Previous work has demonstrated that simple geometric shapes may convey emotional meaning using various experimental paradigms. However, whether affective meaning of simple geometric shapes can be automatically activated and influence the evaluations of subsequent stimulus is still unclear. Thus the present study employed an affective priming paradigm to investigate whether and how two geometric shapes (circle vs. downward triangle) impact on the affective processing of subsequently presented faces (Experiment 1) and words (Experiment 2). At behavioral level, no significant (...) effect of affective congruency was found. However, ERP results in Experiment 1 and 2 showed a typical effect of affective congruency. The LPP elicited by affectively incongruent trials was larger compared to congruent trials. Our results provide support for the notion that downward triangle is perceived as negative and circle as positive and their emotional meaning can be activated automatically and then exert an influence on the electrophysiological processing of subsequent stimuli. The lack of significant congruent effect in behavioral measures and the inversed N400 congruent effect might reveal that the affective meaning of geometric shapes is weak because they are just abstract threatening cues rather than real threat. In addition, because no male participants are included in the present study, our findings are limited to females. (shrink)

This intriguing new book examines and analyses the role of critical realism in economics and specifically how this line of thought can be applied to the real world. With contributions from such varying commentators as Sheila Dow, Wendy Olsen and Fred Lee, this new book is unique in its approach and will be of great interest to both economic methodologists and those involved in applied economic studies.

Logic has acquired a reputation for difficulty, perhaps because many of the approaches adopted have been more suitable for mathematicians than computer scientists. This book shows that the subject is not inherently difficult and that the connections between logic and declarative language are straightforward. Many exercises have been included in the hope that these will lead to a much greater confidence in manual proofs, therefore leading to a greater confidence in automated proofs.

Schoenflies point groups are presented in terms of spatial partitions and Laue classes based on abstract groups. A much simpler system using only a minimal set of generators for three dimensional groups is then presented in the same form. This simplified treatment allows group operations of a given Laue class to be correlated to a greatly simplified Mulliken-style notation for irreducible representations of that class. Transformation matrix representations of point groups in the simplified style can then be manipulated according to (...) their position in the class or to their sub-groups in very clear procedures. Simple rules can replace the large numbers of tables necessary in the Schoenflies approach. Some applications of the method are described. (shrink)

The proteins encoded by the ras proto‐oncogenes play critical roles in normal cellular growth, differentiation and development in addition to their potential for malignant transformation. Several proteins that are involved in the control of the activity of p21ras have now been characterised. p120GAP stimulates the GTPase activity of p21ras and hence acts as a negative regulator of ras proteins. It may be controlled by tyrosine phosphorylation or association with tyrosine phosphorylated proteins. The neurofibromatosis type 1 (NF 1) gene also encodes (...) a potential GTPase activating protein which is likely to be subject to a different control mechanism. Guanosine nucleotide exchange factors for p21ras have now been identified: these may be positive regulators of ras protein function. It appears that p21ras is subject to rapid regulation by several distinct mechanisms which are likely to vary in different cell types; the ras proteins are thereby able to act as very sensitive cellular monitors of the extracellular environment. (shrink)

The book deals with the notion of Downward Causation from a wide array of perspectives, including physics, biology, psychology, social science, communication studies, text theory, and philosophy. The book includes proponents as well as opponents discussing the validity of the notion.

Downward causation exercised by emergent properties of wholes upon their lower-level constituents’ properties has been accused of conceptual and metaphysical incoherence. Only upward causation is usually peacefully accepted. The aim of this paper is to criticize and refuse the traditional hierarchical-vertical way of conceiving both types of causation, although preserving their deepest ontological significance, as well as the widespread acceptance of the traditional atomistic-combinatorial view of the entities and the relations that constitute the so-called ‘emergence base’. Assuming those two (...) perspectives with no reserves, we are condemned to confine our debate to the question of whether reified wholes can have the power to downwardly change or influence their lower-level parts, a question which seems profoundly misleading to me. I therefore propose an alternative relational ontological view, assuming a straightforward horizontal and intra-level way of representing those putative cases of cross-level causation. I finally confront two recent replies to Kim’s well-known objections to DC—Craver and Bechtel and Kistler :595–609, 2009)—, emphasizing their global positive approaches, as well as the reasons why their accounts still seem insufficient to me. I conclude arguing that both Kim’s principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and its allegation of an overdetermination in cases of DC can be surpassed by the new relational ontological perspective presented here. (shrink)

