Dashtakī Shīrāzī, Ghiyās̲ al-Dīn Manṣūr, 1461-1542 ; Avicenna, 980-1037. Shafā. Ilāhīyāt ; Islamic philosophy - Early works to 20th century 4. Metaphysics - Early works to 20th century.

Dashtakī Shīrāzī's commentary on al-Suhrawardī's Hayākil al-nūr.

jild-i 1. Kitāb-i 1 tā kitāb-i 10 -- jild-i 2.Kitāb-i 11 tā kitāb-i 20.

Criticism and interpretation of Akhlāq-i Jalālī, a work of Muḥammad ibn Asʻad Dawwānī, 1426 or 7-1512 or 13, on Islamic ethics.

ABSTRACTTwo rival scholars from Shiraz in Persia, Dawānī and Dashtakī engaged in a bitter and extended dispute over a range of metaphysical and logical issues. One of these was the liar paradox. Their debate on this point marked the most extensive scrutiny of the paradox in Arabic until that time. Dashtakī’s solution was to deny that the statement ‘What I say is false’ is true or false, on the ground that there is one statement and one application of (...) the falsity predicate. Given that – ex hypothesi – there is no other statement, there is no basis for a reiteration of the truth or falsity predicate and describing the statement itself as true or false. Dawānī’s solution was to deny that ‘What I say is false’ is a statement at all, and he argued that it is instead akin to a performative utterance such as ‘I hereby sell you this’. (shrink)

Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any (...) difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. (shrink)

AbstractṢadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 1498) has proposed a solution to the liar paradox according to which the liar sentence is a self-referential sentence in which the predicate ‘false’ is iterated. Discussing the conditions for the truth-aptness of the sentences with nested and iterated instances of the predicates ‘true’ and/or ‘false’, Dashtakī argued that the liar sentence is not truth-apt at all. In the tradition of Arabic logic, the central elements of Dashtakī's solution—the self-referentiality of the liar sentence (...) and the implicit iteration of the predicate ‘false’—were initially highlighted in two earlier solutions proposed by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) and Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1322), respectively. Here I investigate all three solutions and show that Dashtakī's solution can be taken as a synthesis of the other two. None of these solutions seems to be convincing at the end of the day. Nevertheless, all of them include significant logical and philosophical insights. In particular, although Dashtakī's solution is not itself compelling, it is only a few steps away from a promising solution. The appendix to this paper includes translations of the relevant passages. (shrink)

AbstractṢadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 1498) has proposed a solution to the liar paradox according to which the liar sentence is a self-referential sentence in which the predicate ‘false’ is iterated. Discussing the conditions for the truth-aptness of the sentences with nested and iterated instances of the predicates ‘true’ and/or ‘false’, Dashtakī argued that the liar sentence is not truth-apt at all. In the tradition of Arabic logic, the central elements of Dashtakī's solution—the self-referentiality of the liar sentence (...) and the implicit iteration of the predicate ‘false’—were initially highlighted in two earlier solutions proposed by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) and Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1322), respectively. Here I investigate all three solutions and show that Dashtakī's solution can be taken as a synthesis of the other two. None of these solutions seems to be convincing at the end of the day. Nevertheless, all of them include significant logical and philosophical insights. In particular, although Dashtakī's solution is not itself compelling, it is only a few steps away from a promising solution. The appendix to this paper includes translations of the relevant passages. (shrink)

