Há alguns anos atrás, algumas pessoas acreditavam que a tese de que a existência não é um predicado, uma tese defendida por autoridades como Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell, era um dos traços distintivos da chamada filosofia analítica. Que uma tal crença é afinal falsa pode ser tomado como mais um sinal da vitalidade e do anti-dogmatismo que caracterizam em geral a tradição analítica; e o mesmo se aplica a quaisquer outras crenças do género, que comprometam esta tradição com teses (...) filosóficas substantivas. O meu propósito neste ensaio é duplo. Por um lado, descrevo o estado actual da questão relativamente ao venerável tópico da existência, caracterizando e examinando as principais teorias disponíveis. Por outro, argumento a favor de um ponto de vista específico sobre o tópico. Esse ponto de vista consiste na conjunção das seguintes três teses: (F) Não há objectos não-existentes; (H*) A existência é um predicado; e (H**) As afirmações de existência não são uniformes quanto à forma lógica, tendo por vezes a forma de quantificações existenciais e por vezes a forma de predicações monádicas de primeira ordem. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show that the scholastic commentaries on the Predicables or Categorems (in Porphiry Eisagoge) constituted a style of treatises on the philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. In such studies, called afterwards “Material Logic”, is considered, for instance, the theme of the domain of logic and the possibility of its construction; furthermore, logic is relates to ontology through the problem of universals. Here is explored to logical being (ens rationis) which is the (...) objectum (subject) of this discipline, and is analized the structure of proposition and the nature of the main constitutives of inference. In the side of Philosophy of Language are located the study of the meaning of subjects and predicates (or predicables), that of the proposition formed by them, also a hierarchy of logical types (and semantical ones), and the principles of the ordained disposition of natural kinds and other classifications. They are things that now attract the interest of philosophers of logic and philosophers of languagewithin the analytic tradition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Did Hobbes Have a Semantic Theory of Truth? WILLEM R. DEJONG 1. INTRODUCTION THE qUESTIONRAISEDin the title of this article may strike the reader as a bit anachronistic. A phrase like 'semantic theory of truth' evokes associations with rather recent developments in logic, especially the work of Alfred Tarski. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that Hobbes made important observations of a semantical nature. Moreover, in an interesting article still (...) frequently referred to, R. M. Martin has argued that Hobbes "has in mind a clear-cut semantical concept of truth."' Examining Hobbes's semantical ideas somewhat more closely than Martin did, T6rnebohm has given a more precise characterization of Hobbes's view on truth and falsity; he speaks of Hobbes's comprehension theory of truth. ~One of the main purposes of this article is to investigate whether such a theory is correctly attributed to Hobbes. For Tarski 'true' and 'false' are predicates of (declarative) sentences) But this is not enough to speak of a semantic theory of truth: The leading idea behind Tarski's fundamental work in the field of semantics is (a restricted version of) the principle of compositionality. This principle, also known as Frege's principle, says that the semantic value of a (complex) expression is a function of the semantic values of the syntactic (and categorematic) parts it is ' R. M. Martin, "On the Semantics of Hobbes," Philosophyand PhenomenologicalResearch 14 095314): 2o5-11, esp. ~o7, 211. Cf. I. C. Hungerland and G. R. Vick, "Hobbes's Theory of Language, Speech and Reasoning," in ThomasHobbes:Computatwsire Logica--Logic, translated and commentary by A. Martinich, ed. and introduced by I. C. Hungerland and G. R. Vick (New York: 1981), 15--167, esp. 17, 121-22. 9 H. T6rnebohm, "A Study in Hobbes' Theory of Denotation and Truth," Theor~a26 (196o): 53-7o; see p. 66. 3 A. Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch4 (1944): 341-375; see p. 342. [63] 64 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 199o composed of. Moreover, in the case of linguistic expressions which are (deciarative ) sentences this semantic value should be its truth-value. 4 As we shall see, Hobbes's theory of propositions is basically a theory of subject-predicate propositions. It is therefore reasonable to qualify his theory of truth as a semantic one only if it satisfies Frege's principle to a certain extent. Ideally, this means that the truth-value of subject-predicate propositions should be conceived as a function of the semantic interpretations of its subject and predicate. In the next three sections I will concentrate principally on the logicosyntactical aspects of language. I will then discuss successively the general structure of propositions, the various sorts of names, and the syntax of Hobbes's theory of propositions. Section 5 is devoted to Hobbes's theory of truth as interpreted by Martin and T0rnebohm. The outcome of this examination makes it necessary to break away from Martin's restricted conception of semantics. Martin, like Tarski, takes semantics as "semantics in the narrower sense," i.e., as the discipline Quine refers to as the theory of reference. 5 However, sometimes this term is used in a broader sense; the field of semantics is taken then to include the theory of meaning too. Although the wording differs frequently, the distinction between meaning and reference is almost a constant in the history of thinking about language. On the side of meaning one finds terms like connotation, intension, conception, signification and analyticity, while terms like naming, denoting, extension (and sometimes again signification) are ]inked to the notion of reference. In the Computatio sive Logica, the first part of De Corpore, containing Hobbes's most mature work on the philosophy of language, this opposition is displayed by way of a distinction between, on the one side, nominare, denotare and appellare and, on the other side, significare. Hobbes's view of the significative, as opposed to the denotative, role of linguistic expressions is treated in sections 6, 7, and 8. There it will be shown that Hobbes's radical nominalism is decisive for his doctrine of signification; moreover, this nominalism raises serious problems for the relation... (shrink)