Recent developments in nonlinear dynamics have found wide application in many areas of science from physics to neuroscience. Nonlinear phenomena such as feedback loops, inter-level relations, wholes constraining and modifying the behavior of their parts, and memory effects are interesting candidates for emergence and downward causation. Rayleigh–Bénard convection is an example of a nonlinear system that, I suggest, yields important insights for metaphysics and philosophy of science. In this paper I propose convection as a model for downward causation (...) in classical mechanics, far more robust and less speculative than the examples typically provided in the philosophy of mind literature. Although the physics of Rayleigh–Bénard convection is quite complicated, this model provides a much more realistic and concrete example for examining various assumptions and arguments found in emergence and philosophy of mind debates. After reviewing some key concepts of nonlinear dynamics, complex systems and the basic physics of Rayleigh–Bénard convection, I begin that examination here by (1) assessing a recently proposed definition for emergence and downward causation, (2) discussing some typical objections to downward causation and (3) comparing this model with Sperry’s examples. (shrink)

Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science (Bedau 1997). After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergence.

This work empirically tests the concept of the ‘whistleblowing triangle,’ which is modeled on the three factors encapsulated by the fraud triangle, in the Indonesian context. Anchored in the proposition of an original research framework on the whistleblowing triangle and derived hypotheses, this work aims to expand the body of knowledge on this topic by providing empirical evidence. The sample used is taken from audit firms affiliated with both the big 4 and non-big 4 companies operating in (...) Indonesia. The results of analysis using the PLS-PM method found a significant relationship between the components of the whistleblowing triangle and the intention of blowing the whistle. We found that financial incentives are the most significant predictor of auditors’ intention to blow the whistle in Indonesia. Other components, such as opportunity and rationalization, also play an important role in supporting auditors’ intention to blow the whistle. Our findings also suggest that related pressures are the top priority for audit firms in Indonesia to consider in increasing whistleblowing intention. We expand the previous literature on whistleblowing which has been derived from the components of the fraud triangle :28–56, 2016; Smaili and Arroyo in J Bus Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3663-7, 2017) by adding empirical evidence. (shrink)

Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical distinction between the higher and basic levels of organization is supposed, but only a duality of modes of access. Moreover, these modes of access are not construed as mere ways of revealing intrinsic patterns of organization: They are supposed to be constitutive of them, in Kant’s sense. The emergent levels of organization, and the inter-level causations as well, are therefore neither illusory nor ontologically real: They are objective in the (...) sense of transcendental epistemology. This neo-Kantian approach defuses several paradoxes associated with the concept of downward causation, and enables one to make good sense of it independently of any prejudice about the existence (or inexistence) of a hierarchy of levels of being. (shrink)

Recently, Trenton Merricks has defended a libertarian view of human freedom. He claims that human persons have downward causal control of their constituent parts, and that downward causal control of this sort is sufficient for free will. In this paper I examine Merricks’s defense of free will, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I show that having downward causal control is not sufficient for for free will. In an Appendix I also argue that Merricks’s defense of free (...) will, together with assumptions implicit in his broader ontology, commit him to the implausible conclusion that determinism is incompatible with the existence of human persons. (shrink)

The 'completeness of physics' is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downwards causation. I argue that it must do this if it is tare in a valid causal argument for physicalism. Drawing on the notion of conferring causal power, I formulate a suitable principle, 'strong completeness'. I investigate the metaphysical implications of distinguishing this principle from emergent downwards causation, and I argue that categoricalist accounts of properties are better (...) equipped to sustain the distinction than dispositional essentialist accounts. Finally, I argue that the additional evidence needed for strong completeness renders the causal argument otiose for any properties amenable to scientific reduction. (shrink)

