on privacy give rise. The aim of this paper is (...) to show that both assumptions are mistaken. This will motivate a so far neglected, reconciliatory position between privatism and intersubjectivism according to which all thoughts are public while some senses are private. (shrink)

Public law adjudication has grown dramatically in recent decades in many English-speaking countries. In the United States, and increasingly in other countries where it used to be rare for public questions to be decided in court, controversial questions of public policy are tried as constitutional or human rights issues and decided by court order. But in other areas of law - in everyday tort, contract, and property cases - court decisions are typically much less dramatic and seldom if ever announce (...) controversial innovations in public policy. Yet in private law cases too there are implicit questions of social justice.In common law countries, perhaps not surprisingly, tort, contract, and other private law cases are often decided on common law principles. Common law has a style and ethos of its own. It is based on precedent and, although precedent is open to modification, the common law style is anything but radical. With roots in the nineteenth century and earlier, common law often reflects classically liberal ideas, more or less consciously and more or less robustly.Instead of approaching private law cases with a common law mindset, should judges not treat these cases the way they might treat public law cases? Should courts not promote a vision of justice and human rights through private law adjudication, just as they sometimes - and in many countries increasingly - do in notable public law decisions?This article suggests several reasons why they should not. Turning private law more public in such a way would have considerable costs in legal stability, transparency, legitimacy, and judicial habits of neutrality and impartiality. Each of these considerations in turn is associated with what is generally thought of as the Rule of Law. The classically liberal ideas in the common law bloodstream themselves have at least some association with political freedom and the Rule of Law. And even if one is sceptical about classical liberalism and enthusiastic about today's public law, one might consider that public acceptance of ambitious public law adjudication may depend at least in part on the credit that courts build up through morally and politically unambitious day-to-day common law adjudication. (shrink)

Very little of the expanding debate over private policing has employed the language of human rights. This is notable not just because private policing is a distinctly global phenomenon, and human rights have become, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, “the lingua franca of global moral thought.” It is notable as well because a parallel development that seems in many ways related to the spread of private policing—the escalating importance of private military companies—has been debated as a (...) matter of human rights. This Article asks whether discussions of private policing have been impoverished by their failure to employ the language of human rights. It begins by discussing the dramatic rise, over the past several decades, in the size and significance of private policing. It then summarizes the academic and public policy debates about that development and considers what, if anything, the language of human rights could add to those debates, and whether the addition would be welcome. One strand of the Article compares the debate over private policing with the debate over private military companies. Another strand compares private policing with private prisons, in light of the recent ruling by the Supreme Court of Israel declaring private prisons unconstitutional. The Article concludes that the benefits of introducing the language of human rights into debates about private policing are far from clear—with one exception. Human rights, particularly as codified in international treaties, do seem a promising way to get traction on a particular aspect of police privatization that has received less attention than it deserves: the way in which widespread reliance on private security firms may weaken public commitment to providing everyone with a minimally acceptable degree of protection against private violence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Private Bioethics Forums:Counterpoint to Government BodiesCynthia B. Cohen (bio) and Elizabeth Leibold McCloskey (bio)Ethical issues associated with reproductive technologies quickly gain public attention. The front pages of newspapers have featured stories about grandmothers giving birth to their own grandchildren, couples "renting" wombs from surrogates, and researchers prepared to transplant fetal ovaries into women unable to produce viable eggs. With each new and bolder foray into reproductive realms, the (...) question of whether to set limits on the use of such technologies surfaces. An ancillary debate inevitably ensues about the proper forum for discussing and deciding such limits. The recent announcement of human embryo splitting or cloning research is no exception to this pattern. Articles in both the popular press and academic circles in the wake of the reported research contain lamentations about the absence of a national ethics body that could address the ethical issues raised by the cloning experiment. This research also breathed new life into congressional calls to create a government bioethics commission.1At times, it appears that the substantive questions raised by a procedure like cloning are subsumed under the debate about whether this ethics group or that should be convened to study the matter. But the forum in which options are discussed is as crucial to the development of sound ethical thought and public policy as are the conclusions themselves. Thus, we address the question of whether a private, as opposed to a public, bioethics body provides a distinctively useful forum for reaching an understanding of issues such as cloning that have significant ethical and public policy implications.A 1993 Office of Technology Assessment report, in which the authors suggest that a new federal bioethics commission might be useful, has helped to frame recent discussions about the value of government-sponsored bioethics bodies (Office of Technology Assessment 1993). To most people, the question of whether a national forum for bioethics is needed is synonymous with the question of whether a new federal body should be convened. Yet the existence of the National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction (NABER) suggests that the scope of the question should be broadened. [End Page 283]NABER was born in 1992, in part as a response to an Institute of Medicine report on infertility. That document endorsed the formation of a nongovernment body to develop guidelines for assisted reproductive measures and fetal research in the event that a government body was not forthcoming (Institute of Medicine 1989). NABER, which was founded by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Fertility Society, now functions wholly independently of those groups and is supported by private foundations including the Ford, Greenwall, and Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundations and the Walter and Elise Haas Fund. NABER has issued a report on ethical issues related to the use of fetal tissue (Cohen and Jonsen 1993), is about to publish a report and background papers on oocyte donation, and presents a report on human cloning in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. In addition, it has developed a protocol for NABER review of research proposals from federal agencies subject to federal guidelines on the use of human subjects in research.Thus, in function and form, NABER was envisioned as a substitute for a government body, and it now functions in a manner similar to several types of government bioethics groups. Like the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (National Commission) and the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (President's Commission), NABER functions primarily through the publication of reports intended for a broad audience of practitioners, patients, policymakers, and the general public. Just as the Ethics Advisory Board of the late 1970s examined ethical issues related to specific protocols or types of research as they arose, NABER's purposes include scrutinizing the ethics of various research efforts in the reproductive area.NABER also parallels past government bodies in form. Like these groups, NABER is a multidisciplinary board that meets regularly and is supplemented by consultants and staff who provide research and writing for the board. Its members are nationally recognized in... (shrink)

