In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that the incentive inequalities permitted by John Rawls's difference principle are unjust since people cannot justify them to their fellow citizens. I argue that citizens of a Rawlsian society can justify their acceptance of a wide range of incentive inequalities to their fellow citizens. They can do so because they possess the right to freedom of occupational choice, and are permitted – as a matter of justice – to exercise this right by (...) making occupational decisions on the basis of a wide range of values and preferences. (shrink)

Health incentive schemes aim to produce healthier behaviors in target populations. They may do so both by making incentivized options more salient and by making them less costly. Changes in costs only result in healthier behavior if the individual rationally assesses the cost change and acts accordingly. Not all people do this well. Those that fail to respond rationally to incentives will typically include those who are least able to make prudent choices more generally. This group will typically include (...) the least advantaged more generally, since disadvantage inhibits one's effective ability to choose well and since poor choices tend to cause or aggravate disadvantage. Therefore, within the target population, health benefits to the better off may come at the cost of aggravated inequity. This is one instance of a problem I name the Able Chooser Problem, previously emphasized by Richard Arneson in relation to coercive paternalism. I describe and discuss this problem by distinguishing between policy options and their effects on the choice situation of individuals. Both positive and negative incentives, as well as mandates that are less than perfectly effective, require some sort of rational deliberation and action and so face the Able Chooser Problem. In contrast, effective restriction of what options are physically available, as well as choice context design that makes some options more salient or appealing, do not demand rational agency. These considerations provide an equity-based argument for preferring smart design of our choice and living environment to incentives and mandates. (shrink)

Background Policies to use financial incentives to encourage healthy behaviour are controversial. Much of this controversy is played out in the mass media, both reflecting and shaping public opinion. Objective To describe UK mass media coverage of incentive schemes, comparing schemes targeted at different client groups and assessing the relative prominence of the views of different interest groups. Design Thematic content analysis. Subjects National and local news coverage in newspapers, news media targeted at health-care providers and popular websites between (...) January 2005 and February 2010. Setting UK mass media. Results The study included 210 articles. Fifteen separate arguments favourable towards schemes, and 19 unfavourable, were identified. Overall, coverage was more favourable than unfavourable, although most articles reported a mix of views. Arguments about the prevalence and seriousness of the health problems targeted by incentive schemes were uncontested. Moral and ethical objections to such schemes were common, focused in particular on recipients such as drug users or the overweight who were already stereotyped as morally deficient, and these arguments were largely uncontested. Arguments about the effectiveness of schemes and their potential for benefit or harm were areas of greater contestation. Government, public health and other health-care provider interests dominated favourable coverage; oppo- sition came from rival politicians, taxpayersÕ representatives, certain charities and from some journalists themselves. Conclusions Those promoting incentive schemes for people who might be regarded as ÔundeservingÕ should plan a media strategy that anticipates their public reception. (shrink)

Rawls argues that ‘Parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect’. But what are these social conditions that we should so urgently avoid? One evident candidate might be conditions of material inequality. Yet Rawls seems confident that his account of justice can endorse such inequalities without jeopardising citizens’ self-respect. In this article I argue that this confidence is misplaced. Unequalising incentives, I claim, jeopardise the self-respect of those least (...) advantaged—at least under a Rawlsian schema—by undermining the very processes by which Rawls hopes to make distributional inequalities and self-respect compatible. I begin by setting out Rawls’s distinct account of self-respect before moving to describe how Rawls expects the difference principle to support citizens’ in this regard. I then draw upon GA Cohen’s distinction between ‘strict’ and ‘lax’ interpretations of the difference principle to argue that the presence of unequalising incentives undermines both the direct and indirect support that the difference principle can offer to citizens’ self-respect. As such, I claim that Rawls must either weaken his endorsement of unequalising incentives, or risk violating his ‘prior commitment’ to avoiding social conditions harmful to citizens’ self-respect. (shrink)

This paper explores how managers’ and supervisors’ equity incentives impact the likelihood of committing corporate fraud in Chinese-listed firms. Previous research has shown that corporate fraud in China is a widespread phenomenon and has severe consequences for affected firms and executives. However, our understanding of the reasons that fraud is committed in a Chinese setting has been very limited thus far. This is an increasingly important topic, because corporate governance is rapidly changing in China, and it is unclear whether (...) adopting the executive compensation practices of the West is appropriate for Chinese firms. We show that managers’ equity incentives increase their propensity to commit corporate fraud. We also find that this effect is more pronounced for state-owned firms. However, we find a negative but not significant relationship between the equity incentives of the supervisory board and the incidence of fraud. (shrink)

