Bi-intuitionistic logic is the result of adding the dual of intuitionistic implication to intuitionistic logic. In this note, we characterize the expressive power of this logic by showing that the first order formulas equivalent to translations of bi-intuitionistic propositional formulas are exactly those preserved under bi-intuitionistic directed bisimulations. The proof technique is originally due to Lindstrom and, in contrast to the most common proofs of this kind of result, it does not use (...) the machinery of neither saturated models nor elementary chains. (shrink)

The well-known algebraic semantics and topological semantics for intuitionistic logic (Int) is here extended to Wansing's bi-intuitionistic logic (2Int). The logic 2Int is also characterised by a quasi-twist structure semantics, which leads to an alternative topological characterisation of 2Int. Later, notions of Fregean negation and of unilateralisation are proposed. The logic 2Int is extended with a ‘Fregean negation’ connective ∼, obtaining 2Int∼, and it is showed that the logic N4⋆ (an extension of Nelson's (...) paraconsistent logic) results to be the unilateralisation of 2Int∼ via ∼. The logic 2Int∼ is also characterised by a Kripke-style semantics, a twist structure semantics and a topological semantics. (shrink)

We provide a direct method for proving Craig interpolation for a range of modal and intuitionistic logics, including those containing a "converse" modality. We demonstrate this method for classical tense logic, its extensions with path axioms, and for bi-intuitionistic logic. These logics do not have straightforward formalisations in the traditional Gentzen-style sequent calculus, but have all been shown to have cut-free nested sequent calculi. The proof of the interpolation theorem uses these calculi and is purely syntactic, (...) without resorting to embeddings, semantic arguments, or interpreted connectives external to the underlying logical language. A novel feature of our proof includes an orthogonality condition for defining duality between interpolants. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a bi-intuitionistic sequent calculus and to give proofs of admissibility for its structural rules. The calculus I will present, called SC2Int, is a sequent calculus for the bi-intuitionistic logic 2Int, which Wansing presents in [2016a]. There he also gives a natural deduction system for this logic, N2Int, to which SC2Int is equivalent in terms of what is derivable. What is important is that these calculi represent a kind of (...) bilateralist reasoning, since they do not only internalize processes of verifcation or provability but also the dual processes in terms of falsifcation or what is called dual provability. In [Wansing, 2017] a normal form theorem for N2Int is stated, here, I want to prove a cut-elimination theorem for SC2Int, i.e., if successful, this would extend the results existing so far. (shrink)

Bi-intuitionistic logic is the union of intuitionistic and dual intuitionistic logic, and was introduced by Rauszer as a Hilbert calculus with algebraic and Kripke semantics. But her subsequent ‘cut-free’ sequent calculus has recently been shown to fail cut-elimination. We present a new cut-free sequent calculus for bi-intuitionistic logic, and prove it sound and complete with respect to its Kripke semantics. Ensuring completeness is complicated by the interaction between intuitionistic implication and dual (...) class='Hi'>intuitionistic exclusion, similarly to future and past modalities in tense logic. Our calculus handles this interaction using derivations and refutations as first class citizens. We employ extended sequents which pass information from premises to conclusions using variables instantiated at the leaves of refutations, and rules which compose certain refutations and derivations to form derivations. Automated deduction using terminating backward search is also possible, although this is not our main purpose. (shrink)

We prove that certain natural sequent systems for bi-intuitionistic logic have the analytic cut property. In the process we show that the (global) subformula property implies the (local) analytic cut property, thereby demonstrating their equivalence. Applying a version of Maehara technique modified in several ways, we prove that bi-intuitionistic logic enjoys the classical Craig interpolation property and Maximova variable separation property; its Halldén completeness follows.

