This article examines the philosophical issues that arise when preserving urban geological sites or urban geosites. These are preserved not only because of their geological value but also because of aesthetic, cultural, and economic reasons. To do so, it examines the geosite constituted by Olot and its surroundings, a city in Spain that extends amid four dormant volcanoes. It explores the metaphysical paradox that these geosites have become what they are due to the preservation of destruction: human-caused interventions, mostly (...) extraction of materials and exploitation of the land, are precisely what made these geosites visible as sites worth preserving and determining their metaphysical status. It further explores the preservation criteria and shows how they have determined the status of the geosite. Second, it shows how in such urban geosites the collapse of two diametrically opposed conceptions of time – the geological eon and the lived human time – occurs. Lastly, it discusses aesthetic aspects of such geosites by considering aesthetic experience as a primarily cognitive endeavor and shows how metaphysical, epistemological, and aesthetic issues of preservation of geosites are inextricably linked. (shrink)

In this essay I will examine the changing historical relationship between two fundamentally modern concepts: self-preservation and self-ownership. These two concepts have served a dual function in modernity. On the one hand, they are crucial parts of the theoretical underpinning of liberalism: the natural law of self-preservation is the foundation of the rational inclination to form civil society (e.g., Hobbes); and self-ownership provides the foundation for the liberal (i.e., Lockean) notion of private property. But on the other hand, (...) these two concepts serve much more than a theoretical purpose; they also perform a duty in what I would like to call, borrowing Foucault's phrase, a modern technology of the self. At this level, the concepts of self-ownership and self-preservation shape individuals to follow certain routines in their behavior, to treat their bodies in specific ways, to organize their time in a particular fashion. In performing these routines, individuals participate in the collection and dissemination of that knowledge of individual bodies and groups of bodies which, as Foucault and Arendt in their different ways revealed, is endemic to modernity. (shrink)

We prove some preservation theorems concerning inductive and model-complete theories in the framework of semi-classical logic introduced in [1].

We prove the following preservation theorem for the Horn fragment of Equality-free Logic:Theorem 0.1. For any sentence σ ϵ L, the following are equivalent:i ) σ is preserved under Hs, Hs -1 and PR.i i ) σ is logically equivalent to an equality-free Horn sentence.

Preservation and interpolation results are obtained for L ∞ω and sublogics $\mathscr{L} \subseteq L_{\infty\omega}$ such that equivalence in L can be characterized by suitable back-and-forth conditions on sets of partial isomorphisms.

Some patients who have been diagnosed as “dead by neurologic criteria” continue to exhibit certain brain functions, most commonly, neuroendocrine functions. This preservation of neurologic function after the diagnosis of “brain death” or “brainstem death” is an ongoing source of controversy and concern in the medical, bioethics, and legal literatures. Most obviously, if some brain function persists, then it is not the case that all functions of the entire brain have ceased and hence, declaring such a patient to be (...) “dead” would be a false positive, in any nation with so-called “whole brain death” laws. Furthermore, and perhaps more concerning, the preservation of any brain function necessarily entails the preservation of some amount of brain perfusion, thereby raising the concern as to whether additional areas of neural tissue may remain viable, including areas in the brainstem. These and other considerations cast significant doubt on the reliability of diagnosing either “brain death” or “brainstem death.”. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that a comprehensive account of the role of representations in science should reconsider some neglected theses of the classical philosophy of science proposed in the first decades of the 20th century. More precisely, it is argued that the accounts of Helmholtz and Hertz may be taken as prototypes of representational accounts in which structure preservation plays an essential role. Following Reichenbach, structure-preserving representations provide a useful device for formulating an up-to-date version (...) of a (relativized) Kantian a priori. An essential feature of modern scientific representations is their mathematical character. That is, representations can be conceived as (partially) structure-preserving maps or functions. This observation suggests an interesting but neglected perspective on the history and philosophy of this concept, namely, that structure-preserving representations are closely related to a priori elements of scientific knowledge. Reichenbach’s early theory of a relativized constitutive but non-apodictic a priori component of scientific knowledge provides a further elaboration of Kantian aspects of scientific representation. To cope with the dynamic aspects of the evolution of scientific knowledge, Cassirer proposed a re-interpretation of the concept of representation that conceived of a particular representation as only one phase in a continuous process determined by pragmatic considerations. Pragmatic aspects of representations are further elaborated in the classical account of C.I. Lewis and the more modern of Hasok Chang. (shrink)

I develop an account of private property that preserves public participation and access. A focus on the initial state of common ownership, labour, and the proviso reveals that standard Lockean defences of property ignore important common interests. In consequence, property rights over environmentally significant goods must be less strong than full liberal rights, and I show how these will be designed.