A transitive model M of ZFC is called a ground if the universe V is a set forcing extension of M. We show that the grounds ofV are downward set-directed. Consequently, we establish some fundamental theorems on the forcing method and the set-theoretic geology. For instance, the mantle, the intersection of all grounds, must be a model of ZFC. V has only set many grounds if and only if the mantle is a ground. We also show that if the (...) universe has some very large cardinal, then the mantle must be a ground. (shrink)

One of the main line of responses to the infamous causal exclusion problem has been based on the counterfactual account of causation. However, arguments have begun to surface to the effect that the counterfactual theory is in fact ill-equipped to solve the exclusion problem due to its commitment to downward causation. This argumentation is here critically analysed. An analysis of counterfactual dependence is presented and it is shown that if the semantics of counterfactuals is taken into account carefully enough, (...) the counterfactual notion of causation does not need to be committed to downward causation. However, it is a further question whether this is eventually enough to solve the exclusion problem for the analysis shows how the problem itself can take various different forms. (shrink)

Downward causation is a widespread and problematic phenomenon. It is typically defined as the causation of lower-level effects by higher-level entities. Downward causation is widespread, as there are many examples of it across different sciences: a cell constraints what happens to its own constituents; a body regulates its own processes; two atoms, when they are appropriately related, make it the case that their own electrons are distributed in certain ways. However, downward causation is also problematic. Roughly, it (...) seems to be at odds with specific scientific and/or epistemological desiderata: first and foremost, that everything can be reduced (one day or another) to the fundamental, micro-physical constituents and goings-on of the universe, so as to provide a unified explanation of everything and a unification of all the sciences " from the bottom ". Indeed, downward causation (if it is an irreducible phenomenon) introduces special causings not only at the higher levels, but also at the lower ones: if, in principle, we cannot fully understand what happens to the electrons without paying attention to the atoms (at the higher level) and we cannot fully understand what happens to the atoms by only paying attention to the electrons (at the lower level), there is no fully lower-level explanation for both higher-level and lower-level goings-on. In this introduction, we shall try to describe the prospects for downward causation in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. After having delved into the connections between downward causation, emergence and levels (§1), we shall discuss the irreducibility of downward causation (§2). We shall then briefly consider how specific metaphysical and epistemological assumptions bear on our understanding of downward causation and of its possibility (§3) and describe some views according to which downward causation is actually non-causal (or it is a special causal relation) (§4). We shall also mention some problems for the connection between downward causation and mental causation (§5) and some scientific examples of downward causation (§6). Finally, we shall summarize the contents of the contributions in this book (§7). (shrink)

Enabling constraints are bottom up causes which create the possibility of the existence of a system. Disabling constraints reduce the degrees of freedom and narrow the choices of the system which are structural, functional, meaningful relations that assign executive roles to the component parts. In this paper, we discuss causality as enabling and disabling constraints in order to critique the absurdity of transitivity in causal relations. If downward causation is viewed as causation by constraints, we argue that it will (...) not face the absurdity of self-causation which is incurred because of the transitivity principle. In the process of self-organization, organizationally new structures are created from the lower level subcomponents of the system. Such self-organizing systems can be broadly considered as sui-generis and transcend the transitivity principle by causally influencing its subcomponents. These higher level systemic constraints that causally influence the components in a self-organizing system without violating any physical laws via causal constraints are termed as Downward Causation. (shrink)

Digital computers carry out algorithms coded in high level programs. These abstract entities determine what happens at the physical level: they control whether electrons flow through specific transistors at specific times or not, entailing downward causation in both the logical and implementation hierarchies. This paper explores how this is possible in the light of the alleged causal completeness of physics at the bottom level, and highlights the mechanism that enables strong emergence (the manifest causal effectiveness of application programs) to (...) occur. Although synchronic emergence of higher levels from lower levels is manifestly true, diachronic emergence is generically not the case; indeed we give specific examples where it cannot occur because of the causal effectiveness of higher level variables. (shrink)