We propose a new sequent calculus for bi intuitionistic logic which sits somewhere between display calculi and traditional sequent calculi by using nested sequents. Our calculus enjoys a simple (purely syntactic) cut elimination proof as do display calculi. But it has an easily derivable variant calculus which is amenable to automated proof search as are (some) traditional sequent calculi. We first present the initial calculus and its cut elimination proof. We then present the derived calculus, and then present (...) a proof search strategy which allows it to be used for automated proof search. We prove that this search strategy is terminating and complete by showing how it can be used to mimic derivations obtained from an existing calculus GBiInt for bi intuitionistic logic. As far as we know, our new calculus is the first sequent calculus for bi intuitionistic logic which uses no semantic additions like labels, which has a purely syntactic cut elimination proof, and which can be used naturally for backwards proof search. Keywords: Bi-intuitionistic logic, display calculi, proof search. (shrink)

In this contribution, we will present some results concerning the connectives of bi-intuitionistic logic in the setting of Arnold Koslow’s implication structures. Furthermore, we will present soundness and completeness results of Koslow’s implication structures with respect to bi-intuitionistic logic.

We provide a sucient frame-theoretic condition for a super bi-intuitionistic logic to have Maksimova's variable separation property. We conclude that bi-intuitionistic logic enjoys the property. Furthermore, we offer an algebraic characterization of the super-bi-intuitionistic logics with Maksimova's property.

In this article we show that bi-intuitionistic predicate logic lacks the Craig Interpolation Property. We proceed by adapting the counterexample given by Mints, Olkhovikov and Urquhart for intuitionistic predicate logic with constant domains [13]. More precisely, we show that there is a valid implication $\phi \rightarrow \psi $ with no interpolant. Importantly, this result does not contradict the unfortunately named ‘Craig interpolation’ theorem established by Rauszer in [24] since that article is about the property more correctly (...) named ‘deductive interpolation’ (see Galatos, Jipsen, Kowalski and Ono’s use of this term in [5]) for global consequence. Given that the deduction theorem fails for bi-intuitionistic logic with global consequence, the two formulations of the property are not equivalent. (shrink)

In this paper, bi-intuitionistic multilattice logic, which is a combination of multilattice logic and the bi-intuitionistic logic also known as Heyting–Brouwer logic, is introduced as a Gentzen-type sequent calculus. A Kripke semantics is developed for this logic, and the completeness theorem with respect to this semantics is proved via theorems for embedding this logic into bi-intuitionistic logic. The logic proposed is an extension of first-degree entailment logic and can (...) be regarded as a bi-intuitionistic variant of the original classical multilattice logic determined by the algebraic structure of multilattices. Similar completeness and embedding results are also shown for another logic called bi-intuitionistic connexive multilattice logic, obtained by replacing the connectives of intuitionistic implication and co-implication with their connexive variants. (shrink)

We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justi cations and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic (...) as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the S4 modal translation, we give a de nition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is de ned and a probabilistic interpretation of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can express the notion of conjecture that p, de ned as a hypothesis that in some situation the truth of p is epistemically necessary. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce the notions of connexive and bi-intuitionistic multilattices and develop on their base the algebraic semantics for Kamide, Shramko, and Wansing’s connexive and bi-intuitionistic multilattice logics which were previously known in the form of sequent calculi and Kripke semantics. We prove that these logics are sound and complete with respect to the presented algebraic structures.

We consider a “polarized” version of bi-intuitionistic logic [5, 2, 6, 4] as a logic of assertions and hypotheses and show that it supports a “rich proof theory” and an interesting categorical interpretation, unlike the standard approach of C. Rauszer’s Heyting-Brouwer logic [28, 29], whose categorical models are all partial orders by Crolard’s theorem [8]. We show that P.A. Melliès notion of chirality [21, 22] appears as the right mathematical representation of the mirror symmetry between the (...) intuitionistic and co-intuitionistc sides of polarized bi-intuitionism. Philosophically, we extend Dalla Pozza and Garola’s pragmatic interpretation of intuitionism as a logic of assertions [10] to bi-intuitionism as a logic of assertions and hypotheses. We focus on the logical role of illocutionary forces and justification conditions in order to provide “intended interpretations” of logical systems that classify inferential uses in natural language and remain acceptable from an intuitionistic point of view. Although Dalla Pozza and Garola originally provide a constructive interpretation of intuitionism in a classical setting, we claim that some conceptual refinements suffice to make their “pragmatic interpretation” a bona fide representation of intuitionism. We sketch a meaning-asuse interpretation of co-intuitionism that seems to fulfil the requirements of Dummett and Prawitz’s justificationist approach. We extend the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation to bi-intuitionism by regarding co-intuitionistic formulas as types of the evidence for them: if conclusive evidence is needed to justify assertions, only a scintilla of evidence suffices to justify hypotheses. (shrink)

