When it was published in France, this book shocked the philosophers of the Left Bank with its plain-speaking attack on some of France's greatest minds.

En 1996, la publication aux États-Unis du " vrai-faux " article du physicien américain Alan Sokal, visant à dénoncer sur le mode du canular les ravages intellectuels opérés, selon lui, par le " postmodernisme ", puis la parution en France en 1997 du livre rédigé avec Jean Bricmont (Impostures intellectuelles), ont défrayé la chronique. Pour ces auteurs, il était urgent de dénoncer les " extrapolations abusives des sciences exactes aux sciences humaines " d'intellectuels comme Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Jean Baudrillard, (...) Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari et Paul Virilio, et plus encore de critiquer le " relativisme " des chercheurs de la nouvelle école de sociologie des sciences, au premier rang desquels Bruno Latour. Apparemment frappée au coin du bon sens, cette attaque frontale a rencontré un très large écho. Et pourtant, les impostures ne sont pas du côté qu'on croit. Car le positivisme revendiqué par Sokal et Bricmont cache en fait une profonde incompréhension des auteurs qu'ils attaquent et une surprenante ignorance des enjeux politiques et philosophiques majeurs révélés par les travaux sur les " sciences dures " des chercheurs des " sciences douces " Il était donc indispensable de démonter les impostures et les malentendus de l'affaire "Sokal": tel est l'objectif de ce livre, qui réunit des contributions originales de chercheurs de divers horizons - physiciens, philosophes des sciences, anthropologues... Non sans humour, ils entendent faire partager au lecteur leur commune passion pour la science telle qu'elle se fait (beaucoup plus intéressante que la science mythique de certains scientifiques), et plaident pour une réconciliation entre philosophes et physiciens, pour en finir enfin avec la " guerre des sciences ". (shrink)

La 4ème de couverture indique : « Le portrait de Dorian Gray, exhibé dès les premières pages du livre de Wilde auquel il donne son titre, fascine d’emblée le lecteur. La lecture proposée ici souligne que ce portrait, pour ainsi dire jeté en pâture, sert d’écran ou de paravent à un autre portrait encore plus séducteur et inquiétant, en général moins remarqué, celui de la mère morte, représentée en bacchante, qui le hante secrètement. Outre L’imposture de la beauté, ce (...) recueil comprend une étude sur Le Moïse de Michel-Ange de Freud : Un autre Moïse, ou la Force de la loi ; deux lectures consacrées à Nietzsche : Nietzsche et Wagner, Nietzsche et Voltaire (Et pourtant elle tremble!) ; Un battu imbattable, à propos de Larmes de clown, du cinéaste Victor Sjöström ainsi que Angoisse et catharsis, sur The Lady Vanishes, d’Alfred Hitchcock. ». (shrink)

This paper is devoted to an analysis of Ma‘ruf ar-Rusafi’s work The Personality of Mohammed or the Elucidation of the Holy Enigma. While ar-Rusafi is traditionally known as a poet who combines great evocative power with a superb mastery of language and strict adherence to classical form, this canonical image is seriously complicated by the iconoclastic character of this book, completed in 1933 but unpublished until 2002. It totally rejects the orthodox theory of prophecy as passive transmission, and insists on (...) the historic development behind orthodoxy. Rusafi puts forward a way of conceiving the Prophet’s mission that he considers more faithful to the sources and in greater conformity with the elementary requirements of reason. He proposes a “disenraptured” or “demythologized” reading of the Prophet’s life and work. The author considers ar-Rusafi’s book as the most serious assault on orthodoxy that has been launched on it from within in modern times. (shrink)

The publication in France of our book Impostures Intellectuelles [1] appears to have created a small storm in certain intellectual circles. According to Jon Henley in The Guardian, we have shown that ``modern French philosophy is a load of old tosh.''[2] According to Robert Maggiori in Libération, we are humourless scientistic pedants who correct grammatical errors in love letters.[3] We shall try to explain here why neither is the case.