Sayyid Sadr al-din Mohammad Dashtaki Shirazi is the inventor of the division of composition into unified composition and composition by join. With this division, Dashtaki has expressed a new theory about the composition of the material object from first matter and form, as well as the composition of man from soul and body, and considers these compositions as an alliance and unification, not simply the parts joining to each other. In this paper, we will present Dashtaki’s arguments on the theory (...) of unified composition. We will also examine three objections to this theory and responses to them. Finally, we will examine the background of this theory in Bahmanyar's phrases. Dashtaki believes that when the components in the compound have a real plurality, i.e. each one exists separately from the other, a composition by join is created, such as the composition of a house from numerous clays. But if the components in the compound are united and none of them are separate from the others and exists actually, the resulting composition will be an alliance and union. He believes that in the unified composition, every component is identical to any other component and is identical to the whole. Accordingly, Reza is a unique being, both human and writer. In order to achieve a composition, a plurality is needed and in order to form a single composition, there must be plural components related to each other. An important question is that, principally how is a composition possible, if unified composition comes to existence only when the components are made united with each other and with the whole? In other words, unified composition is not possible, because the first condition of the acquisition of the composition, i.e., the plurality of the constituent components, is not satisfied. Dashtaki strives to express a difference between the components in the union compound. He believes that the conditions of the realization and the survival of the components are different, and that is enough for them to be different. In Dashtaki's point of view, in the unified composition the components are analytical, not being separate and plural, in reality. In other words, the components do not have actual and "in-the-world" plurality, which means that it is our intellect that separates them and looks at them as independent objects. Therefore, unity and identity are in-the-world and plurality and discernibility are analytical and in the mind. Dashtaki's first argument for his theory in general is as follows: the three major material objects (solid, plant and animal) are undoubtedly real compounds. But in these compositions, components exist potentially, and in a unified composition, components do not exist actually. Therefore, these objects are unified compounds. The second argument is that the accuracy of predication implies unity. In the unified composition, the components are identical with the whole, and therefore, the components can be predicated to the composition. In Dashtaki's view, if A is predicated to B, then it could be concluded that they are identical and unified. The first objection to this theory is that the unity is incompatible with causality. From the perspective of the Peripatetics, form is the cause of the matter, and this is incompatible with the union of the two. Dashtaki states that in case of causality, there is no need for cause and effect to be two different and discernible entities, but a single entity may be from one aspect the cause and, from another, the effect. In other words, the foresaid causality is analytical causality. When mind analyses something, and then finds analytical components, it can see between those analytical and intellectual components, causality, and find some of them as the cause of the others. The second objection is the incorrectness of the unity in compounds with components not being similar. only in the compounds having similar parts, one can accept the unity of matter and form. For example, in compounds such as horses, it is not possible to accept the union of matter and form, because in horses, there are components with different natures, such as bones, flesh and nerves. Unity of These parts with each other and with the whole is not plausible. Dashtaki’s respond is that the horse is also a natural unit and has no actual plurality. Components having similar or different natures does not make any difference. According to the theory of unified composition, the horse's components are united with the horse's form and have only analytical plurality. Horse’s components are just analytical components, not actual, independent ones. The third objection is the incompatibility of the actual existence of components with their unity. But Dashtaki maintains that a unique actual personal entity cannot have actual plural components. He states that compounds such as horses exist objectively, but objective and real existing is divided into two kinds: dependent existence, and independent existence as a single real thing. Therefore, the two characteristics of "being a component" and "being independent" are incompatible and do not come together in a real being. Dashtaki has also quoted phrases from Bahmanyar to confirm his point of view. Bahmanyar says that the properties of an animal belong to the whole and compound, not to each component. For example, it is a horse that feels, not its bone or brain, as the eye is also a compound, but seeing is the work of the eye, not the work of any of its components. Therefore, the animal, which is something compound, has characteristics that none of its components have. So the animal is something over and above its components. Bahmanyar thinks the components in the animal are potential. Then he states a general rule: any compound in which unity is real, its components do potentially exist. Therefore, Bahmanyar considers the body parts of the living organism as a potential being and generally believes that the components of any compound that have true unity are potential. The potentiality of the components in a real compound does not that mean that the components are destroyed and a new thing is produced. The components are also available, but they do not have the effects they had separately before the composition comes into existence. In other words, the components have found a unique identity together and therefore have a new effect.. It seems that Bahmanyar has expressed the same idea that Dashtaki is looking for in the theory of unified composition. Therefore, it can be said that before Dashtaki, Bahmanyar has come up with the thought of a unity. Of course, Bahmanyar has not explained much about this, and Dashtaki is the first who has organized and completed this idea as a philosophical theory. (shrink)

