The concept of “self-awareness” ( svasaṃvedana ) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and - vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the (...) means of valid cognition and its result ( pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala ), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of selfawareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the theory of perceptual cognition laid out by the 7th century Buddhist scholar, Dharmakīrti, in his magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttika. Like most theories of perception, both ancient and modern, the sensory cognition of ordinary objects is a topic of primary concern. Unlike other theorists, however, Dharmakīrti advances a technical definition of “perception” as a cognition which is both nonconceptual and non-erroneous. Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception is thereby deliberately inclusive of three additional types of “perceptual” cognition, in addition (...) to veridical sensory awareness: the nonconceptual mental apprehension of an immediately-preceding cognition (“mental perception”), the vivid appearance of soteriologically efficacious objects of contemplative practice (“yogic perception”), and the sheer unmediated presence of the contents of cognition—whatever these might be—to the cognizing mind (“reflexive awareness”). Through the logical examination of what it means to be aware of an object, Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the awareness of an object is just the awareness of a phenomenal form or cognitive image produced by that object. Pursuing this analysis further, however, Dharmakīrti argues that the very notion of an object of cognition that exists “externally” or outside the mind is incoherent. Additionally, Dharmakīrti maintains that the phenomenological structure of subject and object—that is, the “first-personal” sense of one’s own cognitions as pertaining to oneself (“for-me-ness”), together with the inseparably concomitant sense that the objects of cognition exist “out there” in an extramental world—is strictly a form of cognitive error. Therefore, because ordinary sensory cognition is inherently structured by this subject-object duality, ordinary sensory cognition must in the final analysis be understood as erroneous. According to Dharmakīrti, in other words, ultimately only the nondual “luminosity” of reflexive awareness is genuinely perceptual, because only reflexive awareness is undistorted by nature. In this way, Dharmakīrti’s epistemology provides a theoretical foundation for the advanced nondual contemplative practices of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, particularly Mahāmudrā and rDzogs chen. (shrink)

The exhaustive explications on jāti-s (sophisticated ripostes) and their seemingly chaotic arrangement in early Indian philosophical texts arouses an expectation for a systematic taxonomy or typology. Such taxonomy would enormously increase the heuristic value of the list of jāti-s. The present article aims to reveal some interpretational problems relevant to the understanding of the jāti-s’ historical development, as well as the theoretical implications of their typology. Focusing historically on the early texts of debate manuals of Nyāya and Buddhist circles, this (...) article will excavate and explicate the vague and the obvious attempts to establish a typology of jāti-s. Given that Diṅnāga was the philosopher who shifted the history of Indian philosophy into the era of macro theory by integrating ontology and epistemology into a general system, the minimal changes of the order of the jāti-s in the list given in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, in contrast to the one found in the Nyāyamukha, will be interpreted as a paradigm shift. The rearrangement of the jāti list in the Pramāṇasamuccaya represents the paradigm shift from the debate (vāda) manual to the epistemological (pramāṇa) treatise, confirming Frauwallner’s ideas regarding the development of Diṅnāga’s thought. (shrink)

The concept of reflexive awareness (Sanskrit svasaṃvedana or svasaṃvitti, Tibetan rang rig) is considered an important epistemological notion in the Dignāga tradition of Buddhist pramāṇa theory. The traditionally accepted view is that Dignāga advocates Yogācāra’s notion of reflexive awareness in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and Candrakīrti rejects it altogether. By contrast, the present paper revisits Dignāga and Candrakīrti in the context of svasaṃvedana and argues that Dignāga endorses the antarjñeyavādic notion of svasaṃvedana and Candrakīrti does not negate it at the conventional (...) level. Candrakīrti attacks Dignāga by attributing him as an exponent of Sautrāntrika-Yogācāra notion of reflexive awareness, but his critique does not fundamentally affect Dignāga’s notion of reflexive awareness propounded in the Pramāṇasamuccaya. The submission of the paper is that the fundamental epistemic agenda of reflexive awareness in Dignāga and Candrakīrti is identical, though they diverge methodologically, and it is shown by reexamining Padma dkar po’s interpretation. (shrink)