Poor medication adherence in patients with a psychosis is associated with relapse. It has been proposed that outcomes might be improved by using financial incentives for treatment adherence (FITA). However, a strong moral intuition against this practice has been found. This paper examines the ethics of FITA. Three arguments are presented, which if accepted would severely restrict or even prohibit the practice. These are based on (1) “incommensurable values”, where FITA denigrates an aspect of “respect for the person”, (2) (...) “exploitation”, where unfair advantage is taken of the patient, and (3) “fairness”, where it is difficult to draw a line between those who should and should not be offered payment. A number of practical impediments are also considered. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to shed new light on the role of feeling in Kant’s psychology of moral motivation by focusing on the concept of an incentive (Triebfeder), a term he borrowed from one of his most important rationalist predecessors, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. I argue that, similar to Baumgarten, Kant understands an incentive to refer to the ground of desire and that feelings function as a specific kind of ground within Kant’s psychology of moral action, namely as the ‘impelling (...) cause’ of desire. I claim that this interpretation has several advantages over the alternatives currently on offer in the literature. (shrink)

This article presents an overview of traditional legal and regulatory incentives directed at achieving lawful corporate behavior, together with examples of more recent governmental incentives aimed at encouraging self regulation activities by corporations. These incentives have been differentiated into positive incentives that benefit corporations for actions that encourage or assist lawful behavior, and punitive incentives that only punish corporations for violations of legal or regulatory standards. This analysis indicates that traditional legal and regulatory incentives (...) for lawful corporate behavior are overwhelmingly punitive in their intended effects, while more recent governmental incentives to encourage voluntary corporate self regulation are much more positive in their intended effects.A prototype private compliance system containing typical features specified in governmental incentives for corporate self regulation was then analyzed applying the same positive/punitive analysis that was performed with the governmental incentives. This analysis suggests that corporate compliance programs that are structured to comply with Department of Defense regulations for defense contractors or the new Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines will reflect the same overwhelmingly punitive balance of incentives for lawful and ethical employee conduct as do the traditional legal and regulatory incentive systems for lawful corporate behavior. (shrink)

In a recent article, Seana Valentine Shiffrin offers a distinctive egalitarian critique of the types of incentive inequalities that are permitted by John Rawls's difference principle. She argues that citizens of a well-ordered society, who publicly accept Rawls's two principles of justice and their justifications, may not demand incentives to employ their talents in productive ways since such demands are inconsistent with a major justification for the difference principle: the moral arbitrariness of talent. I argue that there is no (...) such inconsistency. Citizens can publicly accept the claim that talent is morally arbitrary and accept incentives to employ their talents productively without inconsistency. In the standard case that Rawls envisions, citizens who do so take their preferences to be a reason for a higher salary, not their talents. (shrink)

Chronic shortage in organs for transplantation worldwide is leading many policy-makers to consider various incentives that may increase donation rates.1 These range from giving holders of donor cards some priority on the transplant waiting list or a discount on health insurance premiums, to giving families who consent to donation a medal of honour, reimbursement of funeral expenses, tax incentives or even financial compensation.2–4 Of the various proposed incentive mechanisms, the one that has consistently garnered the most criticism and (...) objection in the literature is that of paying families who consent to donate the organs of a deceased loved one.Arguments against such a policy abound: it could exploit the poor, influence the family to prematurely withdraw care, encourage families to withhold medical information that would result in transplant-transmission of disease, and finally, it would commercialise the value of human life and result in the perception of human organs as commodities. Indeed, to date no Western country has adopted a policy of financial compensation to families for consenting to organ donation.2Recently, a country suffering from severe shortage in organs has implemented a policy of financial incentives that uses cash payments. Wu and Fang5 describe a recent pilot programme in China that compensates families for postmortem donation, through an independent third party and based on consent or presumed consent of the deceased. The particular context within which this programme is implemented validates and even exacerbates some ethical concerns that have been voiced in the Western medical and bioethics …. (shrink)

Low-income environments have been associated with greater levels of impulsive behavior, which contribute to the higher debt and obesity rates that further perpetuate current wealth and health disparities. In this commentary, we describe how this might be explained by an appeal to “incentive hope” and the motivational drive toward consumption triggered by the future uncertainty these groups face.