Bradley offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between credences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate.

Abstract:Environmental ethics and policy have been largely developed around the concept of nature as a dynamic collection of living beings in direct interaction with humans. However, when we consider the Moon, Mars, and other worlds we encounter profoundly static and lifeless nature with essentially no history of human interaction. On what basis do we make decisions on the preservation or utilization of such lifeless landscapes? Here I suggest that static lifeless landscapes on other worlds have some parallels on Earth (...) in the upper elevations of the Antarctic Dry Valleys and the central depression of the Atacama Desert in Chile and Peru. In the soil of both locations life is absent or cannot grow and the timescales of landscape evolution vastly exceed human timescales. For all intents and purposes, these are static and lifeless landscapes. Today, human activities in Antarctica are carefully regulated with a view toward preservation while in the Atacama Desert resource mining has extensively altered the landscape. Thus, these two sites provide alternate possible futures for the Moon and Mars. Preservation of static lifeless landscapes could be based on two attributes. First, they provide a way to further define and understand the Earth and the limits of life—which is the current scientific motivation for biological and geological research activities there. Second, both on Earth and particularly on other worlds, lifeless landscapes may express states that are new to human experience akin to new forms of art or new branches of science. We don't understand these environments, their nature, or their relationship to us. In the case of Mars there may come to be a tension between preserving a lifeless landscape and introducing or enhancing life on that planet. (shrink)

It is argued that the preservation of truth by an inference relation is of little interest when premiss sets are contradictory. The notion of a level of coherence is introduced and the utility of modal logics in the semantic representation of sets of higher coherence levels is noted. It is shown that this representative role cannot be transferred to first order logic via frame theory since the modal formulae expressing coherence level restrictions are not first order definable. Finally, an (...) inference relation, calledyielding, is introduced which is intermediate between the coherence preservingforcing relation introduced elsewhere by the authors and the coherence destroying, inference relation of classical logic. (shrink)

In a current clinical trial for Emergency Preservation and Resuscitation, Dr. Samuel Tisherman of the University of Maryland aims to induce therapeutic hypothermia in order to ‘buy time’ for operating on victims of severe exsanguination. While recent publicity has framed this controversial procedure as ‘killing a patient to save his life’, the US Army and Acute Care Research appear to support the study on the grounds that such patients already face low chances of survival. Given that enrollment in the (...) trial must be non-voluntary, the study has received an exemption from federal standards for obtaining informed consent. How exactly, if at all, is non-voluntary enrollment morally justifiable? In this essay, I appeal to the notable work of Hans Jonas in an effort to defend the EPR trial's use of non-voluntary enrollment. It is often thought and, as I show, it may appear that Jonas has called for the end of experimental medical practice. Still, I derive from Jonas a principle of double-effect upon which physicians may be seen as morally permitted to pursue innovations in emergency medicine but only as a byproduct of pursuing therapeutic success. With this position, I argue that the EPR trial can be granted a stronger philosophical justification than simply waiving the requirement of obtaining informed consent. The double-effect justification would obtain, perhaps regardless of the success of such innovative procedures as therapeutic hypothermia. (shrink)

Griefbots are chatbots modeled on the personalities of deceased individuals, designed to assist with the grieving process and, according to some, to continue relationships with loved ones after their physical passing. The essay examines the promises and perils of griefbots from a Daoist perspective. According to the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi, death is a natural and inevitable phenomenon, a manifestation of the constant changes and transformations in the world. This approach emphasizes adaptability, flexibility, and openness to alternative ways of relating to (...) the deceased after they are gone. Drawing on the Daoist ideas, this essay distinguishes between two importantly different ways to continue a relationship with the deceased, and correspondingly, two kinds of griefbot designs: preservational griefbots and transformational griefbots. A preservational griefbot, which aims to preserve the user’s relationship with the deceased, presents itself as the deceased individual by replicating the deceased’s personality as closely and for as long as possible. By contrast, a transformational griefbot aligns more with Zhuangist ideals and aims to facilitate the transformation of our relationship with the deceased. It helps the bereaved come to terms with their loss and move on with their lives, without abandoning their relationship with the deceased. Specifically, it facilitates this transformation in two ways: first, by helping the bereaved release themselves from their habitual ways of relating to the loved one, thereby bringing closure to their relationship in its previous form; and second, by enabling the bereaved to continue interacting with the ideas and legacies of the deceased in a new and digitally mediated way, which, in turn, reshapes and enriches the content and significance of their relationship. (shrink)