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle imposes some requirements on the formulation of scientific propositions: their terms must be able to perform the role of subject as well as of predicate; their terms should be universal; every demonstration must involve “primary” subjects denoted by terms that “cannot be said of another underlying subject”. Several interpreters, inspired by theses from the Categories, believed that this third requirement refers to names and descriptions of particular substances as basic subjects of predicative statements, since they (...) cannot perform the logical role of predicate. However, such reading puts the third requirement in conflict with the other two. I shall argue that this interpretation is wrong and that the third requirement does not assign to singular terms the function of basic subjects of scientific discourse, but rather acknowledges that substantial predicates have a certain prerogative to occur in denoting phrases. Consequently, Aristotle’s three demands turn out to be compatible with one another. (shrink)

The intention here is that of giving a formal underpinning to the idea of ‘meaning-is-use’ which, even if based on proofs, it is rather different from proof-theoretic semantics as in the Dummett–Prawitz tradition. Instead, it is based on the idea that the meaning of logical constants are given by the explanation of immediate consequences, which in formalistic terms means the effect of elimination rules on the result of introduction rules, i.e. the so-called reduction rules. For that we suggest an extension (...) to the Curry– Howard interpretation which draws on the idea of labelled deduction, and brings back Frege’s device of variable-abstraction to operate on the labels (i.e., proof-terms) alongside formulas of predicate logic. (shrink)

It is shown that for arithmetical interpretations that may include free variables it is not the Guaspari-Solovay system R that is arithmetically complete, but their system R⁻. This result is then applied to obtain the nonvalidity of some rules under arithmetical interpretations including free variables, and to show that some principles concerning Rosser orderings with free variables cannot be decided, even if one restricts onself to "usual" proof predicates.

This paper is about the concept of semantically closed languages. Roughly speaking, those are languages which can name their own sentences and apply to them semantic predicates, such as the truth or satisfaction predicates. Hence, they are “self-referential languages,” in the sense that they are capable of producing sentences about themselves or other sentences in the same language. In section one, we introduce the concept informally; in section two, we provide the formal definition of first-order semantically closed languages, which is (...) the Tarskian definition with some technical modifications. Then, we construct a semantic for this kind of language, and prove that the language is indeed semantically closed (according to Definition 1). Finally, we discuss whether the logic underlying the construction is classical, and future goals of this research. (shrink)