Whenever we think of impostors, we tend to think of liars. Yet impostures cannot be phenomenologically reduced to lies. Every lie presupposes a distinction between true and false, and it operates through a negation of reality, presenting falsity as truth and vice versa. An imposture, on the other hand, seeks to erase the distinction between true and false altogether. An impostor constructs a fiction that aims at substituting reality. In this process, an entire network of lies is put to (...) work in order to attain the ontological status of the real. This results in a dynamic that deprives truths of their authority, while making untruths highly potent in terms of their capacity to produce effects. (shrink)

An eye-opener and a head-scratcher, this set of fifty exercices de style offers an oblique and learned introduction to a great classic of ludic literature dating from the twelfth century, the Maqamat of al-Hariri. Each of the fifty tales of the trickster Abu Zayid, some or perhaps all of which contain or are constituted by one or more formal restrictions, is here presented in the form of a pastiche of some familiar or exotic register of writing in English. We can (...) only admire Cooperson for having taught himself to channel Chaucer, Woolf, and Twain, to parrot Singaporean, Nigerian, and Indian English, to compose in dramatic form and in verse, and to riff off Austen as well as a dictionary of law.... What is frustrating to readers is that our translator-imposter does not let us play the game. He explains each exercise and justifies his approach to it in a prefatory note, then adds footnotes, a bibliography, and a glossary of the “dialect” chosen. We are not even allowed to play guess-the-author! The aim of the elaborate and scholarly apparatus attached to these imitative imitations is to give a hint—a necessarily and unapologetically misleading one—of the pleasure and value of the medieval Arabic for its first and later readers.The problem is that pastiche is not only an entertaining exercise. It typically serves a purpose located somewhere between mockery and homage, and sometimes plays both ends against the middle. Cooperson, however, is not mocking Dickens or Gibbon, even less the al-Hariri he clearly admires beyond all others. Consequently, the nonparticipant reader becomes ever more baffled as to what the game is really for. Surely it cannot be intended only to show us how clever and knowledgeable Mr. Cooperson is? Which he certainly is, but not beyond tripping over his own skipping rope. For example, the prisoner's constraint used in the middle of a pastiche of Dickens, when implemented in the way it was defined by its inventor Paul Fournel, excludes the letter z and also cannot accommodate the tilde of señor—and Dickens would have written bade for the past tense of bid. The more you read, the less you smile, the more you quibble as you are drawn into a surely unintended game of spot-the-blooper.It takes genius to write like someone else, which is why the people who get away with it for real use a battery of extratextual devices to deceive (think of Guilleragues, Ossian, Chatterton, Kuzma Proutkov, Romain Gary... ). Cooperson is not seeking to deceive (yet how can a pastiche not gesture toward deception?), but he is not actually offering fifty linked stories by fifty different hands either. What he has produced with the help of his distinguished préfacier, two editors, and a bevy of consultants is a curiously unidentifiable literary object, and quite possibly the only one of its kind.Two statements made by the translator in his introduction disturb me. He says he avoided using most twentieth-century literary models and references in order not to run into copyright issues. This is a declaration of submission to the Copyright Monster invented and unleashed by publishers in flagrant disregard of the laws of the UK, the US, and the EU, all of which allow parody and pastiche without permission of the copyright holder. Second, he “takes seriously the argument that privileged users of Standard English have no business imitating... the speech varieties associated with less privileged communities.” In all times other than our own, the privileged did not deign to use “less privileged” forms of speech (unless they were Victor Hugo), but if now they do not even dare, we can still guess what will happen. The less privileged will seek to use more privileged forms of speech, just as Anglo-Saxon serfs aped Norman French until they ended up speaking English. More recently, wealthy corporations have sought to own whole programming languages by extending the reach of copyright law; perhaps “less privileged communities” are now about to use similar weapons to protect their linguistic turf. We must object as noisily as we can to attempts to enclose public goods by corporations, by self-defining communities, or by any other entities. We would all be the poorer if they should ever succeed. (shrink)