We consider an approach to propositional synonymy in proof-theoretic semantics that is defined with respect to a bilateral G3-style sequent calculus \(\mathtt{SC2Int}\) for the bi-intuitionistic logic \(\mathtt{2Int}\). A distinctive feature of \(\mathtt{SC2Int}\) is that it makes use of two kind of sequents, one representing proofs, the other representing refutations. The structural rules of \(\mathtt{SC2Int}\), in particular its cut rules, are shown to be admissible. Next, interaction rules are defined that allow transitions from proofs to refutations, and vice versa, (...) mediated through two different negation connectives, the well-known implies-falsity negation and the less well-known coimplies-truth negation of \(\mathtt{2Int}\). By assuming that the interaction rules have no impact on the identity of derivations, the concept of inherited identity between derivations in \(\mathtt{SC2Int}\) is introduced and the notions of positive and negative synonymy of formulas are defined. Several examples are given of distinct formulas that are either positively or negatively synonymous. It is conjectured that the two conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously. (shrink)

Intuitionistic propositional logic with Galois negations ( \(\mathsf {IGN}\) ) is introduced. Heyting algebras with Galois negations are obtained from Heyting algebras by adding the Galois pair \((\lnot,{\sim })\) and dual Galois pair \((\dot{\lnot },\dot{\sim })\) of negations. Discrete duality between GN-frames and algebras as well as the relational semantics for \(\mathsf {IGN}\) are developed. A Hilbert-style axiomatic system \(\mathsf {HN}\) is given for \(\mathsf {IGN}\), and Galois negation logics are defined as extensions of \(\mathsf {IGN}\). We give (...) the bi-tense logic \(\mathsf {S4N}_t\) which is obtained from the minimal tense extension of the modal logic \(\mathsf {S4}\) by adding tense operators. We give a new extended Gödel translation \(\tau \) and prove that \(\mathsf {IGN}\) is embedded into \(\mathsf {S4N}_t\) by \(\tau \). Moreover, every Kripke-complete Galois negation logic _L_ is embedded into its tense companion \(\tau (L)\). (shrink)

We take the well-known intuitionistic modal logic of Fischer Servi with semantics in bi-relational Kripke frames, and give the natural extension to topological Kripke frames. Fischer Servi’s two interaction conditions relating the intuitionistic pre-order with the modal accessibility relation generalize to the requirement that the relation and its inverse be lower semi-continuous with respect to the topology. We then investigate the notion of topological bisimulation relations between topological Kripke frames, as introduced by Aiello and van Benthem, and (...) show that their topology-preserving conditions are equivalent to the properties that the inverse relation and the relation are lower semi-continuous with respect to the topologies on the two models. The first main result is that this notion of topological bisimulation yields semantic preservation w.r.t. topological Kripke models for both intuitionistic tense logics, and for their classical companion multi-modal logics in the setting of the Gödel translation. After giving canonical topological Kripke models for the Hilbert-style axiomatizations of the Fischer Servi logic and its classical companion logic, we use the canonical model in a second main result to characterize a Hennessy–Milner class of topological models between any pair of which there is a maximal topological bisimulation that preserve the intuitionistic semantics. (shrink)

We generalize intuitionistic tense logics to the multi-modal case by placing grammar logics on an intuitionistic footing. We provide axiomatizations for a class of base intuitionistic grammar logics as well as provide axiomatizations for extensions with combinations of seriality axioms and what we call "intuitionistic path axioms". We show that each axiomatization is sound and complete with completeness being shown via a typical canonical model construction.