After a discussion of the different treatments in the literature of vacuous descriptions, the notion of descriptor is slightly generalized to function descriptor Ⅎ $\overset \rightarrow \to{y}(x)$ , so as to form partial functions φ = Ⅎ $y(\overset \rightarrow \to{x}).A(\overset \rightarrow \to{x},y)$ which satisfy $\forall \overset \rightarrow \to{x}z(z=\phi \overset \rightarrow \to{x}\leftrightarrow \forall y(A(\overset \rightarrow \to{x},y)\leftrightarrow y=z))$ . We use (intuitionistic, classical or intermediate) logic with existence predicate, as introduced by D. S. Scott, to handle partial functions, and prove that adding (...) function descriptors to a theory based on such a logic is conservative. For theories with quantification over functions, the situation is different: there the addition of Ⅎ yields new theorems in the Ⅎ-free fragment, but an axiomatisation is easily given. The proofs are syntactical. (shrink)

This paper is a comparative analysis of the Logica Campsale Anglici, valde utilis et realis contra Ocham , from an anonymous author known as pseudo Richard of Campsall, and Ockham’s Summa logicae , in answer to which the former was written. We summarize both authors’s fundamental positions on five key issues: 1) the synonymy between abstract and concrete terms, 2) the reference of primary and secondary intentions, 3) the nature of the relations of predication between terms in propositions, 4) the (...) status of the “passions of the soul” and 5) the prime signification of spoken words. Our aim is to sketch the polemic between Nominalism and Realism in the second decade of the XIVth century. (shrink)

En contra de una interpretación separatista, este artículo aboga por la existencia de una unidad entre la filosofía teórica y la filosofía práctica del bien en Aristóteles; al mismo tiempo, sugiere que su investigación se realice teniendo en cuenta la manera como se corresponden dos principios del pensamiento aristotélico: por un lado, el bien y la justicia no son cualidades necesarias , que es la tesis de los escritos teóricos; y, por otro, no hay manera de adquirir el bien para (...) el hombre, sino a través de la virtud, que es un hábito selectivo de lo bueno conforme a la razón –que es la tesis de los escritos prácticos. En el análisis de estos principios y su relación se descubre un tema más de fondo en la filosofía aristotélica: el concepto formal de bien es insuficiente para hacer bueno a un hombre, aunque no pueda ser suprimido en la explicación de su carácter moral. Against a separatist interpretation, this paper argues for the existence of a unity between Aristotle's theoretical and practical philosophy of goodness. At the same time, it suggests that this unity should be discovered in the correspondence of two principles: the goodness and justice are predicated according to more and less, which is the principle of his theoretical or logical writings and the principle saying that the only way to get a good end is through virtue, which is a selective habit of good things according to reason –which is the thesis of his practical treatises. The analysis of these two principles and their relations discovers a deeper issue in Aristotelian philosophy: the formal concept of goodness is insufficient to make good a man, although it cannot be suppressed in the explanation of the moral character of man. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se examinan algunos de los problemas suscitados por el análisis lógico de la predicación colectiva. Su tratamiento habitual en lógica de primer orden no es del todo satisfactorio, y la búsqueda de otros modos de representación abre interesantes perspectivas. Se investiga, en particular, la introducción de predicados poligraduados, señalando algunas deficiencias e insuficiencias en la literatura reciente sobre los mismos. Argumento que la oposición colectivo/distributivo debe localizarse en la estructura lógica dei enunciado en cuestión. (...) /// In this paper I investigate the logical analysis of statements in which a predicate applies collectively to a plurality of subjects. The standard treatment of such cases in first-order logic is not completely satisfactory, and the search for alternative modes of representation opens up interesting perspectives. I concentrate on the introduction of multigrade predicates, pointing out a number of weaknesses in the current literature on the subject. I argue that the collective/distributive opposition must be located in the logical structure of the statement in question. (shrink)

An example of finite tree Mo is presented such that its predicate logic (i.e. the intermediate predicate logic characterized by the class of all predicate Kripke frames based on Mo) is not finitely axiomatizable. Hence it is shown that the predicate analogue of de Jongh - McKay - Hosoi's theorem on the finite axiomatizability of every finite intermediate propositional logic is not true.