Especially nice models of intuitionistic set theories are realizability models $V$, where $\mathcal A$ is an applicative structure or partial combinatory algebra. This paper is concerned with the preservation of various choice principles in $V$ if assumed in the underlying universe $V$, adopting Constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel as background theory for all of these investigations. Examples of choice principles are the axiom schemes of countable choice, dependent choice, relativized dependent choice and the presentation axiom. It is shown that any of these (...) axioms holds in $V$ for every applicative structure $\mathcal A$ if it holds in the background universe.1 It is also shown that a weak form of the countable axiom of choice, $\textbf{AC}^{\boldsymbol{\omega, \omega }}$, is rendered true in any $V$ regardless of whether it holds in the background universe. The paper extends work by McCarty and Rathjen. (shrink)

We show that adding compatible operations to Heyting algebras and to commutative residuated lattices, both satisfying the Stone law ¬x ⋁ ¬¬x = 1, preserves filtering unification, that is, the property that for every two unifiers there is a unifier more general then both of them. Contrary to that, often adding new operations to algebras results in changing the unification type. To prove the results we apply the theorems of [9] on direct products of l-algebras and filtering unification. We consider (...) examples of frontal Heyting algebras, in particular Heyting algebras with the successor, γ and G operations as well as expansions of some commutative integral residuated lattices with successor operations. (shrink)

A popular and plausible response against Laudan's “pessimistic induction” has been what I call “preservative realism,” which argues that there have actually been enough elements of scientific knowledge preserved through major theory‐change processes, and that those elements can be accepted realistically. This paper argues against preservative realism, in particular through a critical review of Psillos's argument concerning the case of the caloric theory of heat. Contrary to his argument, the historical record of the caloric theory reveals that beliefs about the (...) properties of material caloric, rejected by subsequent theories, were indeed central to the successes of the caloric theory. Therefore caloric remains a favorable case for Laudan. Further, I argue that even confirmed cases of preservation do not warrant an inference to truth. (shrink)

Alzheimer’s disease is an insidious onset neurodegenerative syndrome without effective treatment or cure. It is rapidly becoming a global health crisis that is overwhelming healthcare, society, and individuals. The clinical nature of neurocognitive decline creates significant challenges in bidirectional communication between caregivers and persons with Alzheimer’s disease that can negatively impact quality-of-life. This paper sought to understand how and to what extent would awareness training about the levels of consciousness in AD influence the quality-of-life interactions in the caregiver-patient dyad. A (...) literature review of multiple databases was conducted utilizing a transdisciplinary approach. The sum of findings indicates a positive relationship between enhanced caregiver awareness and training, positive interactions, and improved QOL measures among patients and caregivers. A multidirectional relationship was found among healthcare policies, training and education resources, caregivers, and persons with AD. Specifically, the current lack of policy and inadequate training and educational resources has various detrimental effects on patients and caregivers, while improvements in training and education of caregivers yields positive outcomes in communication and QOL. Furthermore, evidence of preserved consciousness in persons with AD was demonstrated from multiple disciplines, including neurobiological, psychological, and biopsychosocial models. The literature further revealed several methods to access the preserved consciousness in persons with AD and related dementias, including sensory, emotional, and cognitive stimulations. The evidence from the literature suggests a reframed approach to our understanding and treatment of persons with AD is not only warranted, but crucial to address the needs of those affected by AD. (shrink)