The concept of downward causation is frequently used in an explanatory capacity in biology to account for certain regularities and processes. Some philosophers, however, argue that downward causation is metaphysically incoherent, providing three main objections. Underlying these objections is the assumption that entities are connected by compositional hierarchies of levels of organization. In this paper, I introduce the notions of weak and strong compositional relations using examples from evolutionary developmental biology. I argue that downward causation becomes unproblematic (...) if we use features of interventionist theories of causation to explain the causal relations between levels. I show that an interventionist account of downward causation successfully responds to the three central objections to downward causation in the philosophical literature and I clarify the explanatory usefulness of the concept in biology. As such, this paper provides an epistemic solution to demystify downward causation in the context of scientific practice. The solution proposed is compatible with how biologists seem to use a concept of downward causation fruitfully in their work. (shrink)

Experimental investigation of mechanisms seems to make use of causal relations that cut across levels of composition. In bottom-up experiments, one intervenes on parts of a mechanism to observe the whole; in top-down experiments, one intervenes on the whole mechanism to observe certain parts of it. It is controversial whether such experiments really make use of interlevel causation, and indeed whether the idea of causation across levels is even conceptually coherent. Craver and Bechtel have suggested that interlevel causal claims can (...) be analysed in a causal and a non-causal component. I accept this idea but argue that their account should be modified so as to account of cases of apparent downward causation. First, constitution must be distinguished from identity; second, the analysis of downward causation requires the concept of a partial constraint. An analysis along these lines shows that the possibility of downward causation is not refuted by Kim's argument according to which it is incompatible with the completeness of physics. (shrink)

Tim Maudlin argues that we should take facts about distance to be analyzed in terms of facts about path lengths. His reason is that if we take distances to be fundamental, we must stipulate that constraints like the triangle inequality hold, but we get these constraints for free if we take path lengths to be prior. I argue that Maudlin is mistaken. Even if we take path lengths as primitive, the triangle inequality follows only if we stipulate that (...) the fundamental properties and relations obey constraints that are just as puzzling as the triangle inequality. (shrink)

Peirce's pragmatic notion of semiosis can be described in terms of a multi-level system of constraints involving chance, efficient, formal and final causation. According to the model proposed here, law-like regularities, which work as boundary conditions or organizational principles, have a downward effect on the spatiotemporal distribution of lower-level semiotic items. We treat this downward determinative influence as a propensity relation: if some lower-level entities a,b,c,-n are under the influence of a general organizational principle, W, they will show (...) a tendency to behave in certain specific ways, and, thus, to instantiate a set of specific processes. Our goal in this paper is to examine the role of downward determination in semiotic systems, conceived as multi-level hierarchical systems. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a unified account of systemic emergence, downward causation, and interlevel integrative explanations. First, I argue for a relational-transformational notion of emergence and a structural-relational account of downward causation in terms of both its transformational and conditioning effects. In my view, downward causation can avoid the problems traditionally attributed to it, provided that we are able to reconceptualize the notion of ‘whole’ and that form of causality in a purely relational way. In this (...) regard, I distinguish contextual or whole-to-part causation from downward causation, the latter defined by the existence of second-order structural relations. Finally, I argue that while emergence and downward-structural causation imply the in-principle failure of micro-determinism and therefore micro-reduction, they do not rule out the possibility of any type of explanation. On the contrary, they call for the development of interlevel integrative explanations. (shrink)