El propósito de este artículo es mostrar que las llamadas "teorías de la identidad psiconeural" no tienen la estructura lógica de una teoría genuina de la identidad. Un operador de identidad genuino es un operador de segundo orden, o de órdenes superiores, que convierte predicados n-ádicos en predicados n-1-ádicos. Si las teorias de la identidad psiconeural no son, en realidad, teorías de la identidad, entonces la críticas habituales que usan la Ley de Leibniz y otros rasgos que se relacionan (...) con la identidad no tienen ningún efecto. Así, dos serán las conclusiones: (i) que las llamadas "teorías de la identidad psiconeural" deben de reformularse, de manera que expresen claramente su contenido, y (ii) que las críticas utizadas hasta ahora contra ellas no consiguen su objetivo.The aim of this paper is to show that the so-called "theories of psichoneural identity" do not possess the logical structure of a genuine theory of identity. The identity operator is a second- or higher-order operator that converts n-adic predicates into n-1-ádic ones. If the so-called "theories of psichoneural identity" are not theories of identity at all, then two conclusions follow: (i) these theories of the mind-body relation should state their contents in a more appropiate way, and (ii) the usual criticisms against them, which bear on some features that all idetity theories must hold, as for instance Leibniz Law, leave them untouched. (shrink)

The main objective of this paper is to understand the logic role played by photographs in thoughts about entities known only through photographs. I will contrast two general interpretative lines: photography as knowledge by acquaintance and as knowledge by description. The analyses of those interpretations will take into account possible relations with discussions about metaphysics of time and episodic memory. Throughout the paper I will criticize the treatment of photography as acquaintance, based on John Zeimbekis' interpretation. In its treatment as (...) acquaintance, photography would play the logical role of a demonstrative that points to a particular entity in the past, through the causal route that links the photograph to its referent. The criticism of this concept has as its starting point the distinction between the causal referent of the photograph and its representational content. The thesis here developed is that the photographic content would not be sufficient to determine the numerical identity of the referent. Thus, it will be proposed a shift of the logic role played by photography from a referential role to a predicative. Photograph would exemplify phenomenal properties attributed to an entity known only by description. (shrink)

Abordaremos a crítica marxiana à noção hegeliana de "ser" , mostrando que a historicidade e a objetividade, em verdade, são determinações desta . Deste modo, intentamos mostrar que analogias entre a lógica hegeliana e a teoria marxiana podem eclipsar aspectos centrais à abordagem materialista proposta pelo autor de "O capital". Apontando a inversão hegeliana entre sujeito e predicado, Marx trata da apreensão do real que, muito embora seja traçada em diálogo com a dialética hegeliana, é também sua antítese direta (...) . We will deal with the Marxian criticism to the Hegelian notion of "being". It will be shown that historicity and objectivity are determinations of this category . So, the analogy between the Hegelian logic and the Marxian theory may, sometimes, hide essential aspects of the materialist comprehension of history. Here, we intend to prove that, by questioning the treatment dispensed to the matter of being by Hegel, Marx criticizes the Hegelian inversion between subject and predicate in a way that, although dialoguing with Hegel, his conception is the exact opposite at the same time. (shrink)

Contra a concepção monista das relações que imputou a Leib-niz, Russell defendeu a realidade, externalidade e irredutibilidade das re-lações. Para Russell relações são entidades objetivas e não mentais; elas não são sempre essenciais para a individuação de uma entidade; e proposições relacionais não podem ser reduzidas a proposições da forma sujeito-predicado. Meu objetivo principal neste artigo é a análise dos argumentos de Russell para esta tripla tese. De modo geral, constata-se que devido à sua concentração em questões da lógica, (...) Russell não faz jus à perspectiva metafísica de Leibniz.Against the monistic conception of relations that he imputed to Leibniz, Russell defended the reality, externality and irreducibility of relations. For Russell, relations are objective and not merely mental entities; they are not always essential to the individuation of an entity; and propositions of the relational form cannot be reduced to subject-predicate propositions. My primary aim in this article is the analysis of Russell’s arguments for this triple thesis. We can say that Russell was primarily concerned with issues of logic, and because of this mis-understood Leibniz’ metaphysical perspective. (shrink)

La finalidad de este artículo es proveer una reconstrucción lógica del elemento teórico básico de la teoría del valor trabajo desde la perspectiva de la metateoría estructuralista. Las metas son esbozar con alguna precisión la ley fundamental de la teoría �la ley del valor� así como la aserción empírica.