We prove the preservation theorems for NATP; many of them extend the previously established preservation results for other model-theoretic tree properties. Using them, we also furnish proper examples of NATP theories which are simultaneously TP2 and SOP. First, we show that NATP is preserved by the parametrization and sum of the theories of Fraïssé limits of Fraïssé classes satisfying strong amalgamation property. Second, the preservation of NATP for two kinds of dense/co-dense expansions, i.e. the theories of lovely (...) pairs and of [Formula: see text]-structures for geometric theories, and dense/co-dense expansion on vector spaces is proved. Next, we prove the preservation of NATP for the generic predicate expansion and the pair of an algebraically closed field and its distinguished subfield; for the latter, not only NATP, but also the preservation of NTP1 and NTP2 is considered. Finally, we present some proper examples of NATP theories using the results proved in this paper, including the parametrization of DLO and the expansion of an algebraically closed field by adding a generic linear order. In particular, we show that the model companion of the theory of algebraically closed fields with circular orders (ACFO) is NATP. (shrink)

Both Antonio Genovesi and Ferdinando Galiani devised strategies for Neapolitan economic development, which they realised was essential for preserving its recently acquired independent statehood. In order to avoid any socially disruptive effects they considered how economic processes changed the human mind. Both thinkers grounded their political visions on foreign trade on highly sophisticated ideas of the nature of self-interest. In spite of the similar characters of their projects, the political thought of Genovesi and Galiani has never been subject to serious (...) comparison. Instead the two thinkers have tended to be portrayed as opposite characters with highly divergent political leanings. It is argued here that this view is historically questionable and itself a product of a distorting canonisation process that was set in motion in the second half of the eighteenth century. Ironically, comparing the moral philosophies and economic ideas of Genovesi and Galiani, a picture emerges that inverts the myth that started at the end of the eighteenth century and that until this day has determined accounts of the early Neapolitan Enlightenment. (shrink)

Our culture of appreciation of old buildings today is a product of the heritage culture of the eighteenth-century Central European upper class. While we find it pleasant and historically informative to have buildings well preserved, we find the absence of critical questioning of the practice surprisingly absent, although we observe an increasing number of academic discussions in the field of heritage studies, informed by decolonisation, climate change activism, and sustainability issues. Critical artistic practices have too been venturing into heritage and (...) memory politics. The extensive costs of preserving old architecture raise eyebrows mainly only in the far- and alt-right circles, but as late reactions by parts of the global community, such as the attacks on statues as part of the Black Lives Matter movement, signal, there might be a change coming regarding our relationship to the built material past. We offer a reading of the history of the phenomenon, which will make it easier to, first, see it as an ethnic and class construct, and then sketch out a new perspective on its metaphysics, from memory to identity, to discourse. We include voices external to the world of heritage­­ – one that is still run by a privileged group that often claims to speak for others, and whose aims and practices are often, at least for now, accepted by others. We then proceed to discuss what kind of a role a curatorial approach could have in questioning and rethinking the idea of preserving. (shrink)

The aim of this article was to obtain an understanding of what is experienced as human dignity by nurses in surgical practice. In order to obtain experiences from practice, the critical incident technique was chosen. A total of 11 nurses from surgical practice wrote 49 stories about positive and negative incidents. The text was analysed using hermeneutical text interpretation. The findings revealed patient dignity in terms of preserved dignity, that is, healthcare professionals paid attention to the patient. Nurses experienced preserved (...) dignity when healthcare professionals allowed the patient to tell their story, allowed themselves to get close to the patient and in turn received the patient’s trust. Violated dignity included circumstances when the nurses were forced to see what they did not want to see. Nurses experienced violated dignity when healthcare professionals behaved rudely towards the patient, acted as if he or she was invisible or humiliated the patient at the end of life. (shrink)

I consider and reject four possible arguments directed against the preservation of natural aesthetic conditions. (1) Beauty is not out there in nature, but is “in the eye ofthe beholder.” I argue that since ingredients ofnature cause aesthetic experiences, we cannot justifiably disregard and exploit nature. Preservation of aesthetic conditions is compatible with both objective and nonobjective theories of aesthetic value. (2) Frequent aesthetic disagreements bring about irresolvable disputes concerning which segments of nature to preserve. I claim that (...) these disputes are not irresolvable. Not all disputes about nature’s aesthetic values are purely aesthetic disputes: ecological balance, community identity, historic continuity, and economics are relevant; aesthetic experts can help; and such disputes can be put to a vote. (3) Natural beauty is not important compared to nonaesthetic values of nature. I show that this is questionable. Current awareness of environmental problems includes a rapidly growing concern for natural aesthetics. Moreover, even if majority preference is for nonaesthetic uses of nature, this does not settle the question of whether we ought to preserve nature’s attractive features. (4) From neither a utilitarian nor a deontological viewpoint do we have an obligation to preserve natural aesthetic conditions for future generations. I argue that even if we do not have a strict obligation, it does not follow that it makes no moral difference whether we preserve. Not yet existing people may have no rights against us, but this does not mean that we do no wrong in polluting and destroying aesthetic conditions of the natural world in which future people will live. (shrink)