The present volume marks the beginning of a series of "Sanskrit Texts From the Tibetan Autonomous Region" jointly published by the publishing houses of the China Tibetology Research Center, Beijing, and the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, on the basis of a "General Agreement on Cooperative Studies of Copies of Sanskrit Texts and their Joint Publication" signed January 9, 2004. It is also the first result of a cooperation between the Chinese Tibetology Research Center and the Institute for Cultural and (...) Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences with the aim of making these unique jewels of philosophical and religious texts from the Buddhist past which are preserved in their original Sanskrit language in the TAR available in scholarly editions for the first time. This volume consists of two parts. The critically edited Sanskrit text of Jinendrabuddhi's Pramanasamuccayatika, chapter 1 is accompanied by a diplomatic edition of the text. The editions are based on photocopies of a palm-leaf manuscript kept in Lhasa which, to our present knowledge, is the only one extent. Jinendrabuddhi's commentary of the second half of the eighth century CE is, moreover, the only commentary known to have been written on that work which marks the very beginning of the Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic in the first half of the sixth century: Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya. The linguistic and interpretational value of Jinendrabuddhi's text is particularly great in view of the fact that Dignaga's seminal work has not yet been discovered in the original Sanskrit, and that his various polemical treatises on other epistemological authors and schools of his time are unlikely to have been transmitted very long. Moreover, Jinendrabuddhi provides us with numerous quotations from works before Dignaga which belong to all the traditions of brahmanical classical Indian philosophy, but have been irretrievably lost. The great import of Jinendrabuddhi's work has long been well-known through its Tibetan translation. Thus, the publication of its Sanskrit original will have far-reaching consequences for the knowledge and interpretation of the Indian philosophical traditions in their classical Gupta period expressions. (shrink)

Buddhist logicians have rejected the reality of universals on the one hand, and, on the other hand, given a substitute in the form of the doctrine of Apoha. The doctrine of apoha first appears in Dinnaga’s Pramanasamuccaya, according to which words and concepts are negative by their very nature. They proceed on thebasis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating their opposite meaning. The Buddhist logicians talk of two types of knowledge, viz., pratyaksa, which is non- relational (...) and anumana, which is relational. They accept nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as a pure pratyaksa, and savikalpaka pratyaksa has been merged with anumana by them. According to them, cognition is either a direct awareness of an object, which is independent of any mentalconstructionor it is an awareness of an object which is a mentalconstruction. Further, according to the Buddhist logicians inferences are of two kinds, viz., svarthanumana and pararthanumana. But they do not accept pararthanumana as a source of knowledge. Now, since perception is devoid of kalpana, perceptual knowledge is essentially non-linguistic and does not involve any general concept or universal. Thus,Apoha has no role to play in perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana are based on kalpana, thus according to the Buddhist logicians knowledge of universal is essential for both, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana. (shrink)

In PV 3.440ab and 473cd–474ab, Dharmakīrti raises the argument of infinite regress twice. The argument originates from the same argument stated by Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.12ab1, in which the fault of infinite regress is called aniṣṭhā. In Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti 1.12b2, Dignāga presents another type of argument of infinite regress driven by memory, which is elucidated by Dharmakīrtian commentators. The arguments were criticized by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and even more intensively so by two modern scholars, Jonardon Ganeri and (...) Birgit Kellner. In this paper, I first examine the source of the arguments—Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti 1.12 and its translation, based on which I provide my interpretation of the two models of arguments of infinite regress. I then offer my response, according to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, to Ganeri’s and Kellner’s critiques. By doing so, I attempt to identify the essence of these arguments is and find out to what extent one can defend the infinite regress argument in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory. (shrink)

The Nyāyamukha by Dignāga, considered the founder of the Buddhist epistemological school, is known to have been studied intensively by East Asian Buddhists and scholars through Xuanzang’s Chinese translation. However, Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya offers a clue that helps to better understand the religio-philosophical and historical position of the Nyāyamukha in South and East Asia. The eighth-century commentator describes the Nyāyamukha as a work for highly intelligent persons and contrasts it to Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. He also preserves fragments (...) of the Nyāyamukha’s final verse, which served as the basis for a Sanskrit reconstruction of the verse, published in 2005. The present paper first examines the historical implications of Jinendrabuddhi’s interest in the Nyāyamukha and then discusses the hitherto accepted and yet problematic interpretation of its final verse. An analysis of relevant materials will include East Asian Buddhist sources in Chinese to seek evidence related to Jinendrabuddhi’s text. A detailed examination of hermeneutic aspects will lead us to reinterpreting the poison simile, “intellect-poison”, as well as a discussion of how this term was used by Vasubandhu. This will show that it is possible that the Sanskrit reconstruction should be modified slightly. (shrink)