In his paper John Corcoran examines in detail many issues relating to logical form, and raises some questions about my formulations. In my response I emphasize two main distinctions that may clear up some of the issues. One is the distinction between logical forms, in the sense of logical properties of an abstract character, and logical form, in the sense in which we speak of the logical form of a sentence, or of a proposition. Another is the distinction, emphasized by (...) Boole, between primary propositions , and secondary propositions —which I illustrate through the distinction between predicate negation and sentential negation.Em seu artigo John Corcoran examina em detalhe muitas questões sobre forma lógica e levanta alguns problemas relativos à minhas formulações. Na réplica enfatizo duas distinções principais, que podem esclarecer algumas questões. A primeira é a distinção entre formas lógicas, no sentido de propriedades lógicas de caráter abstrato, e forma lógica, no sentido em que falamos da forma lógica de uma sentença ou de uma proposição. A segunda é a distinção, enfatizada por Boole, entre proposições primárias e proposições secundárias , exemplificada com a distinção entre negação predicativa e negação sentencial. (shrink)

O presente artigo expõe, a partir de uma análise da sistemática metodológica estabelecida na Ciência da Lógica de Hegel, a concepção de quantum, como forma de propiciar as reflexões necessárias no desenvolvimento especulativo da segunda parte da Doutrina do Ser. Para isso, buscamos evidenciar a relação dialética entre a concepção de qualidade e quantidade, para assim compreender a ordem sistemática de desenvolvimento dialético do Ser, em que a determinação qualitativa é posta imediatamente na unidade com o próprio ser, enquanto (...) a quantidade está estabelecida na suprassunção da qualidade. Para tanto, delineamos a distinção entre quantidade pura, indeterminada e a quantidade determinada pelo quantum, mediante a problematização de concepções que estabelecem a configuração do quantum nas suas próprias determinações, tais como valor numérico e unidade, que subsidiam a fundamentação lógica do número. Por fim, tratamos da relação de diferença e identidade dos conceitos de grandezas extensiva e intensiva, para assim compreender a noção de infinitude quantitativa. (shrink)

The intentionality is a key concept in Husserl’s phenomenology, by means of which comes out to the light the proverbial tension between the modern tradition and the ‘thing self’. Conscious of the risk of reexaminating a topic that it has already been object of innumerables interpretations, the au..

El objetivo del presente artículo es someter a escrutinio la afirmación de Hintikka según la cual la verdadera lógica elemental no es la clásica sino la lógica IF y, en consecuencia, el marco en que ordinariamente son pensadas las relaciones entre lógica y matemáticas es por completo inadecuado. Pa..

Resumo: Neste trabalho discute-se a crítica de István Mészáros à Lógica de Hegel. Aponta-se como o marxismo realiza a crítica aos pontos de partida e de chegada da Ciência da lógica, quais sejam, o pensamento sem pressupostos e o círculo auto-constituído da Lógica. Com isso, indica-se a diferença entre os modos hegeliano e marxista de conceber o enraizamento do conhecimento no processo de vida real. Discute-se ainda como István Mészáros realizou uma dura crítica à hipostasiação do método (...) dialético em G. Lukács, crítica esta que se apóia na rejeição de um método que deixa de prestar contas ao ser e que, por isso, acaba lidando com a identidade entre conhecimento e ser como uma mera postulação abstrata.: This paper discusses István Mészáros critique of Hegel’s Logic. We point out how Marxism criticizes the presuppositionless thinkingand self-constituted circle of reasoning of the Science of logic. We thereby show the difference between the Hegelian and Marxist ways of conceiving the rooting of knowledge in the process of real life. We also discuss how Mészáros made a scathing critique of the hypostatization of dialectical method in Lukács work. This critique is based on the rejection of a method that fails to be accountable to the real world and therefore ends up treating the identity of knowledge and being as a mere abstract postulation. (shrink)