Bien que couramment utilisée dans les discours médiatiques, la notion d’« arrogance » reste pourtant peu étudiée. L’analyse de discours réalisée à partir d’une revue de presse nous permet ici d’éclairer les mécanismes de l’arrogance et la manière dont s’articulent précisément incommunication et imposture stratégique, qu’il convient dès lors de considérer conjointement. Car en niant l’interaction et en entremêlant méprise et mépris, l’arrogance éclaire négativement la force du lien qui existe entre information, communication et stratégie.Although the word is often (...) used in media discourse, “arrogance” in itself has rarely been studied. Our analysis of discourses taken from a press review highlights the mechanisms of arrogance and the interplay of un-communication and strategic deception, which must therefore be considered together. By negating this interplay and by interweaving misconception and contempt, arrogance negatively highlights the powerful link between information, communication and strategy. (shrink)

Depuis plusieurs années, on constate que les sciences suscitent une tenace convoitise de la part de mouvements qu'on peut qualifier du terme générique de " spiritualistes ". Notre environnement culturel est en grande partie technoscientifique ; il leur faut donc investir cet espace pour diffuser encore et toujours des thèses pourtant éculées : l'existence d'un Plan cosmique ou divin, l'ordonnancement du monde par une intelligence transcendante, la fin du darwinisme, le principe anthropique fort... Ces mouvements, aux contours très divers, présentent (...) néanmoins une véritable unité de visée et de pensée, quand il s'agit pour eux de " montrer " que la science la plus en pointe rejoint les intuitions fondatrices des religions instituées ou des spiritualités moins organisées. Ainsi, foi et science deviendraient les deux faces indissociables de la " connaissance ". Beaucoup considèrent avec condescendance ces errements, ce qui leur évite de s'interroger avec force sur les symptômes d'une société qui voit se déliter les idées des Lumières, certainement améliorables mais en tout état de cause, d'une inestimable pertinence pour un projet de connaissance universelle, D'autres pensent qu'il est vraiment temps d'agir. C'est la raison d'être de cet ouvrage, issu du colloque organisé au Muséum national d'histoire naturelle par Jean Dubessy et Guillaume Lecointre, et préfacé par Jacques Bouveresse. Rassemblant une quinzaine de contributions, ce livre combat une pensée qui, sous prétexte de " ré-enchanter le monde ", n'a d'autre but que de subordonner la connaissance objective de ce monde à son projet irrationaliste, en la faisant ployer sous le fardeau de l'ineptie et de l'imposture intellectuelle. (shrink)

As the title suggests, Breeur’s project is to discuss three key ideas: lies, stupidity, and imposture. The book is organized into two parts of two chapters each, followed by an appendix. The individual chapters and sub-sections are well-written and philosophically sophisticated. However, the reader will be disappointed if they expect a sustained analysis of the relations among the book’s titular ideas or a unified account of their role in the breakdown of respect for truth more broadly. Breeur’s approach is (...) more episodic, laying out valuable considerations and enticing formulations, but often breaking off before spelling out their full implications or connecting them to previous discussions in the book. His discussion clearly opens up these additional avenues of thought, but the task of going down them is left largely to the reader. This review briefly takes up each of Breeur’s themes: lies, stupidity, and imposture. (shrink)