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception (...) of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice. (shrink)

The rapid development of credit default swap market has changed the manner of credit risk management of banks to some extent and has had a new influence on the bank-enterprise credit model. In this study, the credit financing process of credit risk in small- and medium-sized enterprises gathers within a bank, which makes it difficult for SMEs to raise funds. On the basis of the perspective of CDS, we construct an incentive game model of bank-enterprise credit behavior and analyze the (...) influence mechanism of the credit financing of SMEs on CDS contract coupon rate, CDS payout ratio, bank-enterprise credit effort, and loan recovery rate when considering CDS. The result shows that the CDS contract leads to insufficient supervision after a bank loan, the moral hazard of the SMEs rises, and the probability of credit default events increases. In addition, in view of CDS, the SMEs can access more credit funds. (shrink)

The ethics of health incentive research—a form of public health research—are not well developed, and concerns of justice have been least examined. In this paper, we explore what potential long term harms in relation to justice may occur as a result of such research and whether they should be considered as part of its ethical evaluation. ‘Long term harms’ are defined as harms that contribute to existing systematic patterns of disadvantage for groups. Their effects are experienced on a long term (...) basis, persisting even once an incentive research project ends. We will first establish that three categories of such harms potentially arise as a result of health incentive interventions. We then argue that the risk of these harms also constitutes a morally relevant consideration for health incentive research and suggest who may be responsible for assessing and mitigating these risks. We propose that responsibility should be assigned on the basis of who initiates health incentive research projects. Finally, we briefly describe possible strategies to prevent or mitigate the risk of long term harms to members of disadvantaged groups, which can be employed during the design, conduct and dissemination of research projects. (shrink)

Richard Penny argues that Rawls’s commitment to self-respect puts him at odds with his endorsement of unequalizing incentives. Penny draws on G.A. Cohen’s distinction between ‘lax’ and ‘strict’ readings of the difference principle to make this point. Given this, Penny concludes that Rawls faces a dilemma: either Rawls weakens his endorsement of unequalizing incentives or weakens his commitment to self-respect. By taking the difference principle in isolation, Penny creates a false dilemma. I will argue that once we place (...) the difference principle in the context of Rawls’s theory as a whole, we find that unequalizing incentives pose no danger to the self-respect of the least advantaged. Moreover, I will argue that a strict reading of the difference principle is incompatible with the self-respect of all citizens in a well-ordered society given the fact of reasonable pluralism. My arguments reveal the importance of seeing self-respect as a threshold good, rather than a relative one. (shrink)

:A common justification offered for unequal pay is that it encourages socially beneficial productivity. G. A. Cohen famously criticizes this argument for not questioning the behaviour and attitudes that make those incentives necessary. I defend the communal status of incentives against Cohen's challenge. I argue that Cohen's criticism fails to appreciate two different contexts in which we might grant incentives. We might grant unequal payment to someone because they demand it. However, unequal payment might be an offer (...) instead. I claim that incentives as offers promote the ideal of society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage. (shrink)

Hertwig and Ortmann suggest paying participants contingent upon performance in order to increase the thoroughness they devote to a decision task. We argue that monetary incentives can yield a number of unintended effects including distortions of the subjective representation of the task and impaired performance. Therefore, we conclude that performance-contingent payment should not be generally employed in judgment and decision research.

Given the constraints of human partiality and the possible social benefits of widespread genetic technology, allowing for incentive-based inequalities in access in order to boost innovation and diffusion may be the only feasible option available to the post-genomics egalitarian planner. In light of the prevailing ethos that exists in the non-ideal circumstances of society, an initial post-genomics egalitarian goal for all to have equivalent access to comparable genetic interventions seems very unlikely to succeed.While I outline how the initial egalitarian goal (...) can entail either overly prohibitive or overly idealistic prescriptions, I argue that the more recent non-ideal focus has not given adequate attention to how different distributions in genetic access may not only be constrained by, but may also affect the prevailing ethos for better or worse, in turn affecting the range of feasible options into the future. I analyse Farrelly’s Lax Genetic Difference Principle , as an exemplar of a non-ideal post-genomics theorising, and evaluate it in terms of its anticipated effects on the egalitarian ethos. I argue that achieving a more just distribution of access to genetic technologies, by principles that take into account genuine non-ideal considerations, requires a greater awareness of such effects.Finally, I briefly sketch a framework for ‘ethos-proofing’ non-ideal principles, in terms of access to genetic technologies, particularly enhancements, with regard to maintaining and fostering such an egalitarian ethos. (shrink)

An egalitarian interpretation and defence of Rawls's principles of justice and their institutional and policy implications in response to G. A. Cohen's criticisms of Rawls's alleged justification of unequalizing incentives.