This paper defends the notion of downward causation. I will seek to elucidate this notion, explain why it is a useful way of thinking, and respond to criticisms attacking its intelligibility. My account of downward causation will be in many respects similar to the account recently advanced by Ellis. The overall framework I will adopt is the interventionist treatment of causation I have defended elsewhere: X causes Y when Y changes under a suitable manipulation of X. When X (...) is at a higher “level” than Y this allows for the possibility of downward causation from X to Y. True claims of downward causation must meet certain additional conditions, some of which have already been discussed by Ellis. These include the condition that X must have a homogenous effect on Y in the sense that the effect of X on Y must be the same regardless of how X is “realized” at lower levels. In addition, the most plausible examples of downward causation will involve causes X, that in a sense that I will try to specify, are capable of being manipulated by macro-level interventions that have a coordinated or organized impact on them, as when one manipulates the temperature of a gas by placing it in a heat bath.Three common criticisms of the notion of downward causation that I will consider are: the claim that this involves a whole acting downward on its parts which is an objectionable idea because wholes and parts are not sufficiently distinct to stand in causal relationships, that downward causation commits us to the existence of causal cycles in which X causes Y which in turn causes X and that the asymmetric nature of the causal relation rules out such cycles, and causal exclusion type worries, according to which all of the causal action occurs among “low level” variables, so that upper level variables are deprived of causal efficacy. In response I will argue that plausible examples of downward causation in the scientific literature do not involve whole to part causation, there is nothing wrong with causal cycles, which are common in, for example, biological contexts, exclusion type worries do not arise within the interventionist framework that I favor. (shrink)

In the context of proliferation of many logical systems in the area of mathematical logic and computer science, we present a generalization of forcing in institution-independent model theory which is used to prove two abstract results: Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and Omitting Types Theorem . We instantiate these general results to many first-order logics, which are, roughly speaking, logics whose sentences can be constructed from atomic formulas by means of Boolean connectives and classical first-order quantifiers. These include first-order logic , (...) logic of order-sorted algebras , preorder algebras , as well as their infinitary variants \ , \ , \ . In addition to the first technique for proving OTT, we develop another one, in the spirit of institution-independent model theory, which consists of borrowing the Omitting Types Property from a simpler institution across an institution comorphism. As a result we export the OTP from FOL to partial algebras and higher-order logic with Henkin semantics , and from the institution of \ to \ and \ . The second technique successfully extends the domain of application of OTT to non conventional logical systems for which the standard methods may fail. (shrink)

In discussing the relationship between genetically influenced differences and educational attainment (EA), Burt employs the concept of downward causation. I note the similarities between Burt's concept of downward causation and the sociogenomics concept of vertical pleiotropy and argue that her discussion of downward causation introduces an unnecessary normative component. The core problem concerns not the appropriateness of phenotypes that influence EA but mistaken assumptions about which phenotypes are being predicted.

Continuing, we study the Strong Downward Löwenheim–Skolem Theorems of the stationary logic and their variations. In Fuchino et al. it has been shown that the SDLS for the ordinary stationary logic with weak second-order parameters \. This SDLS is shown to be equivalent to an internal version of the Diagonal Reflection Principle down to an internally stationary set of size \. We also consider a version of the stationary logic and show that the SDLS for this logic in internal (...) interpretation \\) for reflection down to \ is consistent under the assumption of the consistency of ZFC \ “the existence of a supercompact cardinal” and this SDLS implies that the continuum is weakly Mahlo. These three “axioms” in terms of SDLS are consequences of three instances of a strengthening of generic supercompactness which we call Laver-generic supercompactness. Existence of a Laver-generic supercompact cardinal in each of these three instances also fixes the cardinality of the continuum to be \ or \ or very large respectively. We also show that the existence of one of these generic large cardinals implies the “\” version of the corresponding forcing axiom. (shrink)

Many researchers consider cancer to have molecular causes, namely mutated genes that result in abnormal cell proliferation (e.g. Weinberg 1998); yet for others, the causes of cancer are to be found not at the molecular level but at the tissue level and carcinogenesis would consist in a disrupted tissue organization with downward causation effects on cells and cellular components (e.g. Sonnenschein & Soto 2008). In this contribution, I ponder how to make sense of such downward causation claims. Adopting (...) a manipulationist account of causation (Woodward 2003), I propose a formal definition of downward causation, and discuss further requirements (in light of Baumgartner 2009). I then show that such an account cannot be mobilized in support of non-reductive physicalism (contrary to Raatikainen 2010). However, I also argue that such downward causation claims might point at particularly interesting dynamic properties of causal relationships that might prove salient in characterizing causal relationships (following Woodward 2010). (shrink)

