I am grateful to the editors of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for inviting me to write a comment on Kathleen Gill’s ‘On the Metaphysical Distinction Between Processes and Events’. I readily concede that she is right in the central criticism she makes of my 1978 paper: that a properly metaphysical or ontological distinction between processes and events, if it is to be made at all, cannot be sustained on the basis of the informal linguistic criteria I offered in ‘Events, (...) Processes, and States.’ My main concern in that paper was to show that discussions of the Kenny-Vendler typology of activities, performances, and states had focused too narrowly on verb types, on adverbial phrases, on the domain of human action, and on English-language intuitions. Mine was one of several voices urging in the late 1970s that issues of tense logic and of the logic of verb types had to be placed in the broader context of verb aspect — a salient and pervasive structure in natural languages generally, and one that had been studied by philologists and linguists since the nineteenth century. Captivated, as I and others had become at the time, by evidence that the distinction between count nouns and mass nouns appears to be mirrored in verb predications, I went on to make some rather venturesome ‘ontological’ claims. It is satisfying, of course, that Gill accepts not only that there is ‘substantial evidence in favor of recognizing a grammatical distinction between the language of processes and [the language of] events’ but also that ‘similarities with count and mass expressions will allow us to apply techniques for han dling nominal expressions to verbal expressions’. It is more than satisfying that the phenomenon of verb aspect is now noticed and investigated by philosophers as well as by linguists. (shrink)

In his recent provocative article, “Aristotle’s Distinction between Energeia and Kinesis,” Professor J. L. Ackrill has added fuel to the flames of a controversy at least as old as the Lyceum. Professor Ackrill avows a primarily aporetic purpose, and raises, with the aim of stimulating discussion, what he regards as several difficulties, confusions, inadvertences and lacunae in the Aristotelian text anent the ἐνέργεια-κίνησισ distinction. But perhaps it would not be untoward to take up Professor Ackrill’s challenge, in order to (...) attempt to determine, with the aid of other parties to the controversy and a reexamination of the text, whether the aporiai be not insoluble and, in fact, rather Professor Ackrill’s than Aristotle’s. Indeed, it may well be that there are grounds for arguing that, on Aristotle’s view, ἐνέργεια and κίνησισ are not only clearly distinguished, but systematically related as well. (shrink)

A distinction between ‘activities’ and ‘processes’ plays an important role in Aristotle's argument to establish that the good life is a life of activities, among which metaphysical contemplation is foremost. But, as a result of having failed to distinguish internal from external ends of action, Aristotle makes fallacious inferences from every activity's having an internal end in itself to its possessing features which may be legitimately inferred only from external ends, and from every process's having an internal end that is (...) its terminal point to its having the attainment of that terminal point as an external end. The resulting confusion explains a number of problematic elements in Aristotle's ethical theory. (shrink)

Preview: Bergson noted that the cinematographic image does not really move. It is, then as now, a series of still photographs. The real motion in such images is produced by machinery, which imparts a kinesis, an energy of movement, to the succession of fixed images. Our perception then endows such images with their “life,” insofar as they can be said to possess life. It is an illusion, it is “virtual” both as space and time. The real duration, as generated (...) by the machinery or as lived by the perceiver is part of a broader system of images that includes those still photographs and their succession. Images of images of images, by the time they are processed by our bodies and appear to our mind’s eye as inhibited acts we have not enacted. (shrink)

The differences between the theories of hearing held by Aristotle and by Alexander of Aphrodisias are explored. Alexander appears to have a more systematic approach which avoids the dilemma faced by Aristotle in deciding whether the hearing process constitutes a time-taking kinesis or an instantaneous energeia.

Since the advent of industrial animal farming in the mid-nineteenth century, works of fiction have played a vital role in bringing to light the dynamics of violence, resistance, and sabotage that inhabit its spaces. This article addresses the latest configuration of this phenomenon, examining a selection of twenty-first century novels (among them Isabelle Sorente’s _180 jours_, Deb Olin Unferth’s _Barn 8_, and Nadja Niemeyer’s _Gegenangriff_) that confront the sites of large-scale automated breeding, feeding, slaughter, and processing that are the factory (...) farms of today. At the core of these novels are episodes of transgression – break-ins, escapes, abductions – that implicate the whole network of actors involved: humans, animals, machines, and matter. Disrupting the flows of bodies, the rhythms of conveyor belts, and the logistics of transport, these episodes highlight not only the rigorous disciplinary power, but also the permeability of the boundaries, and the fragile interplay of _kinesis_ and _stasis_ that sustain modern meat production. The article thus elucidates how these works crystallize what Georges Bataille characterized as “the chaotic aspect” of abattoirs, theorizing an aesthetics of transgression as the hallmark of contemporary factory-farm fiction and the key vector of its socioethical ambitions. (shrink)

The differences between the theories of hearing held by Aristotle and by Alexander of Aphrodisias are explored. Alexander appears to have a more systematic approach which avoids the dilemma faced by Aristotle in deciding whether the hearing process constitutes a time-taking kinesis or an instantaneous energeia.