Introduction Financial incentive schemes have been commonly used by the hearing aid industry as a way of encouraging device sales. These schemes can lead to a conflict of interest as the hearing device dispenser is torn between personal reward over the best interests of their client. This conflict of interest has the potential for the dispenser to develop “moral distress”, a negative state of mind when an individual’s ethical values contrast with those of the employing organization. The purpose of this (...) study was to investigate if there was a relationship between financial incentives and moral distress in Australian audiologists and audiometrists. Methods An online survey was distributed to all members of Audiology Australia and the Australian College of Audiology via email. Participants rated their perceived moral distress from 0 to 10 on the Moral Distress Thermometer and answered four questions about financial incentives in their respective workplace. Results A total of 65 participants, 42 females and 23 males, completed the online survey. A quarter of participants rated their moral distress corresponding to levels of uncomfortable or above. A statistically significant association was found between financial incentives, sales target setting, and higher perceived moral distress in participants. Conclusions For our sample, the implementation of financial incentives created ethical challenges for practicing audiologists and audiometrists. Modifications to employee rewards programs as well as a regulation of device sales are recommended. (shrink)

In this paper I consider thecontribution that theories about common propertyresource management and policies relating toparticipation can make to our understanding ofcommunal water resource management. Common totheoretical and policy approaches are the ideas thatincentives are important in defining the problem ofcollective action and that institutions apparentlyoffer a solution to it. The gendered dynamics ofincentives and institutions are explored. This paperbriefly outlines theoretical approaches toinstitutions as solutions to collective actionproblems and indicates the linkages with policiesregarding participation in water resource management.It suggests (...) that, whilst offering considerableinsights, such approaches are limited and may resultin policy prescriptions that do little to involve orempower women. In particular, I argue that themodeling of incentives is impoverished in itseconomism and its abstraction of the individual froma life world. I suggest that the conceptualization ofinstitutions is primarily an organizational one,which, whilst alluding to the role of norms,practices, and conventions, focuses primarily onformal manifestations of collective action; contracts,committees, and meetings. Where women‘s participationis concerned, I illustrate that incentives tocooperative may be devised from reproductive concernsand the minor exigencies of daily life (as well asfrom productive concerns) and that alternative modelsof institutions may better reflect the way in whichdecisions are made and implemented within a socialcontext. (shrink)

This paper studies whether incentivizing performance with competition and cooperation-based incentive schemes, rather than individual compensation, affects peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour. We run a laboratory experiment in which we introduce three different compensation schemes—piece rate, the equal-split-sharing-rule and a tournament—associated with a real effort task and we measure risk behaviour both before and after the effort task. We find that competition more than halves peer influence on risk behaviour compared with piece-rate compensation and in some specifications produces negative (...) peer effects. Competition also significantly reduces an individual’s feeling of attachment to their peers and self-reported peer influence. (shrink)

Leading scholars in the field of health economics evaluate the role of incentives in health and health-care decision making from the perspectives of both supply and demand.

This book provides the first systematic study on three types of incentives for organ donation. It covers extensive research conducted in four culturally different societies: Hong Kong, mainland China, Iran and the United States, and shows on the basis of the research that a new model of incentives can be constructed to enhance organ donation in contemporary societies. The book focuses on three types of incentives: honorary incentives, commonly adopted in the United States and other Western (...) countries by offering things such as a thank-you card and a memorial park for donors to encourage donations motivated by pure altruism; compensationalist incentives, adopted in the Islamic Republic of Iran to encourage donation by providing monetary compensation to unrelated living donors for appreciating their altruistic contribution of donation; and familist incentives, implemented in Israel and mainland China to provide priority to organ transplantation to donors and/or their family members. The book demonstrates that a new model of incentives must go beyond offering only one type of incentives and should rather include different types of incentives that are practically effective, politically legitimate and ethically justifiable for particular societies. This implies that suitable incentive measures may vary from society to society to optimize organ donation. This book provides a clear reference for both the scholars and practitioners in the field of organ transplantation, as well as for general readers interested in bioethics and health care policy. (shrink)