This dissertation is an investigation into the relation between mind and language from different perspectives, split up into three interrelated but still, for the most part, self-standing parts. Parts I and II are concerned with the question how thought is affected by language while Part III investigates the scope covered by mind and language respectively. Part I provides a reconstruction of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous Private Language Argument in order to apply the rationale behind this line of argument to the (...) relation between mind and language. This argumentative strategy yields the conclusion that reasoning – an important type of thought – is constitutively dependent on language possession and is therefore not available to non-linguistic creatures. This result is achieved by considering the preconditions for reasoning – given that it is a rule-governed activity – and eliminating competitors to language for providing reasoners with what it takes to reason. Part II provides a critical outlook on the wide and highly heterogeneous field of linguistic relativity theories. It is argued that no kind of linguistic relativity whatsoever follows from the conclusion of Part I – i.e., the claim that reasoning is constitutively dependent on having a language. While Part II does not provide a conclusive argument against the linguistic relativity hypothesis, it is argued that endorsement of linguistic relativity theories often rests on a mistaken assumption to the effect that language and culture are interwoven in a way which makes it impossible to separate culture and language, as well as their respective studies. This assumption is undermined by providing examples of languages which clearly predate their culture or do not even have a culture at all. So, the assumption that language and culture are inextricably intertwined is refuted by way of counterexample. Part III provides an in-depth examination of the Principle of Expressibility – prominently endorsed and formulated by John Searle – which claims that whatever can be thought can also be said. The domains of what can be thought and of what can be said are considered in set theoretic terms in order to determine whether one is contained in the other, so that everything we can think can also be adequately communicated. After thorough study of interpretative issues regarding the Principle of Expressibility and consideration of the most pressing potential counterexamples to the principle, we can conclude that we have good reason to believe in the truth of the Principle of Expressibility. In conclusion, the achieved results are related back to prominent positions in the discussion about thought and language which already make their appearance in the very beginning of this investigation. The final chapter of this dissertation reminds us that eminent figures in philosophy have often taken a wrongheaded perspective on the relation between language and thought, so that language has frequently appeared to be an impediment to thought. We can, however, confidently conclude that language, on the contrary, is by far our most apt means for thought and that reasoning would not even be possible without the resources language provides. (shrink)