In a series of recent publications, Alan Sokal has launched a series of stinging attacks against contemporary cultural studies. In Intellectual Impostures, for example, written together with Jean Bricmont, the authors (hereafter S&B) criticise the way in which French poststructuralist critics, such as Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan and Gilles Deleuze, have abused the scientific terminology to which, Sokal claims, they exhibit slavish adherence. Many authors, such as Andrew Ross and Stanley Aronowitz, have taken up the cudgels against S&B. But their (...) replies often miss the mark either by arguing at too abstract a level against S&B's project as a whole or employing strategies and principles drawn from the self same body of texts which S&B criticize. In this article, by contrast, I reply to specific criticisms S&B direct against Lacan's use of topological concepts. By showing that S&B miss a perfectly reasonable, mathematically acceptable way of reading Lacan's appropriation of topology, I intend to raise more general doubts about S&B's erudition in connection with the works they criticise. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente artículo es realizar una comparación entre las definiciones de persona en el _Leviatán_ de Hobbes de la edición inglesa de 1651 y de la edición latina de 1668. Para ello, tendremos en cuenta los posibles cambios que se hayan podido producir en la definición de persona con la publicación del _De Homine_ en 1658, mostrando la importancia que tienen las constantes referencias al teatro en este proceso. Finalmente, intentaremos sugerir la hipótesis de que la persona natural (...) en Hobbes es siempre una construcción artificial. (shrink)

Depuis quelques années, un mouvement d'idées venu des Etats-Unis, qualifié de "Révolution transhumaniste", a pris un essor considérable. Demain, on vivra 200 ou 300 ans... et bien sûr en parfaite santé : l'immortalité n'est pas loin! Ces prophéties s'appuient sur les avancées réelles de l'intelligence artificielle et de la recherche en biologie, en particulier dans le domaine du vieillissement, passant ainsi allègrement de l'homme préservé et/ou augmenté à un véritable homme dieu. Mais dès que l'on s'intéresse au cerveau, les données, (...) particulièrement complexes, ne vont pas dans leur sens. Il existe une contradiction criante entre la jeunesse éternelle promise et la réalité actuelle, marquée en particulier par les échecs thérapeutiques répétés dans les maladies neurodégénératives. Forts de leur expérience et de leur autorité dans le domaine des neurosciences et du vieillissement, Danièle Tritsch et Jean Mariani dénoncent l'imposture du transhumanisme et ses excès ou délires, données scientifiques à l'appui. De façon accessible et vivante, avec de nombreux exemples de la vie quotidienne, ils démontrent que les efforts lents et soutenus de la recherche biologique et médicale - auxquels contribuera l'intelligence artificielle - restent la seule voie pour comprendre le fonctionnement du cerveau, le maintenir en bonne santé (cerveau préservé), le doter de capacités nouvelles (cerveau augmenté) et, dans un délai non prévisible, guérir ou stabiliser les maladies neurodégénératives (cerveau réparé). L'homme dieu, quant à lui, ne s'appuie sur rien de tangible. (shrink)

The question as to what makes something “fake” is not an ordinary one. It bears traces of the very beginning of philosophy, where Plato faced the need to discern between the true and the false clai...

The philosophical allegation of imposture levelled by the Radical Enlightenment at Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad – the three founders of the monotheistic religions – has a complex theological history. Strange as it may sound, it is an idea closely connected to some of the “dangerous” debates conducted by scholastic theologians. Some of these theologians described divine omnipotence in a manner that prompted the vexed question of whether God can deceive us. Of course, no theologian doubted that God could and (...) yet would not deceive us. However, for some scholastics, God permitted the Devil to deceive men. After the Reformation, the Devil assumed a central role in debates between the Christian denominations. Depending on one’s confessional allegiance, the Devil could be the Pope or Luther or Calvin. In this way, the churches of post-Reformation Europe contributed to a process by which the Devil was transformed into the human figure of the “impostor,” preparing the ground, as this article shows, for later, more radical criticisms of religion per se. (shrink)