This paper documents for the first time tournament incentives of pension fund managers and their preferences for social and environmental security characteristics. Using a comprehensive data set on pension fund security holdings, differences in manager tournaments are distinguished by sorting pension funds into portfolios based on the number of concurrent managers each pension fund employs. Results indicate that the way pension schemes structure portfolio manager tournament incentives is important in explaining the social and environmental portfolio firm characteristics of (...) pension fund held stock. (shrink)

In mainstream business and economics, prizes such as the Presidential Medal of Freedom are understood as special types of incentives, with the peculiar features of being awarded in public, and of having largely symbolic value. Informed by both historical considerations and philosophical instances, our study defines fundamental theoretical differences between incentives and prizes. The conceptual factors highlighted by our analytical framework are then tested through a laboratory experiment. The experimental exercise aims to analyze how prizes and incentives (...) impact actual individuals’ behavior differently. Our results show that both incentives (monetary and contingent) and prizes (non-monetary and discretional rewards) boost motivation to perform if awarded publicly, but only prizes crowd in motivation promoting virtuous attitude. (shrink)

The Chinese academic assessment and incentive system drew mixed responses from academia. In the essay the author tried to explain why the current assessment system is appropriate in China and an opportunistic behavior in Chinese academia is exposed.

This paper examines the relationship between CEO incentives and strong and weak corporate social performance. Using the KLD database we find that incentives have no significant relationship with strong social performance. Salary and long-term incentives have a positive association with weak social performance.

Incentives for improving research productivity at universities prevail in global academia. However, the rationale, methodology, and impact of such incentives and consequent evaluation regimes are in need of scrutinization. This paper explores the influences of financial and career-related publishing incentive schemes on research cultures. It draws on an analysis of 75 interviews with academics, senior university administrators, and journal editors from China, a country that has seen widespread reliance on international publication counts in research evaluation and reward systems. (...) The study focuses on humanities and social sciences as disciplinary sites, which embody distinct characteristics and have experienced the introduction of incentive schemes in China since the early 2000s. Findings reveal tensions between internationalization and indigenization, quality and quantity, integrity and instrumentalism, equity and inequity in Chinese academia. In particular, we argue that a blanket incentive scheme could reinforce a managerial culture in higher education, encourage performative objectification of academics, and jeopardize their agency. We thereby challenge ‘one-size-fits-all’ policymaking, and suggest instead that institutions should have the opportunity to adopt an ethical and ‘human-oriented’ approach when developing their research incentives and evaluation mechanisms. (shrink)

This book, first published in 2006, examines the incentives at work in a wide range of institutions to see how and how well coordination is achieved by informing and motivating individual decision makers. The book examines the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs. It investigates the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to kidney transplants, to see if they enhance general well being. The book examines a broad range of market transactions, (...) from auctions to labor markets, to the entire economy. The analysis is conducted using specific worked examples, lucid general theory, and illustrations drawn from news stories. Of the seventy different topics and sections, only twelve require a knowledge of calculus. The second edition offers new chapters on auctions, matching and assignment problems, and corporate governance. Boxed examples are used to highlight points of theory and are separated from the main text. (shrink)

Many jurisdictions have put regulatory strategies in place to provide incentives and safeguards to whistleblowers to encourage whistleblowing on corporate wrongdoings. One such strategy is the provision of a financial incentive to the whistleblower if the complaint leads to a successful regulatory enforcement action against the offending organization. We conducted an experiment using professional accountants as participants to examine whether such an incentive encourages potential whistleblowers to report an observed financial reporting fraud to a relevant external authority. We also (...) examine the effect of perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing on accountants’ intention to whistleblow. We find that a financial incentive results in a higher intention to whistleblow to a relevant external authority. We also find that perceptions of the seriousness of the wrongdoing are significantly and positively associated with accountants’ intention to whistleblow to a relevant external authority. We find a significant interaction between the provision of a financial incentive and the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing on the intention to report the wrongdoing externally. The intention to report the financial reporting fraud externally is higher when the level of perceived seriousness is higher, regardless of the availability of a financial incentive. However, when the perceived level of seriousness is lower, the presence of financial incentive results in a higher intention to report the financial reporting fraud externally. These findings indicate that the impact of a financial incentive on the intention to whistleblow is moderated by perceptions of the seriousness of the wrongdoing. (shrink)