We define notions of homomorphism, submodel, and sandwich of Kripke models, and we define two syntactic operators analogous to universal and existential closure. Then we prove an intuitionistic analogue of the generalized (dual of the) Lyndon-Łoś-Tarski Theorem, which characterizes the sentences preserved under inverse images of homomorphisms of Kripke models, an intuitionistic analogue of the generalized Łoś-Tarski Theorem, which characterizes the sentences preserved under submodels of Kripke models, and an intuitionistic analogue of the generalized Keisler Sandwich Theorem, which characterizes the (...) sentences preserved under sandwiches of Kripke models. We also define several intuitionistic formula hierarchies analogous to the classical formula hierarchies $\forall_n (= \Pi^0_n)$ and $\exists_n (=\Sigma^0_n)$ , and we show how our generalized syntactic preservation theorems specialize to these hierarchies. Each of these theorems implies the corresponding classical theorem in the case where the Kripke models force classical logic. (shrink)

A truth-preservation fallacy is using the concept of truth-preservation where some other concept is needed. For example, in certain contexts saying that consequences can be deduced from premises using truth-preserving deduction rules is a fallacy if it suggests that all truth-preserving rules are consequence-preserving. The arithmetic additive-associativity rule that yields 6 = (3 + (2 + 1)) from 6 = ((3 + 2) + 1) is truth-preserving but not consequence-preserving. As noted in James Gasser’s dissertation, Leibniz has been (...) criticized for using that rule in attempting to show that arithmetic equations are consequences of definitions. -/- A system of deductions is truth-preserving if each of its deductions having true premises has a true conclusion—and consequence-preserving if, for any given set of sentences, each deduction having premises that are consequences of that set has a conclusion that is a consequence of that set. Consequence-preserving amounts to: in each of its deductions the conclusion is a consequence of the premises. The same definitions apply to deduction rules considered as systems of deductions. Every consequence-preserving system is truth-preserving. It is not as well-known that the converse fails: not every truth-preserving system is consequence-preserving. Likewise for rules: not every truth-preserving rule is consequence-preserving. There are many famous examples. In ordinary first-order Peano-Arithmetic, the induction rule yields the conclusion ‘every number x is such that: x is zero or x is a successor’—which is not a consequence of the null set—from two tautological premises, which are consequences of the null set, of course. The arithmetic induction rule is truth-preserving but not consequence-preserving. Truth-preserving rules that are not consequence-preserving are non-logical or extra-logical rules. Such rules are unacceptable to persons espousing traditional truth-and-consequence conceptions of demonstration: a demonstration shows its conclusion is true by showing that its conclusion is a consequence of premises already known to be true. The 1965 Preface in Benson Mates (1972, vii) contains the first occurrence of truth-preservation fallacies in the book. (shrink)

In Part 4 of his "Ethics," Spinoza puts forward and defends what might appear to be the controversial Hobbesean thesis that the desire to prolong one’s life is the basis of virtue (i.e., E4p22). Indeed there is a tradition of commentators offering an egoistic, Hobbesean interpretation of Spinoza’s ethical theory. In this paper, however, I argue that we should not understand Spinozistic self-preservation in the commonsense, empiricist sense of prolonging our lives. Instead I argue that, for Spinoza, self-preservation (...) is a matter of perfection-preservation and perfection-enhancement, which does not essentially involve extending the duration of an individual’s existence. (shrink)

Many ecological economists have argued that some natural capital should be preserved for posterity. Yet, among environmental philosophers, the preservation paradox entails that preserving parts of nature, including those denoted by natural capital, is impossible. The paradox claims that nature is a realm of phenomena independent of intentional human agency, that preserving and restoring nature require intentional human agency, and, therefore, no one can preserve or restore nature (without making it artificial). While this article argues that the preservation (...) paradox is more difficult to resolve than ordinarily recognized, it also concludes by sketching a positive way to understand what it means to preserve natural capital during the Anthropocene. (shrink)