Kim has argued that in the layered model of reality shared by nonreductive physicalism and by emergentism, the assumed dependence of the mental level on the physical level leaves no room for downward causation. In his analysis Kim assumes that causal relata are events, conceived of as exemplifications of properties by particulars at a certain time. But if causal relata are conceived of in different ways and causation is appropriately understood, one can find room in the layered model for (...) downward causation with different degrees of strength. A mild form of downward causation somehow arises from the identification of causal relata with tropes. A stronger form comes from an appeal to generic events as causal relata. Finally, an even stronger form emerges from causal relata understood as free exercisings of powers to will. (shrink)

The book includes contributions by Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, George F. R. Ellis, Christopher D. Frith, Mark Hallett, David Hodgson, Owen D. Jones, Alicia Juarrero, J. A. Scott Kelso, Christof Koch, Hans Küng, Hakwan C. Lau, Dean Mobbs,...

We propose a construct, the Trust Triangle, that highlights three primary mechanisms that provide ex post accountability for opportunistic behavior and motivate ex ante trust in economic relationships. The mechanisms are a society’s legal and regulatory framework, market-based discipline and reputational capital, and culture, including individual ethics and social norms. The Trust Triangle provides a framework to conceptualize the relationships between trust, corporate accountability, legal liability, reputation, and culture. We use the Trust Triangle to summarize recent developments (...) in the empirical finance literature that examine how trust is formed and how trust, or its absence, affects financial markets, firm performance, and the incidence of financial fraud. To date, most studies examine only one leg of the Trust Triangle in isolation. The evidence, however, indicates that all three legs of the Trust Triangle have first-order effects on a wide range of financial outcomes and that they are interrelated. Attempts to model trust and trustworthiness that do not incorporate all three aspects of the Trust Triangle will therefore miss essential aspects of the basic economic problem of how counterparties overcome the risks of moral hazard, asymmetric information, and opportunism to engage in mutually beneficial exchange and production activities. We focus especially on culture-related mechanisms, a recently developed area in empirical finance research that has potential to influence the more established research on laws and reputation. (shrink)

One of the main challenges of the nonreductionist approach to complex structures and phenomena in philosophy of biology is its defense of the plausibility of the theory of emergence and downward causation. The tension between remaining faithful to the rules of physicalism and physical causal closure, while defending the novelty and distinctiveness of emergents from their basal constituents, makes the argumentation of many proponents of emergentism lacking in coherency and precision. In this article I aim at answering the suggestion (...) of several thinkers to redefine emergence and downward causation in terms of the broader Aristotelian view of causation. In addition, I further develop this interdisciplinary conversation to include theological implications of emergentism, analyzed in reference to Aquinas’ understanding of divine action in terms of the same fourfold division of causes—bringing thus natural science, philosophy, and theology into creative and fruitful dialogue. (shrink)

J.P. Moreland—Christian philosopher, theologian, and apologist—issues a call to recapture the drama and power of kingdom living—to cultivate a revolution of Evangelical life, spirituality, thought, and Spirit-led power. Drawing insights from the early church, he unpacks three essential ingredients of this revolution: Recovery of the Christian mind. Renovation of Christian spirituality. Restoration of the power of the Holy Spirit. Western society is in crisis: the result of our culture's embrace of naturalism and postmodernism, and a biblical worldview has been pushed (...) to the margins. Christians have been strongly influenced by these trends, with the result that their personal lives often reflect the surrounding culture more than the way of Christ, and the church's transforming influence on society has waned as a result. Kingdom Triangle is divided into two major sections: The first examines and provides a critique of secular worldviews and shows how they have ushered in the current societal crisis. The second lays out a strategy for the Christian community to regain the potency of kingdom life and influence in the world. Moreland believes that evangelical Christianity can mature and lead the surrounding society out of the meaningless morass it finds itself in with humility and vision. With clear insight, he puts the thoughtful Christian in a position to understand our current cultural struggle and to return to a responsible presentation of "the way of Christ" as not just a way of right living, but also a way of knowledge and meaningful life. (shrink)