Quel est le statut de l’éthique appliquée à la médecine? Dans un monde qui, à certains égards, est plus près de la déroute humanitaire que du Paradis des Anges, la question s’impose. La réflexion bioéthique cherche un équilibre entre idéologie et pragmatisme, entre utilitarisme et convenance personnelle, entre posture et imposture, ou encore entre progressisme et réaction. Ces alternatives nous entraînent loin de la bioéthique qui, elle, s’organise sur le choix de la vie, le progrès et le souci de (...) l’autre. À côté des greffes d’organes et des 2 millions d’enfants dans le monde nés par procréation médicalement assistée (dont 200 000 en France), qui sont les marqueurs d’une époque fantastique, la mort par euthanasie est en train de devenir une possible « variable d’ajustement économique ». Sur quels « biens humains fondamentaux » prendre appui pour fonder l’éthique? La dignité de l’homme? La maternité, les parents, la famille, autrui, ou un au-delà qui existe dans toutes les déclinaisons athées ou immanentes. Bernard Kanovitch est médecin, professeur honoraire à Paris-XI, ancien chef de service à la Fondation Rothschild, ancien membre du Comité consultatif national d’éthique, ancien membre du Conseil national du sida, président de la Fondation Maïmonide pour le dialogue judéo-musulman. (shrink)

"Le propos de ce livre est une invitation ©ne jamais c©♭der ©la tentation du repli identitaire avec tous ses d©♭riv©♭s sectaires. Comme opium de toutes les soci©♭t©♭s, le repli identitaire est un p©♭ril mondial. Cette tentation est devenue la source d'inspiration et d'animation de toutes les formes de haine, d'hostilit©♭, d'exclusion et d'intol©♭rance. D'o©£ l'urgence plus que vitale de renouer avec ce qui constitue l'identit©♭ humaine dans l'expression la plus signifiante de sa dignit©♭ : penser. Il appartient ©chacun et ©chacune (...) de penser ©partir de la d©♭construction et de porter le message d'espoir et d'avenir pour une humanit©♭ vivante et solidaire. C'est singuli©·rement et collectivement que nous devons d©♭construire. Oser d©♭construire est le seul imp©♭ratif qui vaille pour le sursaut de notre humanit©♭ devant les p©♭rils de l'identitaire qu'il soit id©♭ologique, politique, ©♭conomique, social, culturel, linguistique ou religieux. Face au p©♭ril identitaire, une ©♭thique et une politique de la d©♭construction s'av©·rent incontournables. D©♭construire, c'est nourrir la conviction et l'engagement pour l'impossible, condition de l'horizon de tous les possibles."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Sokal and Bricmont in their exposé of allegedly meaningless statements about science by recent French philosophers take errors of particular applications of philosophical ideas to science as refutations of the whole general framework utilized. They also seem to think that taking snippets out of context is sufficient to expose the "fashionable nonsense." In the early twentieth century, British analytic philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead did the same with Hegel on mathematics. After deciding not to bother to (...) read Hegel because of distaste for what he wrote about mathematics, Whitehead was later surprised to learn that his own relational process philosophy resembled that of Hegel in various respects. (shrink)

In this essay I want to take some metaphors seriously. I want to push at their limits and ask whether this exercise can help us think differently about photographs and their relationship to what they depict. (Should it be ‘what they depict’ or ‘what they are seen as depicting’? The choice of phrasing depends on theoretical position: is depiction inherent in the image, or is it seen by the viewer?). The moel of citationality based on Cadava’s work is developed by (...) exploring in more detail the variety of bibliographic ciataions. (shrink)

Platon, Aristote, Descartes, Rousseau, Hegel, Heidegger : tels sont les grands philosophes consacrés qui font ici l'objet d'une critique sans concession d'où il ressort que leur discours est daté quand il n'est pas tout simplement creux. renseignement s'en nourrit pourtant, relayant ainsi les commentaires bavards et prétentieux de fidèles serviteurs prisonniers d'une réputation surfaite de profondeur de la pensée. Ils ne se sont pas encore avisés que leurs formules sont vides. Ni véritable connaissance ni authentique sagesse, leur discours est un (...) bavardage sans fin à la gloire passée d'une discipline exsangue. "Au regard des disciplines devenues conquérantes : l'histoire, la psychologie, la sociologie, l'ethnologie, depuis que les grands progrès de la connaissance sont accomplis par les sciences et les techniques, la philosophie ne sait que faire. À mesure que les sciences progressent, que les méditations ne cheminent plus infailliblement par "la classe de philosophie", les systèmes philosophiques s'effondrent à un rythme qui fait peur. Que reste-t-il de ces valeureux combattants dont le propre de chacun a été de nier tous les autres? Platon, Aristote, Descartes, Des figurines abstraites et démodées, des penseurs vénérables soumis à une tradition fabriquée qui est encore une habile façon de justifier, par bribes, un état de fait insupportable". On aura compris que ce déboulonnage des idoles est en même temps un appel à une mise à jour radicale et assumée de la discipline. (shrink)