This book explores the ethics around everything connected with setting up and running a therapy private practice. Offering a hands-on approach to realistic ethical dilemmas encountered by the private practitioner, the book examines the everyday management of practice, and the context of ethical issues in contemporary private practice. Chapters explore the fundamentals of some of the most common ethical considerations in private practice, providing space for the reader to think creatively about how they use their preferred (...) ethical framework, and how that may be translated into an individually tailored approach for each client, and for each private practice. The book provides exercises, examples, and vignettes, in addition to the author's own unique working model, to help the reader bring theoretical reflections into their own everyday practice. Relational Ethics in Psychotherapy and Counselling Private Practice will help private practitioners feel more confident and grounded in their private practice and up-to-date with developing thoughts. It will also appeal to training institutes, supervisors, and students. (shrink)

A thoughtful addition to the growing debate over public and private morality. Looks at lying and deception in law, family, medicine, government.

The precise relationship between Hobbes's political philosophy and his late history of the English Civil War remains something of a puzzle. Given his well known doubts about the epistemological status of history, Behemoth or the Long Parliament is often treated as little more than a procrustean effort at forcing complex historical events into the bed of abstract theory that he had developed earlier. On this view, even Noam Flinker, who offers one of the few studies devoted to a close reading (...) of Behemoth, argues that Hobbes intended the work to be self repudiating, and that the dialogue form and the apparent confusions of one of the participants were meant to point readers to �the less rhetorical logic of the Leviathan�. Others, more impressed by Hobbes�s pragmatic intentions than his methodological pretensions, note that a primary motive for his political arguments was a horror at first of the prospect and then of the reality of civil war. They thus emphasize the significance of Behemoth for Hobbes and his interpreters. Robert Kraynak, for example, argues that it �is a work of primary importance� in completing the �history of civilization which is the logical beginning point of Hobbes's thought�, and that a complete understanding of his political theory is impossible without his analysis of the way in which �doctrinal politics and disputative science� had created political chaos in England. This interpretation correctly emphasizes the role of ideas, as opposed to economic interests, in his explanation of civil conflict. It also rightly notes didactic continuities between Behemoth and his earlier work. However, I argue below that it overestimates the extent to which Hobbes treats the general idea of opinion as an eliminable product of �artificial� historical relations rather than as a permanent feature of human psychology and action. Thus, it discounts the extent to which his understanding of the relationship between opinion and civil war was a product of his philosophy rather than of a 'history of civilization'. (shrink)

The positions on private landownership of two libertarian scholars thought to have a wide following in that movement are examined The libertarians —Murray Rothbard and Robert Nozick—hold positions which are untenable. Rothbard's theory is almost indistinguishable from John Locke's and rests on the labor theory of ownership and the admixture theory of labor; standards which are too vague. Nozick believes that making something valuable gives a right of ownership, but again the standard is too ambiguous. And it is necessary (...) to appropriate a thing before one can improve it. The value added theory permits a utilitarian justification of landownership involving the payment of compensation to non-owners. (shrink)

Philosophy (and its corollaries in the human sciences such as literary, social and political theory) is distinguished from other disciplines by a more thoroughgoing emphasis on the a priori. Philosophy makes no claims to predictive power; nor does it aim to conform to popular opinion (beyond ordinary intuitions as recorded by ‘thought experiments’). Many philosophers view the discipline’s self-exemption from ‘real world’ empirical testing as a non-issue or even an advantage, in allowing philosophy to focus on universal and necessary truths. (...) This article argues otherwise. The non-instrumentality of philosophical discourse renders it into a collective private language, impairing the discipline’s ability to judge the quality of its own output. The natural sciences and other technical disciplines offer the non-expert ‘windows of scrutiny’ into their respective methodologies, through numerous findings that can be easily and independently tested by amateurs. Such outside scrutiny provides a mechanism of external quality control, mitigating the internal effects of cognitive bias and institutionalised conformity upon the discourses of technical disciplines. In contrast, the conclusions of philosophy are not testable without in-depth knowledge of the methods by which they are arrived at; knowledge which can apparently only be gained through an extensive program of study, in philosophy. This epistemic circularity renders the program (even one of self-study) into a ‘black box’ in which the internal influence of cognitive biases and conformity effects cannot be independently assessed. The black box of philosophy is, in all relevant respects, analogous to the black box of the Cartesian mind that is the subject of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. (shrink)