Against the background of the fact that speakers not seldom intend to convey imports which deviate from the linguistically expressed meanings of linguistic items, the present article addresses some consequences of this phenomenon which appear to still be neglected in textual studies. It is suggested that understanding behaviour is in some respect a primary objective of exegesis and that due attention must be attributed to the high diversity of behaviour-related criteria by which interpretations of linguistic items are to be evaluated. (...) Although we intimate in addition that individual (meaningful) sentences occurring either in oral conversations or in written documents generally exhibit a multiplicity of contents of diverse types and that the circumstance that sometimes only a content equalling the linguistic significance of a pertinent unit matters for purposes of interpretation is caused by a material coincidence of different varieties of content, the tenets advocated in the paper do not essentially depend on that view. On the other hand, the following assumptions are relevant in the present connection: (a) A number of deviances between imports conveyed by linguistic utterances and literal meanings of expressions occur due to maxims of linguistic behaviour that are quite independent of lexical and syntactic features of individual natural languages. (b) It is by no means an exceptional phenomenon that imports not derivable by grammatical rules of a particular language alone possess primary importance for interpretation and textual exegesis. In view of significant affinities between understanding of sentences and of texts it is argued that the consideration of diverse aspects of behaviour possesses relevance for textual exegesis at least in the following respects: (1) By delivering a heuristic device for discerning problems affecting adopted interpretations it encourages searches for alternatives. (2) It provides means for evaluating the degree of acceptability of particular textual exegeses and possibly rejecting them on a more rational basis than mere intuition. (3) It offers possibilities for critically assessing the validity of explicit arguments advanced in favour of or in opposition to some interpretation. (4) It furnishes a background for assessing certain disputes about translation. The dimension of linguistic behaviour also attains importance in connection with questions of exegesis which are not concerned with assessments of (propositional) contents intended to be communicated, such as the ascertainment of the function which some argument possesses in a context. For substantiating the thesis that omission of raising relevant questions concerning behaviour is not an isolated phenomenon two examples will be employed: (1) A discussion concerning the exegesis of a crucial passage of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, (2) a critical appraisal of a recent publication dealing with the interpretation of the second chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā-s. (shrink)

The present paper, ‘Theory of Apoha on the basis of the Pramanasamuccaya’, is based upon Dingnaga's principal philosophical treatise called Pramanasamuccaya and its commentary vritti . The main aim of this paper is to come to an understanding of Dingnåga's views on the doctrine of apoha (anyapoha), which seems to be most important to interpret the conventional signs that are of the words and sentences of human speech which are used by man conventionally. Thus the central concern of this doctrine (...) of apoha is the interpretation of the process of the import of word. (shrink)

Among the means of valid cognition, the one which appears first in every enumeration, which was considered as being the basis of all other means of knowledge and which was considered as a legitimate method of knowledge by all schools of Indian thought is perception (pratyakṣa). With regard to perception, we can naturally expect such questions as ‘what is it to perceive’ or ‘what do we mean when we say that something is perceived’. It is generally believed that the philosophical (...) theories of perceptions are really theories about what we mean by ordinary perceptual statements. In considering our knowledge about the external world, the philosopher tends to consider the way in which perception can and does provide us with the knowledge and the nature, extent and certainty of knowledge it provides us with. It is a well acknowledged fact that perception is the fundamental source of knowledge. In Buddhist epistemology, a systematic discussion on perception is found in the writings of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya with vṛitti, who belongs to Yogācāra school of Buddhism of Mahayana tradition. An attempt has been made in this paper to explain and examine critically the first chapter of Pramāṇasamuccaya with vṛitti, i.e., perception with special reference to Non-Buddhist schools, namely Nyāyayikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṁkhyans and Mīmāṁsakas. To explain it, the paper has been divided into three sections. Section I deals with Dignāga’s theory of perception and examination of non-Buddhist school's theory of perception, section II deals with Dignāga’s examination of nature of Perception with reference to non-Buddhists schools and section III deals with conclusion. (shrink)

Summary An attempt is made in this book to expound the Buddhist theory of perception as conceived by Dinnaga and Dharmkirti, especially as presented in Pramanavarttika of the latter. The study is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter deals with the Dinaga-Dharmakirti logico-epistemological sub-system within the overall system of Buddhist philosophy. The second chapter brings out the unique contribution of Pramanavarttika as a commentary to Pramanasamuccaya of Dinnaga. The third and fourth chapters are focused on the pre-Dinnaga and non-Buddhist (...) theories of perception. The fifth chapter deals with Dharmkirti’s well- reasoned addition of the term ‘non-illusive” to the definition of perception as given by Dinnaga. The sixth chapter is devoted to the main theme freedom from conceptual construction or kalpnapodham as the definiens of the term pratyaksha. The seventh chapter is about the four kinds of perception. The eighth chapter deals with the nature of the object of perception, the criteria of valid perception along with a discussion on illusion. The ninth chapter sums up the relevance of Pramanavarttika’ s contribution to Buddhist philosophy. (shrink)