The increasing availability of personal data of a sequential nature, such as time-stamped transaction or location data, enables increasingly sophisticated sequential pattern mining techniques. However, privacy is at risk if it is possible to reconstruct the identity of individuals from sequential data. Therefore, it is important to develop privacy-preserving techniques that support publishing of really anonymous data, without altering the analysis results significantly. In this paper we propose to apply the Privacy-by-design paradigm for designing a technological framework to counter the (...) threats of undesirable, unlawful effects of privacy violation on sequence data, without obstructing the knowledge discovery opportunities of data mining technologies. First, we introduce a k-anonymity framework for sequence data, by defining the sequence linking attack model and its associated countermeasure, a k-anonymity notion for sequence datasets, which provides a formal protection against the attack. Second, we instantiate this framework and provide a specific method for constructing the k-anonymous version of a sequence dataset, which preserves the results of sequential pattern mining, together with several basic statistics and other analytical properties of the original data, including the clustering structure. A comprehensive experimental study on realistic datasets of process-logs, web-logs and GPS tracks is carried out, which empirically shows how, in our proposed method, the protection of privacy meets analytical utility. (shrink)

One goal of this paper is to argue that autobiographical memories are extended and distributed across embodied brains and environmental resources. This is important because such distributed memories play a constitutive role in our narrative identity. So, some of the building blocks of our narrative identity are not brain-bound but extended and distributed. Recognising the distributed nature of memory and narrative identity, invites us to find treatments and strategies focusing on the environment in which dementia patients are situated. A second (...) goal of this paper is to suggest various of such strategies, including lifelogging technologies such as SenseCams, life story books, multimedia biographies, memory boxes, ambient intelligence systems, and virtual reality applications. Such technologies allow dementia patients to remember their personal past in a way that wouldn’t be possible by merely relying on their biological memory, in that way aiding in preserving their narrative identity and positively contributing to their sense of well-being. (shrink)

Between Preservation and Recreation: Tamil Traditions of Commentary. Edited by Eva Wilden. École Française d’Extrême-Orient Collection Indologie, vol. 109. Pondichéry: Institut Français de Pondichéry / École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 2009. Pp. xiv + 319.

We prove the NTP1 property of a geometric theory T is inherited by theories of lovely pairs and H‐structures associated to T. We also provide a class of examples of nonsimple geometric NTP1 theories.

I argue that procrastination with respect to environmental preservation is in the class of procrastination problems that are particularly difficult to overcome because of the presence of factors that support second-order procrastination. If my reasoning is correct, then second-order procrastination can help explain the distressing fact — assuming it is a fact — that, despite widespread professions of serious concern, the issue of environmental preservation is not getting as much of our attention as it deserves. My reasoning also (...) suggests that improving our situation may require that some of the efforts now focused on promoting concern for environmental preservation be rerouted into tracking procrastination and deploying insights on how to cope with it. (shrink)

Structural realists claim that structure is preserved across instances of radical theory change, and that this preservation provides an argument in favor of realism about structure. In this paper, I use the shift from Newtonian gravity to Einstein’s general relativity as a case study for structural preservation, and I demonstrate that two prominent views of structural preservation fail to provide a solid basis for realism about structure. The case study demonstrates that (i) structural realists must be epistemically (...) precise about the concrete structure that is being preserved, and (ii) they must provide a metaphysical account of how structure is preserved through re-interpretation in light of a new theory. Regarding (i), I describe a means of epistemic access to the unobservable that I call “thick detection” of structure, which isolates the structure that will be preserved. Regarding (ii), I argue that thickly detectable structure is preserved across theory change through a process of extracting the old structure from the new structure, much like what has been done with geometrized versions of Newtonian gravity. With these two responses in hand, the structural realist can adequately account for the preservation of structure and can provide a strong argument in favor of structural realism. (shrink)

We show that the existential preservation theorem fails for two-variable first-order logic FO2. It is known that for all k ≥ 3, FOk does not have an existential preservation theorem, so this settles the last open case, answering a question of Andreka, van Benthem, and Németi. In contrast, we prove that the homomorphism preservation theorem holds for FO2.