"œLa irrupción de la Fenomenologí­a: Génesis de las Investigaciones Lógicas de Husserl" La intencionalidad es un concepto clave en la Fenomenologí­a de Husserl, por medio del cual sale a la luz la tensión proverbial entre la tradición moderna y la "cosa en sí­". Conciente del riesgo de reexaminar un tema que ya ha sido objeto de inumerables interpretaciones, la autora lo usa como hilo conductor para reconstruir la génesis de la obra capital de Husserl, así­ como de la supuesta "irrup- (...) ción" de la Fenomenologia. '"The irruption of the Phenotnenology: Génesis ofthe Husserl's Logical Investigations" The intentionality is a key concept in the Husserl"™s Phenomenology, by means of which comes out to the light the proverbial tension between the modern tradition and the "thing self". Conscious of the risk of reexamining a topic that it has already been object of inumerables interpretations, the author uses it like conductive thread to reconstruct the genesis of the capital work of Husserl, as well as the supposed "irruption" of the Phenomenology. (shrink)

I provide a proof method for First Order Monadic Predicate Logic. This method uses the Normal Form of Herbrand and the Disjunctive and Conjunctive Normal Forms for Propositional Logic. The validity is determined by mere inspection of the presence and arrangement of formulas that act as informational atoms. The exact relationship between First Order Monadic Predicate Logic and the extended syllogistic developed during the nineteenth century is established by the Normal Form of Herbrand.

Karl Popper presenta al realismo como su posición acerca del conocimiento, distinguiéndola del instrumentalismo y del esencialismo. Ataca del primero la consideración meramente instrumental de las teorías científicas. Del segundo, critica que sostenga la posibilidad de establecer la verdad definitiva de las teorías, y que éstas describen esencias. El instrumentalismo coincide con Popper en que no hay conocimiento de esencias a través de las teorías científicas, pero de ello infiere que las teorías son meros instrumentos. Popper señala que el carácter (...) meramente instrumental de las teorías las vuelve irrefutables. Porque un instrumento de predicción no puede ser refutado (cf. Popper (1972a, p. 149)). Además, el instrumentalismo no puede explicar el interés del científico por la verdad. Su esencialismo modificado, toma del esencialismo que “el científico aspira a una verdadera descripción del mundo o de algunos de sus aspectos, y a una explicación verdadera de los hechos observables” (Popper, 1972a, p. 150). Pero agrega que no es posible saber con certeza si sus hallazgos son verdaderos. Resaltar el carácter conjetural de las teorías científicas no implica disminuir la aspiración del científico a describir algo real. (shrink)

Gadamer, en Verdad y Método, alude a una llamada "nueva lógica", a propósito del concepto de la ocasionalidad de la obra de arte, desde el punto de vista hermenéutico. El autor se aprovecha de dicho concepto para rastrear en la obra de Lipps el pensamiento de la ocasionalidad y la lógica hermenéutica que le hace justicia, logrando con ello la rehabilitación de un filósofo de interés para el pensamiento kairológico que actualmente representa el autor.

The notions of fetishism and mystification constitute the fundamental concepts with which Marx analyzes the forms of appearance relating to capitalist societies. These concepts have an architectural role in the internal structure of Marx’ project of a critique of political economy. This paper aims to expose and discuss the interpretative contributions opened up by the book by Clara Ramas San Miguel: Fetiche y Mistificación capitalistas. La crítica de la economía política de Marx published in 2018 at Siglo XXI.