Islamic thought, no matter what tradition it belonged to, went through a process in which almost all thinkers after the twelfth century were also commentators of Avicenna (d. 428/1037). When this phenomenon combined with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's (d. 606/1210) ability to problematize, his critical readings revealed the aporias and turned them into problems which would occupy the thinker’s mind after him and waiting to be solved. The quiddityof knowledge has an important place among these, both in terms of being closely (...) related to many issues where ontology, epistemology and axiology intersect and being a problem area where the Islamic intellectual traditions’ conception of existence is directly reflected. As seen in the analyses of many thinkers, notably Râzî, the ontology, quiddity and category of knowledge in Avicennian philosophy contain elements that are conducive to encountering important challenges when the system as a whole is taken into consideration. Accordingly, scholars like Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānî (ö. 749/1349), al-Taftāzānī (ö. 792/1390), al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (ö. 816/1413), Alî al-Qūshjī (ö. 879/1474), al-Dawwānī (ö. 908/1502), Sadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (ö. 903/1498) have taken the discussion to a further point both in terms of identifying the problem and revealing its implications and proposing solutions. This study aims to analyze the sixteenth-century thinker Kutb al-Dīn al-Ījī’s treatment of this problem who inherited the debates of past on the matter in question. He carries out his evaluations especially through the Alī al-Qūshjī (ö. 879/1474), al-Dawwānī (ö. 908/1502) and al-Dashtakī’s comments on the subject. He makes important contributions by analyzing these scholars’ solution offers con-cerning the problem of categorical status of knowledge and putting forward his own approach. He thinks that Alī al-Qūshjī’s distinction between realization (husūl) and subsistence (qiyām), al-Dashtakī’s theory of transformation and al-Dawwānī’s offer to not put the knowledge under the category of quality are problematic from various aspects. (shrink)

The article is devoted to comparative analysis of metaphysical studying of a Samaritan theologian and exegete al-Ghazzāl ibn ’Abū Surūr (d. after 1755) and a representative of Shiraz Illuminationism school, philosopher, astronomer and mathematician Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr al-Dashtakī (d. 1541). Based on a scrupulous analysis of the doctrines by al-Ghazzāl and Ghiyāth al-Dīn, the author comes to the conclusion about their genetic link – supposedly, as a result of perception of Illuminationist systems in the Middle East in 17th–18th centuries. (...) It is noticed that a Samaritan exegete, acquainted with Arab-Mus­lim philosophic literature as a prominent specialist, taught about ontologistic primacy of light, metaphysical nothingness of dark, stated about light nature of action and com­plete dependence of matter on the will of the Creator. Separately it discusses the desire of both authors to deconstruct the classic for Arabic philosophy thesaurus. It is expressed in the convergence of the categories ‘movement’ (ḥaraka) and ‘action’ (fi‘l), as well as in the consistent replacement of the concept ‘self’ (ḏāt) with the concept of ‘light’ (nūr). The differences between the concepts of al-Ghazzāl and ad-Dashtakī are also discussed separately: while the first author inscribes the opposition ‘light – dark’ in a creation onto­logical context, the latter professes belief in the ‘total unity’ of the lights, their eternity and uncreation. The research is preceded by a short excursion into the history of Samari­tan theology of the 11th–18th centuries. Moreover, the article provides the description of unpublished documents which served the textological basis for the author’s work – in particular, the manuscript of al-Ghazzal’s interpretation of Genesis and Exodus ‘Dis­persion of the darkness [covering] the secrets of the Giver’ (Kashf / Kāshif al-Ghayāhib ‘alā Asrār al-Wāhib; British Library, Add MS 19657). (shrink)

The article charts my trajectories as a feminist activist/academic seeking to research, write and talk about gender-based violence in relation to the Middle East. More specifically, I am drawing on research and activism in relation to Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon to map the discursive, political and empirical challenges and complexities linked to scholarship and activism that is grounded in both feminist and anti-racist/anti-islamophobic politics. While reflecting on my positionality, the article aims to challenge the binary of activism and academia as (...) well as Western and Middle Eastern contexts in terms of knowledge production. (shrink)