Various four- and three-valued modal propositional logics are studied. The basic systems are modal extensions BK and BS4 of Belnap and Dunn's four-valued logic of firstdegree entailment. Three-valued extensions of BK and BS4 are considered as well. These logics are introduced semantically by means of relational models with two distinct evaluation relations, one for verification and the other for falsification. Axiom systems are defined and shown to be sound and complete with respect to the relational semantics and with respect (...) to twist structures over modal algebras. Sound and complete tableau calculi are presented as well. Moreover, a number of constructive non-modal logics with strong negation are faithfully embedded into BS4, into its three-valued extension B3S4, or into temporal BS4, BtS4. These logics include David Nelson's three-valued logic N3, the four-valued logic N4 bottom, the connexive logic C, and several extensions of bi-intuitionistic logic by strong negation. (shrink)

In this paper it is suggested to generalize our understanding of general (structural) proof theory and to consider it as a general theory of two kinds of derivations, namely proofs and dual proofs. The proposal is substantiated by (i) considerations on assertion, denial, and bi-lateralism, (ii) remarks on compositionality in proof-theoretic semantics, and (iii) comments on falsification and co-implication. The main formal result of the paper is a normal form theorem for the natural deduction proof system N2Int of the bi- (...) class='Hi'>intuitionistic logic 2Int. The proof makes use of the faithful embedding of 2Int into intuitionistic logic with respect to validity and shows that conversions of dual proofs can be sidestepped. (shrink)

In this paper I will develop a lambda-term calculus, lambda-2Int, for a bi-intuitionistic logic and discuss its implications for the notions of sense and denotation of derivations in a bilateralist setting. Thus, I will use the Curry-Howard correspondence, which has been well-established between the simply typed lambda-calculus and natural deduction systems for intuitionistic logic, and apply it to a bilateralist proof system displaying two derivability relations, one for proving and one for refuting. The basis will be (...) the natural deduction system of Wansing's bi-intuitionistic logic 2Int, which I will turn into a term-annotated form. Therefore, we need a type theory that extends to a two-sorted typed lambda-calculus. I will present such a term-annotated proof system for 2Int and prove a Dualization Theorem relating proofs and refutations in this system. On the basis of these formal results I will argue that this gives us interesting insights into questions about sense and denotation as well as synonymy and identity of proofs from a bilateralist point of view. (shrink)

We introduce a logic BI in which a multiplicative (or linear) and an additive (or intuitionistic) implication live side-by-side. The propositional version of BI arises from an analysis of the proof-theoretic relationship between conjunction and implication; it can be viewed as a merging of intuitionistic logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The naturality of BI can be seen categorically: models of propositional BI's proofs are given by bicartesian doubly closed categories, i.e., categories which freely (...) combine the semantics of propositional intuitionistic logic and propositional multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The predicate version of BI includes, in addition to standard additive quantifiers, multiplicative (or intensional) quantifiers ∀ new and ∃ new which arise from observing restrictions on structural rules on the level of terms as well as propositions. We discuss computational interpretations, based on sharing, at both the propositional and predicate levels. (shrink)

In this paper, we give a possible characterization of the distributivity on bi-approximation semantics. To this end, we introduce new notions of special elements on polarities and show that the distributivity is first-order definable on bi-approximation semantics. In addition, we investigate the dual representation of those structures and compare them with bi-approximation semantics for intuitionistic logic. We also discuss that two different methods to validate the distributivity—by the splitters and by the adjointness—can be explicated with the help of (...) the axiom of choice as well. (shrink)

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Väänänen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges’ semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by (...) the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O’Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural rôle, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural rôle. (shrink)