L’argent joue un rôle important dans le sentiment d’appartenance à un groupe social, et ce dès l’enfance. À la clé, l’exclusion, la honte, l’injustice auront pour effet de donner la priorité au regard des autres qui rendent le sujet vulnérable. On assiste alors à un appauvrissement du monde interne dont les manifestations somatiques témoignent, associées à un sentiment d’imposture et de solitude dans un registre de dépressivité. La place que prend le transgénérationnel dans ce type de problématique, sous la (...) forme de l’appartenance, de la réparation, de la reconnaissance de l’ordre des générations, de la dette... est fondamentale. L’histoire de Natacha et de sa famille en est une illustration. (shrink)

Macaulay was wrong: The British public in one of its periodic fits of morality may be a ridiculous spectacle but it has at least one rival in the reaction we have recently witnessed to ‘cultural relativism’, ‘postmodernism’, and suchlike phenomena. One good illustration of the point is the argument of Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont's Intellectual Impostures (1998: London, Profile Books). Sokal and Bricmont spend the greater part of their time holding various postmodernist writers up to ridicule, and it would (...) be a waste of time to defend it against them. However, their most seriously argued chapter (chapter four) is a critique, not of postmodernism, but of epistemic relativism in the philosophy of science, as mainly exemplified by the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn, and it is important to answer the case they make. There are many reasons for finding that case unconvincing. For example: (i) Sokal and Bricmont repeatedly imply that epistemic relativism is counter-intuitive. Against them it can be objected that some quite ordinary proposition can be both true and, at the same time, only true for beings with certain types of visual apparatus or with a certain cultural history. Nor are they right in claiming that all scientists find epistemic relativism implausible. Some do, but Chomsky doesn't. Neither does Stephen Hawking; (ii) Sokal and Bricmont suppose that there is a single, uniquely correct description of the universe ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but all the evidence we have suggests the contrary; (iii) it is not the case that epistemic relativism entails that any description is just as good as any other, so they are wrong to insist that it must endorse all manner of silly superstition; (iv) Sokal and Bricmont frequently insist that “the scientific method is not radically different from the rational attitude in everyday life or in other domains of human knowledge” but this glosses over great differences between the procedures appropriate to different areas of inquiry – science on the one hand, history and/or psychoanalysis on the other. (shrink)

Award-winning poet and critic Kevin Young traces the history of the hoax as a peculiarly American phenomenon--the legacy of P.T. Barnum's 'humbug' culminating with the currency of Donald J. Trump's 'fake news'. Disturbingly, Young finds that fakery is woven from stereotype and suspicion, with race being the most insidious American hoax of all. He chronicles how Barnum came to fame by displaying figures like Joice Heth, a black woman whom he pretended was the 161-year-old nursemaid to George Washington, and 'What (...) Is It?', an African American man Barnum professed was a newly discovered missing link in evolution. Bunk then turns to the hoaxing of history and the ways that forgers, plagiarists, and journalistic fakers invent backstories and falsehoods to sell us lies about themselves and about the world in our own time, from pretend Native Americans like Nasdijj to the deadly imposture of Clark Rockefeller, from the made-up memoirs of James Frey to the identity theft of Rachel Dolezal. This brilliant and timely work asks what it means to live in a post-factual world of 'truthiness' where everything is up for interpretation and everyone is subject to a pervasive cynicism that damages our ideas of reality, fact, and art."--Dust jacket flap. (shrink)