The fact that Pentecostal Christianity is the fastest growing form of Christianity in Africa can no longer be a subject of debate. Christianity, one of the major religions in the world, has been growing at unprecedented rates in sub-Saharan Africa. What is being observed on the religious atmosphere is the Pentecostalisation of African Christianity in Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular. From 2009 onwards, Zimbabwe has experienced a mushrooming spree of contemporary Pentecostalism. Though conglomerate in nature, three ecclesiastical figures (...) overshadow the rest, namely Emmanuel Makandiwa’s United Family International Church, Uebert Angel of Good News Church and Walter Magaya of Prophetic, Healing and Deliverance Ministries. The three Pentecostal figures became highly popular through the propagation of the Gospel of Prosperity with vigour and vitality. Their presence in the Zimbabwean religious arena has attracted mixed perceptions. Some people view them as rippers of peoples’ hard-earned monies, while others regard them as true prophets – the messengers of God. The million-dollar question remains: Are they catalysts or antidotes to downward social mobility? This article grapples to assess whether the ‘Big Three’ contemporary Pentecostal prophets serve as propellers or dispellers of downward social mobility. The Big Three are antidotes based on three arguments: (1) Propagation of the Gospel of Prosperity, (2) miracle performances and (3) societal empowerment champions. On the other hand, the prophets are catalysts based on three arguments: white-collar prophecy, negation of social justice and preferential option for the Powerful. Through the application of the justitia pro-povo oprimido liberation hermeneutics, the study argues that the ‘Big Three’ ecclesiastical clergymen serve more as catalysts to downward social mobility than antidotes to downward social mobility. The justitia pro-povo oprimido liberation hermeneutics is a new methodological approach invented by the author based on liberation theology that sees Christianity as seeking the justice of the oppressed. Contribution: The article critically reflects on rise of contemporary Pentecostalism in Zimbabwe focussing on the three outstanding prophets – Emmanuel Makandiwa, Uebert Angel and Walter Magaya. While the three clergymen contributed immensely, both positively and negatively to the rise and development of African Pentecostalisation of Zimbabwe, the justitia pro-povo oprimido liberation hermeneutics reveals the contemporary Pentecostal figures as propellers of downward social mobility. (shrink)

With the purpose to understand better the role of information not only in communication systems, but actually in our environmental reality, this paper presented the model of Universal Triangle of Reality, composed by Matter, Energy and Information, as fundamental constitutive components of this reality. Arguments coming from the field of physics, both at the cosmic and microparticles scale are presented, showing undoubtable conclusions that information is a fundamental component of reality in our material world. At the cosmic level, where (...) the unusual high concentration of mass in the black holes constitutes a special state of matter, suitable for analysis of their special properties, the problem of the conservation principle of information is discussed. At the quantum level, the special unusual characteristics derived from the non-localization principle are also highlighted, together with information-involved problems and solutions. The Universal Triangle of Reality in the living systems reveals the high role of the involved information, both as the informational common organization on the entire evolution scale, and as the info-dynamics processes inside of own structure and resulted from interaction with the environment. The relevant advances in the approaching and understanding of the functionality of the living systems from informational point of view are highlighted, showing the high contribution of information concepts in understanding/solving of various older/recent problems in philosophy, neuroscience/neurology/psychiatry, neuro-physics/neuropsychology/behavior sciences, geriatrics/gerontology, biology and life sciences. Keywords: information-matter-energy, universal triangle of reality in non-living and living systems, informational system of human body and living structures, neurosciences and life sciences. (shrink)

In the present article, we consider the question of the primary elements in Plato’s Timaeus, the components of the whole universe reduced, by an extraordinarily elegant construction, to two right triangles. But how does he reconcile such a model with the infinite diversity of the universe? A large part of this study is devoted to Cornford’s explanation in his commentary of the Timaeus and its shortcomings, in order to finally propose a revised one, which we think to be entirely consistent (...) with Plato’s text. This analysis is an essential step for the understanding of the connection between the sensible world and the mathematical principles that underlies Timaeus’ cosmological account. (shrink)

We introduce a notion of pseudo-reachability in Gaifman graphs and suggest a graph-theoretic and uniform approach to the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorems for partition logics as well as logics with general Malitz quantifiers.

Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...) claim about epistemic value—what I label ‘Downwards Propriety’—much stronger than any they have offered justification. The second part of this paper offers an argument that this challenge cannot be met: that there is no hope for providing a purely axiological justification of Downwards Propriety, at least given widely accepted assumptions about epistemic value. (shrink)

We present a downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem which transfers downward formulas from L ∞,ω to L κ +, ω . The simplest instance is: Theorem 1. Let $\lambda > \kappa$ be infinite cardinals, and let L be a similarity type of cardinality κ at most. For every L-structure M of cardinality λ and every $X \subseteq M$ there exists a model $N \prec M$ containing the set X of power |X| · κ such that for every pair of finite (...) sequences a, b ∈ N $\langle N, \mathbf{a}\rangle \equiv_{\| N \|^+,\omega} \langle N, \mathbf{b}\rangle \Leftrightarrow \langle M, \mathbf{a}\rangle \equiv_{\infty,\omega} \langle M, \mathbf{b}\rangle.$ The following theorem is an application: Theorem 2. Let $\lambda , and suppose χ is a Ramsey cardinal greater than λ. If T has the (χ, L κ +, ω -unsuperstability property, then T has the (χ, L λ +, ω )-unsuperstability property. (shrink)

This note concerns the model theoretic properties of logics extending the first-order logic with monadic second-order variables equipped with the stationarity quantifier. The eight variations of the strong downward Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem down to <ℵ2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$<\aleph _2$$\end{document} for this logic with the interpretation of second-order variables as countable subsets of the structures are classified into four principles. The strongest of these four is shown to be equivalent to the conjunction of CH and (...) the Diagonal Reflection Principle for internally clubness of S. Cox. We show that a further strengthening of this SDLS and its variations follow from the Game Reflection Principle of B. König and its generalizations. (shrink)

Moving deftly among literary and visual arts, as well as the modern critical canon, Christopher Prendergast's book explores the meaning and value of representation as both a philosophical challenge (What does it mean to create an image that "stands for" something absent?) and a political issue (Who has the right to represent whom?). _The Triangle of Representation_ raises a range of theoretical, historical, and aesthetic questions, and offers subtle readings of such cultural critics as Raymond Williams, Paul de Man, (...) Edward Said, Walter Benjamin, and Hélène Cixous, in addition to penetrating investigations of visual artists like Gros, Ingres, and Matisse and significant insights into Proust and the onus of translating him. Above all, Prendergast's work is a striking display of how a firm grounding in theory is essential for the exploration of art and literature. (shrink)

This paper offers a speculative elaboration on downward workplace mobbing – the intentional and repeated inflictions of physical or psychological harm by superiors on subordinates within an organization. The authors cite research showing that workplace mobbing is not a marginal fact in today's organizations and that downward workplace mobbing is the most prevalent form. The authors also show that causes of and facilitating circumstances for downward workplace mobbing, mentioned by previous research, match current organizational shifts taking place (...) within a context of globalisation. This paper argues that it is not the organizational shifts themselves which are to "blame", but an inadequate transformation of leadership and power in reaction to those shifts. Using Foucault's power-knowledge-rules of right triad, the authors offer an explanation for downward workplace mobbing beyond the organizational changes themselves. More precisely, as the organizational changes can be characterized by a new power/knowledge bond calling forth new rules of right, downward workplace mobbing could be seen as manifestations of power outside of the delineations drawn by these new rules of right. In other words, downward workplace mobbing is pathology of current organizational shifts, resulting from not acting out the full ethical potential of the discourse of excellence, adventure, creativity and responsibility, which characterizes these shifts. (shrink)