Non-classical generalizations of classical modal logic have been developed in the contexts of constructive mathematics and natural language semantics. In this paper, we discuss a general approach to the semantics of non-classical modal logics via algebraic representation theorems. We begin with complete lattices L equipped with an antitone operation ¬ sending 1 to 0, a completely multiplicative operation ◻, and a completely additive operation ◊. Such lattice expansions can be represented by means of a set X together with binary (...) relations ⊲, R, and Q, satisfying some first-order conditions, used to represent (L,¬), ◻, and ◊, respectively. Indeed, any lattice L equipped with such a ¬, a multiplicative ◻, and an additive ◊ embeds into the lattice of propositions of a frame (X,⊲,R,Q). Building on our recent study of "fundamental logic", we focus on the case where ¬ is dually self-adjoint (a≤¬b implies b≤¬a) and ◊¬a≤¬◻a. In this case, the representations can be constrained so that R=Q, i.e., we need only add a single relation to (X,⊲) to represent both ◻ and ◊. Using these results, we prove that a system of fundamental modal logic is sound and complete with respect to an elementary class of bi-relational structures (X,⊲,R). (shrink)

A theory of substructural negations as impossibility and as unnecessity based on bi-intuitionistic logic, also known as Heyting-Brouwer logic, has been developed by Takuro Onishi. He notes two problems for that theory and offers the identification of the two negations as a solution to both problems. The first problem is the lack of a structural rule corresponding with double negation elimination for negation as impossibility, DNE, and the second problem is a lack of correspondence between certain sequents (...) and a characterizing frame property. While the identification of negation as impossibility and negation as unnecessity does solve Onishi’s problems, in general it nevertheless seems desirable to keep the two notions separate. The present paper addresses the first problem by introducing a reformulation of Onishi’s display sequent calculus in a language of sequents that incorporates Boolean negation. Instead of identifying negation as impossibility and negation as unnecessity, a notion of weak frame correspondence is defined. It is observed that DNE weakly corresponds with a certain frame property, and two structural sequent rules are presented that together also weakly correspond with that frame property and allow one to derive DNE. Moreover, the reformulated display calculus has an independent motivation by considerations on proof-theoretic semantics. (shrink)

Karl Popper developed a theory of deductive logic in the late 1940s. In his approach, logic is a metalinguistic theory of deducibility relations that are based on certain purely structural rules. Logical constants are then characterized in terms of deducibility relations. Characterizations of this kind are also called inferential definitions by Popper. In this paper, we expound his theory and elaborate some of his ideas and results that in some cases were only sketched by him. Our focus is (...) on Popper's notion of duality, his theory of modalities, and his treatment of different kinds of negation. This allows us to show how his works on logic anticipate some later developments and discussions in philosophical logic, pertaining to trivializing connectives, the duality of logical constants, dual-intuitionistic logic, the conservativeness of language extensions, the existence of a bi-intuitionistic logic, the non-logicality of minimal negation, and to the problem of logicality in general. (shrink)

We give a novel approach to proving soundness and completeness for a logic (henceforth: the object-logic) that bypasses truth-in-a-model to work directly with validity. Instead of working with specific worlds in specific models, we reason with eigenworlds (i.e., generic representatives of worlds) in an arbitrary model. This reasoning is captured by a sequent calculus for a _meta_-logic (in this case, first-order classical logic) expressive enough to capture the semantics of the object-logic. Essentially, one has a (...) calculus of validity for the object-logic. The method proceeds through the perspective of reductive logic (as opposed to the more traditional paradigm of deductive logic), using the space of reductions as a medium for showing the behavioural equivalence of reduction in the sequent calculus for the object-logic and in the validity calculus. Rather than study the technique in general, we illustrate it for the logic of Bunched Implications (BI), thus IPL and MILL (without negation) are also treated. Intuitively, BI is the free combination of intuitionistic propositional logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic, which renders its meta-theory is quite complex. The literature on BI contains many similar, but ultimately different, algebraic structures and satisfaction relations that either capture only fragments of the logic (albeit large ones) or have complex clauses for certain connectives (e.g., Beth’s clause for disjunction instead of Kripke’s). It is this complexity that motivates us to use BI as a case-study for this approach to semantics. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to define a new logic $${\mathcal {SI}}$$ called semi-intuitionistic logic such that the semi-Heyting algebras introduced in [ 4 ] by Sankappanavar are the semantics for $${\mathcal {SI}}$$ . Besides, the intuitionistic logic will be an axiomatic extension of $${\mathcal {SI}}$$.