This is the best book to date on Buddhist theory of perception as found in the Pramänasamuccaya of Dignäga, 480 to 540 A.D. The book offers seventy pages of translation, copious notes, and two Tibetan editions in transliteration of Dignäga's chapter on perception. The translation is strikingly good with the necessary additions carefully bracketed to allow as much as possible a fluent reading if one disregarded the brackets. The translation is a presentation of the theory of perception, an examination of (...) a definition of perception found in a work attributed to Vasubandhu, followed by examinations of non-Buddhist theories of perception: Nyäya, Vaisesika, Sämkhya, and Mïmämsaka. Mistakenly Hattori says, "Unlike his predecessors, Dignäga does not accept the unconditional authority of Scripture." If that were true, then Dignäga's teacher Vasubandhu, his teacher's brother Asanga, the great Nägärjuna, and many other Buddhist scholars who differentiated between scriptures requiring interpretation and those not requiring interpretation would have to be accused of unconditionally accepting all scriptures. Also, he says, "There is a commentary... by the great Tibetan scholar Darma Rinchen. However, I have not utilized it since I thought that the examination of it might serve to clarify only the Tibetan interpretation of Dignäga's thought." Rather, it would seem that this dimly lit field needs as much light as possible even if from the tinted lanterns of Tibet. However, all in all the book is excellent; it is not light reading or even particularly appealing to those whose interest is religious practice.--P. J. H. (shrink)

A diplomatic edition of a commentary by Bcom-ldan-ral-gri (1227-1305), a Tibetan Buddhist scholar of the Kadampa (Bka-gdams-pa) tradition, on the "Pramāṇasamuccaya" written by the Indian Buddhist logician, Dignāga (c. 480-540 CE); includes extensive introductory material on the life and work of Dignāga, and reception of this treatise in Tibet.

Previous studies have claimed that the term ‘all-inclusive pervasion’ ( sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti ) appeared for the first time in the Hetubindu , and that it was Dharmakīrti who created this theory. This article attempts to modify this view and to show that the prototype of this theory can already be found in Dignāga’s system of logic. Dignāga states in the third chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti that the co-existence of a logical reason with what is to be proved is understood by means (...) of two types of exemplification that sum up external items ( bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta ). Furthermore, with respect to where the pervasion is indicated, he states in the second chapter of the same work that the non-deviation of a logical mark from what is to be proved is indicated elsewhere ( anyatra ). He also implies that anyatra means in the substratum in general ( ādhārasāmānya ) and that the subject is implicitly included in other substrata, i.e., in the substratum in general. Building upon Dignāga’s awareness of the issue, the conflict between the universality of pervasion and the particularity of actual inference, Dharmakīrti reinforced Dignāga’s system of logic by demonstrating that a property to be proved as the universal is not particularised by the subject by the use of the idea of ‘the exclusion of nonconnection’ ( ayogavyavaccheda ) and by adopting the concept of ‘all’ in place of ‘external items’. (shrink)

According to Dignāga, the word “cow” makes one understand all cows in a general form by excluding non-cows. However, how does one understand the non-cows to be excluded? Hattori answers as follows: “On perceiving the particular which is endowed with dewlap, horns, a hump on the back, and so forth, one understands that it is not a non-cow, because one knows that a non-cow is not endowed with these attributes.” Hattori regards observation of a dewlap, etc. as the cause of (...) excluding non-cows. Akamatsu presents a view similar to Hattori’s. Tanizawa, however, criticises Akamatsu by pointing out that then the apohavādin would have accepted positive elements such as a dewlap as defining characteristics of a cow. Stating that X is not a cow because it is not endowed with a dewlap, etc., amounts to accepting that the dewlap, etc. are the defining characteristics of a cow. Instead of a real universal cowness the apohavādin would have accepted a dewlap, etc. Akamatsu’s understanding of apoha, if it was correct, implies Tanizawa, would destroy the essence of the Buddhist theory of apoha. Continuing the view of Hattori and Akamatsu, Yoshimizu recently published two articles on Dignāga’s theory of apoha. He claims that “the word “cow” excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on them.” Thus, “the word “cow” can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that none of them has all the members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly definition of “cow”.” Horns, one of the characteristic features of cows, are indeed mentioned by Dignāga in PS 5:43. Yoshimizu understands Dignāga’s semantics as being parallel to the modern semantics of componential analysis. A question arises: what does Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of apoha, really think regarding this issue? The present article sheds light on the incompatibility of the two interpretations by investigating the relevant source texts. It further shows that the issue Tanizawa deals with was already discussed by Dignāga. Examining Dignāga’s discussions shows that Tanizawa is right in his understanding of apoha. The interpretation by Hattori and other scholars is not supported by Dignāga’s text. The present conclusion is also supported by Mādhava, Uddyotakara and Kumārila. None of them assumes Dignāga’s theory to be as Hattori, etc. take it. (shrink)