It is argued, in this article, that Hegel’s philosophy is permeated by a tacit thesis, and that this takes the form of a non-dialectical negation, the precise nature and speculative importance of which we propose to determine. The unspoken thesis is that Hegel never directly states that his conceptual sublation of the representative form of Christianity results in the strict deletion of both the resurrection of Christ and the immortality of the soul. Yet, far from being reducible to the author’s (...) simple prudence in the face of censorship, this constraint to remain silent on a truth of such importance to his thought demonstrates from within the System itself (and its strategy for keeping tacit its perhaps most original aspect) that the contingency of history is irreducible to its dialectical treatment. For the speculative dialectic– which culminates in the truth of Christianity being fulfilled in the form of the concept– is obliterated at this point by the oppressive action of a Prussian monarchy which, by this very fact, demonstrates that it does not fulfill the objective spirit, since it stands in the way of the fully explicit saying of the absolute spirit. Thus, we can try to show how there is an internal way within Hegelianism (inherited from the identification within it of a non-dialectical negation that undermines its very foundation) to maintain that the absolute is not the Idea, but a form of contingency that overhangs it, and exceeds the hegelian version of this concept. (shrink)