Las relaciones entre los Estados Unidos de América y la actual Federación de Rusia, han sido objeto de minuciosos estudios académicos a lo largo de los años. Estas dos grandes potencias han jugado un importante papel en la configuración del sistema internacional. Con este artículo se pretende realizar un análisis de la política exterior de Rusia, -desde el enfoque realista de las relaciones internacionales- el cual no puede desprenderse de un estudio paralelo que haga referencia al comportamiento de Occidente en (...) general, y en particular de los Estados Unidos de América. (shrink)

Las interpretaciones tradicionales de Frege tienden a explicar su antipsicologismo como indicando que ninguna consideración subjetivista debe interferir en la elaboración de un lenguaje lógico; dichas interpretaciones, sin embargo, tienen problemas para explicar el énfasis dado por el mismo Frege a conceptos como el de fuerza asertiva. Este artículo pretende solucionar esta extrañeza investigando, a partir de su concepto de ciencia, algunas de las ideas epistemológicas de Frege. Esto nos llevará a concluir que una concepción de la verdad como fenómeno (...) esencialmente público puede resolver este y otros problemas interpretativos. (shrink)

Over the past 50 years, Nelson algebras have been extensively studied by distinguished scholars as the algebraic counterpart of Nelson's constructive logic with strong negation. Despite these studies, a comprehensive survey of the topic is currently lacking, and the theory of Nelson algebras remains largely unknown to most logicians. This paper aims to fill this gap by focussing on the essential developments in the field over the past two decades. Additionally, we explore generalisations of Nelson algebras, such as N4-lattices which (...) correspond to the paraconsistent version of Nelson's logic, as well as their applications to other areas of interest to logicians, such as duality and rough set theory. A general representation theorem states that each Nelson algebra is isomorphic to a subalgebra of a rough set-based Nelson algebra induced by a quasiorder. Furthermore, a formula is a theorem of Nelson logic if and only if it is valid in every finite Nelson algebra induced by a quasiorder. (shrink)

Neste artigo, o trabalho seminal de Luciano Floridi “A Lógica de Estar Informado” é examinado em detalhes, em especial quais aspectos tornam tal lógica relevante para que a mesma não colapse em sistemas lógicos epistêmicos ou doxásticos conhecidos. Ao final, é apresentado um cenário para demonstrar que a refletividade da relação de acessibilidade não é necessária, e desse modo os axiomas de introspecção positiva e negativa podem ser descartados, e.g. quando se afirma que um agente pode deter uma (...) informação sem estar informado que ele detém uma informação. (shrink)

El artículo ofrece una reflexión hermenéutica sobre el sentido aparentementeparadójico de la combinación de los términos "ciencia" y "lógica" en laCiencia de la lógica de Hegel. Se muestran las raíces metafísicas de estaempresa, presentes en la transformación kantiana de la secular concepciónaristotélica, con la finalidad de hacer más comprensible la transformaciónhegeliana de la metafísica en lógica.

El presente artículo tiene el propósito de describir y analizar de manera sistemática la naturaleza de la lógica de la investigación científica que viene principalmente caracterizada por el método científico y el razonamiento o inferencia abductiva propuesta por el filósofo pragmatista Charles Sanders Peirce. El texto inicia con una crítica hacia la postura racionalista de Descartes y trascendentalista de Kant. Prosigue tanto con una explicación de las nociones de “duda” y “creencia” como con una descripción de los métodos para (...) fijar nuestras “creencias” (método de la tenacidad, método de la autoridad, método a priori y método científico). Y concluye con la dilucidación del método científico, cuya naturaleza se encuentra determinada por las tres formas de razonamiento o inferencia: abducción, deducción e inducción. (shrink)

A lexicografia constitui, na atualidade,uma ãrea de estudos lingüísticos que, fundamentadana observação das necessidades dos usuários,mostra novas orientações no sentido de satisfazê-las. A idéia de elaborar um dicionário noqual as palavras se encontrem organizadas deacordo com seus múltiplos enlaces, tanto paradigmáticosquanto sintagmáticos, e ao qual o consulente,premido por problemas de esquecimento oude desconhecimento lexical, recorra com o objetivode encontrar a expressão exata de um conteúdoque queira vincular, além de constituir-se numprojeto extremamente ousado, certamente preencheráuma lacuna e representará um significativoavanço no (...) mundo lexicográfico. (shrink)