Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of (...) propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with. (shrink)

The article presents two concepts of indexicality. The first, more standard and narrow, identifies indexicality with systematic (meaning controlled) context-sensitivity. The second, broader (derived from the work of Jerzy Pelc), conceives indexicality in terms of the potential variability of the general semiotic characteristics expressions (with respect to the context of use). The text introduces the concept of a pragmatic matrix that serves for a schematic representation of contextual variation. I also recapitulate briefly the views of Jerzy Pelc on the meaning (...) (manner of use) and use of expressions, and briefly indicate its relationship approaches with contemporary debates around contextualism and status of non-sentential speech acts. Finally, the relationship between the broader notion of indexicality and the directival theory of meaning is analyzed. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

The authors of this book, scholars from Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ukraina, Kirghizia and Poland, seek to answer the question, in what way the Westeuropean and postcommunist countries respond to the challenges posed to them by democratization in Central and Eastern Europe and European constitutional politics and policymaking. New democracies necessarily pose a challenge to non-democratic states, because they liberated themselves from the totalitarian regime. They pose a challenge for the old liberal democracies too, because they try to compromise individual (...) interests and freedoms with traditional prepolitical and political group identities. But just the model of democracy can be followed in many non-Western countries which aspire to establish a democratic order. This book raises the questions that are particularly significant to the present-day political practice in its European and global dimensions. It is intended as a companion volume for all those who combine their academic research with wider interests in the promoting of democracy in the period of globalization and under the new pressures of European constitutional politics. (shrink)

I defend an alternative to the two traditional accounts of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognition as primary versus social cognition as primary. These accounts have complementary explanatory vices and virtues. They also share a natural assumption: that interpretation in terms of mental states is “spectatorial”, aiming exclusively for an objective description of the mental facts about self and others. I argue that if one rejects this assumption in favor of the view that interpretation in terms of mental (...) states also plays important regulative roles with respect to minds and behavior, a new and superior conception of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition comes into view. On this conception, person-level metacognitive concepts are socio-cognitive tools that shape us into better cognitive agents and more predictable cognitive objects, thereby enhancing our abilities at social coordination. Mastery of these metacognitive concepts relies on subpersonal, non-conceptual, procedural metacognition. This reconceptualization of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition combines the complementary explanatory virtues of the two traditional conceptions, while avoiding their complementary explanatory vices. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to pose a problem for theories that claim that belief reports are context dependent. Firstly, I argue that the claim is committed to verbalism, a theory that derives the context sensitivity of belief reports from the context sensitivity of the psychological verbs used in such reports. Secondly, I argue that verbalism is not an attractive theoretical option because it is in conflict with the non-proto-rigidity of verbs like ‘believe’. Finally, I describe various consequences that (...) the argument has for invariantism and moderate contextualism. (shrink)

Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context (...) as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative. (shrink)

The author presents the problem of humanizing the demon and giving to the human being the demonic features. The analysis focuses on modern Polish prose, especially on such works: Cz. Miłosz, A. Szczypiorski, J. Broszkiewicz, A. Gołubiew, T. Konwicki, G. Herling- Grudziński. He is mostly interested in the devil figure as an evil spirit.

The paper proposes a metaaxiological political framework, which is the ground for the thesis that the central idea that underlies politics is well-being and its improvement. Every political activity relies on certain goods, values and standards forming its operational framework. The aim and essence of politics is to ensure the realization of constitutive values. These values include the normative concept of the human being and constitutive values underpinning the functioning of the state and political community (i.e. good life, justice, freedom, (...) security, peace, identity, unity, rule of law, representation, sovereignty, legitimacy). On the one hand, the normative values represent preconditions that have to be present in every political sphere. On the other, they serve as ideals pursued by states and political systems. They are investigated by means of normative typological categories. (shrink)

The article refers exclusively to the Carl Schmitt’s political theology. His three conceptions of political theology and corresponding theoretical approaches are reconstructed and precisely analysed. The first conception is called the sociology of concepts or the theory of analogies between religious and legal-political concepts. The second Schmitt’s approach to political theology is the eschatological conception. Both these conceptions are basically descriptive and analytical. Solely the third conception is normative (and political), therefore, its presents the concept of political theology as a (...) normative approach to the Political. (shrink)

A set-theoretical proof of Gowers’ Dichotomy Theorem is presented together with its application to another dichotomy concerning asymptotic l 2 basic sequences.