Sufi group mainly dictates its followers to distance themselves from worldy affairs and to live in religious seclusion. This article offers a distinct perspective on the study of sufism through examining the political activities of the sufi group the Tarekat Qa>diriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah of Cukir in Indonesia and the group’s political patron, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. The article benefits form a French philosopher Michel Foucault’s concept of geneology and the notion of knowledge to better comprehend the nature of political activism (...) of a sufi group. It further argues that basic concept of student and master relationship in Sufism is explaining the politics of sufism in contemporary Indonesia. The mutual relation between leaders of the sufi group and the PPP has facilitated the crossing boundaries of Sufi basic principle of non-participatory politics. (shrink)

Information and communication technologies are increasingly used for development in the Global South, and mHealth plays key role. This paper analyzes the particular relationship to science that characterizes a global maternal mHealth program deployed in Ghana and India. Using science and technology studies, this research relies on qualitative interviews conducted between 2014 and 2016 with funders, implementers, and beneficiaries of this mHealth program. This story begins with a randomized controlled trial, a biomedical experiment with a strong positioning regarding science and (...) the production of evidence. But rapidly the scientific stance disappears to give way to the testing and marketing of a product for the digital economy. From science to market, this paper offers to revisit a classical STS topic through the lens of mHealth. It shows how the various experimental forms taken by this project fundamentally diverge from scientific methods and evidence production and at the same time how it nurtures an ongoing instrumental relationship with science. Thus, from clinical research to product marketing, this paper highlights the tenuous link between evidence-based and market-based mHealth in the Global South. (shrink)

Community engagement is increasingly defended as an ethical requirement for biomedical research. Some forms of community engagement involve asking the consent of community leaders prior to seeking informed consent from community members. Although community consent does not replace individual consent, it could problematically restrict the autonomy of community members by precluding them from research when community leaders withhold their permission. Community consent is therefore at odds with one of the central principles of bioethics: respecting autonomy. This raises the question as (...) to how community consent can be justified or even required. This paper aims to provide an answer to this question by arguing, based on the work of Taylor and Kymlicka, that community practices are important for the identity and autonomy of community members. When these practices are incompatible with a solitary focus on individual informed consent, they need to be protected by making these decision‐making practices (including asking permission to community authorities) part of the consent process. Since these decision‐making practices are important for the autonomy of community members, community consent with the goal of protecting these practices is not necessarily in conflict with autonomy. (shrink)

Logic; Islamic philosophy; Islam--doctrines.

Muhammad al-Shahrastani, the famous Muslim theologian of the 12th century and author of the Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects, was greatly influenced by Ismaili teachings. In this work al-Shahrastani refutes the metaphysics of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) from an Ismaili point of view.

Good and evil; religious aspects; Islam.

al-juzʼ 1. al-Falsafah al-Islāmīyah wa-baʻḍ qaḍāyā al-falsafah -- al-juzʼ 2. al-Akhlāq wa-al-siyāsah -- al-juzʼ 3. al-Islām wa-al-ḥaḍārah -- al-juzʼ 4. al-Anā wa-al-ākhar, min mufakkirī al-Islām.

Arab countries; intellectual life; congresses.

Burnout, characterized by emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, and a diminished sense of personal accomplishment, is an occupational phenomenon now recognized by the World Health Organization. This study explores the interplay between psychological capital and emotional labour in contributing to burnout among workers in a Malaysian non-profit organization (NPO). Psychological capital encompasses positive psychological states such as self-efficacy, optimism, hope, and resilience. Emotional labour involves managing emotions to fulfil job roles, often requiring workers to present emotions that may not reflect their true (...) feelings. The constant need to maintain these emotional displays can lead to emotional dissonance and burnout. Given Malaysia's demographic shifts towards an ageing population, the implications of burnout among NPO workers, who provide critical services to vulnerable groups, are significant. The high workload and emotional demands placed on these workers can result in chronic stress, emotional exhaustion, and a decrease in job performance and motivation. This study aims to fill the research gap by examining the specific factors that contribute to burnout in the Malaysian context, considering the unique cultural and social dynamics that may influence these relationships. The findings of this research can provide valuable insights for developing interventions to enhance psychological resilience and manage emotional labour more effectively among NPO workers. By addressing these challenges, organizations can support their workforce in maintaining high levels of service quality and personal well-being, which is crucial for the sustainability of NPOs and the well-being of the communities they serve. (shrink)