Linear continuous logic is the fragment of continuous logic obtained by restricting connectives to addition and scalar multiplications. Most results in the full continuous logic have a counterpart in this fragment. In particular a linear form of the compactness theorem holds. We prove this variant and use it to deduce some basic preservation theorems.

It is argued that contraposition is valid for a class of natural language conditionals, if some modifications are allowed to preserve the meaning of the original conditional. In many cases, implicit temporal indices must be considered, making a change in verb tense necessary. A suitable contrapositive for implicative counterfactual conditionals can also usually be found. In some cases, the addition of certain words is necessary to preserve meaning that is present in the original sentence and would be lost or changed (...) in the contrapositive without them. A distinction is made between adding new meaning and adding new words to preserve existing meaning. For concessive conditionals and relevance conditionals, however, no valid contrapositive can be found. They do not belong to the class of contraposable conditionals, which can be independently defined. Difficult cases are also discussed in which the contradictory of the consequent semantically entails the truth of the antecedent. In such cases the content of the antecedent is implicit in the meaning of the consequent. Contraposition becomes possible if what is implicit in the original consequent is made explicit in the contrapositive antecedent. (shrink)

This paper explores the aesthetic aspects at play in the preservation efforts in the Bosc de Tosca to gain insight into the role of aesthetics in preservation of natural heritage. The preservation of landscapes entails a complex balancing between aesthetics and sustainability, as preservationist decisions based primarily on appearance may be at odds with pressing environmental concerns. If the area to be preserved is a constantly evolving and lived landscape, the interventions enacted on the place may affect (...) the current appearance and the way in which the area is lived now and in the future. By resorting to the issues discussed in intergenerational aesthetics, this paper aims to show how including the potential aesthetic experience and values of future generations may help in making more aesthetically and environmentally sustainable decisions. The paper begins with a description of the Bosc de Tosca and its surroundings, its metaphysical status, and a description of the preservation approaches at play in the area. It then presents the main stakes of intergenerational aesthetics. It ends by discussing specific aspects of the preservation of the Bosc de Tosca area and aesthetic interventions to show the complex relationship between aesthetics and sustainability and how intergenerational aesthetics can contribute to both theory and practice of preservation taking into account environmental concerns. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim at explaining the relevance of thought experiments in philosophy and the history of science by describing them as particular instances of two categories of creative thinking: metaphorical reasoning and abductive cognition. As a result of this definition, we will claim that TEs hold an ignorance-preserving trait that is evidenced in both TEs inferential structure and in the process of scenario creation they presuppose. Elaborating this thesis will allow us to explain the wonder that philosophers of (...) science have consistently shown for TEs, as well as the high functionality of TEs in the creative aspects of scientific and philosophical praxis. (shrink)

Fertility preservation has become more common for various populations, including oncology patients, transgender individuals, and women who are concerned about age-related infertility. Little attention has been paid to fertility preservation for patients with differences/disorders of sex development (DSD). Our goal in this article is to address specific ethical considerations that are unique to this patient population. To this end, we present a hypothetical DSD case. We then explore ethical considerations related to patient’s age, risk of cancer, concern about (...) genetic transmission of a DSD condition to children, co-occurring gender dysphoria, and access to experimental fertility preservation procedures. Given the limitations of current technologies, we recommend offering fertility preservation to individuals living with DSD using an informed decision-making approach that instills realistic expectations and minimizes the potential for false hope. Finally, we conclude with practical recommendations for this case based on the ethical considerations. (shrink)

In this paper we study intermediate logics between the logic G≤∼, the degree preserving companion of Gödel fuzzy logic with involution G∼ and classical propositional logic CPL, as well as the intermediate logics of their finite-valued counterparts G≤n∼. Although G≤∼ and G≤ are explosive w.r.t. Gödel negation ¬, they are paraconsistent w.r.t. the involutive negation ∼. We introduce the notion of saturated paraconsistency, a weaker notion than ideal paraconsistency, and we fully characterize the ideal and the saturated paraconsistent logics between (...) G≤n∼ and CPL. We also identify a large family of saturated paraconsistent logics in the family of intermediate logics for degree-preserving finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics. (shrink)