Different kinds of fakery and imposture can be differentiated by means of the imaginary regimes within which a performative simulation unfolds. Engaging with Sartre’s analysis of the imaginary, we will identify three such regimes, calling them the objective, the reflective, and the phantasmatic. Each of these regimes involves its own kind of image and accordingly a specific type of simulation. It is proper to the objective image to attain dissimulation of the self by replacing the real with fiction. In (...) the reflective regime, the real is not substituted by the imaginary, but rather contaminated by it. Finally, whereas the objective and the reflective regimes operate within the sphere of intentional simulation, the phantasmatic image carries us beyond Sartre’s findings, as it shapes the very structure of pre-reflective disclosedness which provides the background for our projects. (shrink)

Intellectual Impostures , for example, written together with Jean Bricmont, the authors (hereafter S&B) criticise the way in which French poststructuralist critics, such as Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan and Gilles Deleuze, have abused the scientific terminology to which, Sokal claims, they exhibit slavish adherence. Many authors, such as Andrew Ross and Stanley Aronowitz, have taken up the cudgels against S&B. But their replies often miss the mark either by arguing at too abstract a level against S&B's project as a whole (...) or employing strategies and principles drawn from the self same body of texts which S&B criticize. In this article, by contrast, I reply to specific criticisms S&B direct against Lacan's use of topological concepts. By showing that S&B miss a perfectly reasonable, mathematically acceptable way of reading Lacan's appropriation of topology, I intend to raise more general doubts about S&B's erudition in connection with the works they criticise. (shrink)

The work of the distinguished philosopher Sarah Kofman has, since her tragic death in 1994, become a focus for many scholars interested in contemporary French philosophy. The first critical collection on her thought to appear in English, Enigmas evaluates Kofman's most important contributions to philosophy, psychoanalytic theory, feminism, and literary theory. These insightful essays range from analyses of Kofman's first book, L'Enfance de l'art, to her last, L'Imposture de la beauté. This unique volume represents the major themes in Kofman's (...) scholarship: literature and aesthetics; philosophy and metaphor; women, feminism, and psychoanalysis; and Jews and German nationalism. Selected essays explore and diagnose Kofman's personal struggles as they are reflected in her writing. (shrink)

Of the triple criticism that Claude Lefort claimed to find in Machiavelli – against tyranny, bourgeois conservatism and democratic idealism – little attention is usually paid to the last one. In this article, we will demonstrate that the greatest work of the French philosopher, Le Travail de l'œuvre, Machiavel (1972), in addition to a critique of tyranny and oligarchic rule, constitutes above all a long demonstration of the way in which democracy ends up finding her most potent enemy in the (...) idealized image of itself. Following in the footsteps of Lefort's Machiavelli, we will see the character of the conspirator emerge to the foreground, who will bring to the scene the proposition of the inevitability of the imposture of power and the defense of the indispensability and legitimacy of the illegal act undertaken against illegitimate legality. (shrink)

Impostors, confidence artists, and artful deceivers seem to have achieved a strange kind of popularity and even prestige in our contemporary political landscape, for reasons that remain elusive, especially given how harmful and socially unwanted such behaviors ostensibly are. Herman Melville’s 1857 novel, The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, helps us shift our perspective on this seemingly irrational phenomenon because it points out how being susceptible to dupery is linked to the enjoyment of fiction itself. This insight also highlights the importance of (...) epistemological failure in the recent “return to aesthetics” in literary studies, where the positive dimension of unconsciously “willing one’s dupery” directly links aesthetic form to politics. The logic that connects aesthetics to unconscious enjoyment is then elaborated in the work of psychoanalytic thinkers such as Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Helene Deutsch and others to raise particular questions about how and why the enjoyment of being duped has been associated with feminine sexuality. Reading Melville’s novel while considering psychoanalytic concepts such as the “as if” personality, imposture, and interpassivity illuminates how confidence games play upon the ruses of sexuality, which have profound implications for why the public remains in thrall to the workings of known deceivers. (shrink)