Dijkstra and Scholten have proposed a formalization of classical predicate logic on a novel deductive system as an alternative to Hilbert's style of proof and Gentzen's deductive systems. In this context we call it CED (Calculus of Equational Deduction). This deductive method promotes logical equivalence over implication and shows that there are easy ways to prove predicate formulas without the introduction of hypotheses or metamathematical tools such as the deduction theorem. Moreover, syntactic considerations (in Dijkstra's words, "letting the symbols (...) do the work") have led to the "calculational style," an impressive array of techniques for elegant proof constructions. In this paper, we formalize intuitionistic predicate logic according to CED with similar success. In this system (I-CED), we prove Leibniz's principle for intuitionistic logic and also prove that any (intuitionistic) valid formula of predicate logic can be proved in I-CED. (shrink)

We consider a logic which is semantically dual (in some precise sense of the term) to intuitionistic. This logic can be labeled as “falsification logic”: it embodies the Popperian methodology of scientific discovery. Whereas intuitionistic logic deals with constructive truth and non-constructive falsity, and Nelson's logic takes both truth and falsity as constructive notions, in the falsification logic truth is essentially non-constructive as opposed to falsity that is conceived constructively. We also briefly (...) clarify the relationships of our falsification logic to some other logical systems. (shrink)

Inquisitive logic is a research program seeking to expand the purview of logic beyond declarative sentences to include the logic of questions. To this end, inquisitive propositional logic extends classical propositional logic for declarative sentences with principles governing a new binary connective of inquisitive disjunction, which allows the formation of questions. Recently inquisitive logicians have considered what happens if the logic of declarative sentences is assumed to be intuitionistic rather than classical. In short, (...) what should inquisitive logic be on an intuitionistic base? In this paper, we provide an answer to this question from the perspective of nuclear semantics, an approach to classical and intuitionistic semantics pursued in our previous work. In particular, we show how Beth semantics for intuitionistic logic naturally extends to a semantics for inquisitive intuitionistic logic. In addition, we show how an explicit view of inquisitive intuitionistic logic comes via a translation into propositional lax logic, whose completeness we prove with respect to Beth semantics. (shrink)

Semi-intuitionistic logic is the logic counterpart to semi-Heyting algebras, which were defined by H. P. Sankappanavar as a generalization of Heyting algebras. We present a new, more streamlined set of axioms for semi-intuitionistic logic, which we prove translationally equivalent to the original one. We then study some formulas that define a semi-Heyting implication, and specialize this study to the case in which the formulas use only the lattice operators and the intuitionistic implication. We prove (...) then that all the logics thus obtained are equivalent to intuitionistic logic, and give their Kripke semantics. (shrink)

This paper is a reaction to the following remark by grzegorczyk: "the compound sentences are not a product of experiment. they arise from reasoning. this concerns also negations; we see that the lemon is yellow, we do not see that it is not blue." generally, in science the truth is ascertained as indirectly as falsehood. an example: a litmus-paper is used to verify the sentence "the solution is acid." this approach gives rise to a (very intuitionistic indeed) conservative extension (...) of the heyting logic satisfying natural duality laws. (shrink)

We show that intuitionistic logic is deductively equivalent to Connexive Heyting Logic ($$\textrm{CHL}$$ CHL ), hereby introduced as an example of a strongly connexive logic with an intuitive semantics. We use the reverse algebraisation paradigm: $$\textrm{CHL}$$ CHL is presented as the assertional logic of a point regular variety (whose structure theory is examined in detail) that turns out to be term equivalent to the variety of Heyting algebras. We provide Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style proof systems for (...) $$\textrm{CHL}$$ CHL ; moreover, we suggest a possible computational interpretation of its connexive conditional, and we revisit Kapsner’s idea of superconnexivity. (shrink)

Brouwer's views on the foundations of mathematics have inspired the study of intuitionistic logic, including the study of the intuitionistic propositional calculus and its extensions. The theory of these systems has become an independent branch of logic with connections to lattice theory, topology, modal logic and other areas. This paper aims to present a modern account of semantics for intuitionistic propositional systems. The guiding idea is that of a hierarchy of semantics, organized by increasing (...) generality: from the least general Kripke semantics on through Beth semantics, topological semantics, Dragalin semantics, and finally to the most general algebraic semantics. While the Kripke, topological, and algebraic semantics have been extensively studied, the Beth and Dragalin semantics have received less attention. We bring Beth and Dragalin semantics to the fore, relating them to the concept of a nucleus from pointfree topology, which provides a unifying perspective on the semantic hierarchy. (shrink)

The interplay of introduction and elimination rules for propositional connectives is often seen as suggesting a distinguished role for intuitionistic logic. We prove three formal results about intuitionistic propositional logic that bear on that perspective, and discuss their significance.

In the pioneering article and two papers, written jointly with McKinsey, Tarski developed the so-called algebraic and topological frameworks for the Intuitionistic Logic and the Lewis modal system. In this paper, we present an outline of modern systems with a topological tinge. We consider topological interpretation of basic systems GL and G of the provability logic in terms of the Cantor derivative and the Hausdorff residue.

There are basically two ways to view intuitionistic logic: as a philosophical‐foundational issue in mathematics; or as a technical discipline within mathematical logic. Considering first the philosophical aspects, for they will provide the motivation for the subject, this chapter follows L. E. J. Brouwer, the founding father of intuitionism. Although Brouwer himself contributed little to intuitionistic logic as seen from textbooks and papers, he did point the way for his successors.

I propose a new semantics for intuitionistic logic, which is a cross between the construction-oriented semantics of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov and the condition-oriented semantics of Kripke. The new semantics shows how there might be a common semantical underpinning for intuitionistic and classical logic and how intuitionistic logic might thereby be tied to a realist conception of the relationship between language and the world.

In recent years, the logic of questions and dependencies has been investigated in the closely related frameworks of inquisitive logic and dependence logic. These investigations have assumed classical logic as the background logic of statements, and added formulas expressing questions and dependencies to this classical core. In this paper, we broaden the scope of these investigations by studying questions and dependency in the context of intuitionistic logic. We propose an intuitionistic team semantics, (...) where teams are embedded within intuitionistic Kripke models. The associated logic is a conservative extension of intuitionistic logic with questions and dependence formulas. We establish a number of results about this logic, including a normal form result, a completeness result, and translations to classical inquisitive logic and modal dependence logic. (shrink)

Motivated by the definition of semi-Nelson algebras, a propositional calculus called semi-intuitionistic logic with strong negation is introduced and proved to be complete with respect to that class of algebras. An axiomatic extension is proved to have as algebraic semantics the class of Nelson algebras.

Dual-intuitionistic logics are logics proposed by Czermak , Goodman and Urbas . It is shown in this paper that there is a correspondence between Goodman's dual-intuitionistic logic and Nelson's constructive logic N−.

We introduce a probabilistic extension of propositional intuitionistic logic. The logic allows making statements such as P≥sα, with the intended meaning “the probability of truthfulness of α is at least s”. We describe the corresponding class of models, which are Kripke models with a naturally arising notion of probability, and give a sound and complete infinitary axiomatic system. We prove that the logic is decidable.

The interplay of introduction and elimination rules for propositional connectives is often seen as suggesting a distinguished role for intuitionistic logic. We prove three formal results concerning intuitionistic propositional logic that bear on that perspective, and discuss their significance. First, for a range of connectives including both negation and the falsum, there are no classically or intuitionistically correct introduction rules. Second, irrespective of the choice of negation or the falsum as a primitive connective, classical and (...) class='Hi'>intuitionistic consequence satisfy exactly the same structural, introduction, and elimination (briefly, elementary) rules. Third, for falsum as primitive only, intuitionistic consequence is the least consequence relation that satisfies all classically correct elementary rules. (shrink)