In Rescuing Justice and Equality , G. A. Cohen reiterates his critique of John Rawls's difference principle as a justification for inequality-generating incentives, and also argues that Rawls's ambition to provide a constructivist defence of the first principles of justice is doomed. Cohen's arguments also suggest a natural response to my earlier attempt to defend the basic structure objection to Cohen's critique, which I term the alien factors reply. This paper criticises the reply, and Cohen's more general argument against (...) Rawls's constructivism. 1. (shrink)

Current incentive structures are more favorably aligned with the world’s problems than with their solutions. We conceptualize this as the paradox of incentives to argue the need for new thinking and restructuring of incentives to break the paradox during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond, and create new opportunities for societal transformation.

Bonuses, as incentives or rewards for health -related behavior, feature prominently in German social health insurance. Their goal is centered around promoting personal responsibility, but reducing overall health -care expenditure and enabling competition between sickness funds also play a role. The central position of personal responsibility in German health -care policy is described, and a framework is offered for an analysis of the ethical issues raised by policies seeking to promote responsibility. The framework entails seven tests relating to: solidarity; (...) equality and equity; intrusiveness; attributability and opportunity of choice; evidence, rationale, and feasibility; affected third parties; and coherence. It is contended that a focus on tests, in particular from within contractualism, is the most appropriate way of addressing the question of health responsibility in pluralistic societies. However, taken by themselves, the tests also allow an identification of the key ethical issues by particular policies, which are illustrated by applying the framework to particular bonus polices. (shrink)

The paper by Lynch et al. argues that payments to research participants in biomedical research can be divided into three different categories, reimbursement, compensation, and incentive and...

ABSTRACTThe disadvantaged have incentives to commit crime, and to develop criminogenic dispositions, that limit the extent to which their co-citizens can blame them for breaking the law. This is true regardless of whether the causes of criminality are mainly “structural” or “cultural.” We need not assume that society as a whole is unjust in order to accept this conclusion. And doing so would neither stigmatize nor otherwise disrespect the disadvantaged.

The current study investigates whether tournament incentives motivate chief executive officer to be socially responsible. Furthermore, it explores the role of sub-national institutional contingencies [i.e., state-owned enterprises vs. non-SOEs, foreign-owned entities vs. non-FOEs, cross-listed vs. non-cross-listed, developed region] in CEO tournament incentives and the corporate social responsibility performance relationship. Data were collected from all A-shared companies listed in the stock exchanges of China from 2014 to 2019. The study uses the baseline methodology of ordinary least squares and cluster (...) OLS regression. Moreover, firm-fixed effects regression, two-stage least squares regression, and propensity score matching deal with the endogeneity problem and check the robustness of the results. The results provide reliable evidence that tournament incentives motivate CEOs to be more socially responsible. On the other hand, sub-national institutional contingencies positively affect the association between CEO tournament incentives and CSRP. The findings have important implications for companies and regulators who wish to enhance CSP by providing incentives to top managers. (shrink)

Over the past decade the welfare state has come under sustained attack not only from quarters which never approved of its policies, but also from political theorists who used to support it. With the collapse of communism, the policy of comprehensive welfare provision came under renewed scrutiny. It was argued that its impact on work incentives is most detrimental. Examining in detail current unemployment debates within Western welfare states, this book seeks to verify or refute the view that non-work (...) is increasingly chosen by work shy individuals - the 'pathological' theory of unemployment. Drawing from a range of disciplinary perspectives - from social philosophy and the history of philosophy, to occupational psychology and feminist economics - this interdisciplinary analysis reveals that the "pathological" theory of unemployment, with its reliance on a deficient depiction of human nature and its disregard of non-pecuniary work incentives and empirical evidence on benefit fraud, cannot be upheld. (shrink)

Rawls’ The Law of Peoples does not offer a clear principled account of the way in which liberal and decent peoples should deal with benevolent absolutisms. Within the Rawlsian framework, benevolent absolutisms are a type of society that respects basic human rights and is not externally aggressive. Rawls rules out the use of coercion to engage with benevolent absolutisms but does not provide an alternative strategy. The article develops one, namely, it argues that liberal and decent peoples should use positive (...) incentives to induce benevolent absolutisms to make their transition to the status of well-ordered peoples. In so doing, it offers a principled way to expand Rawls’ international nonideal theory and, in the process, provides a more nuanced approach to the promotion of political participation in international society. The article draws on the literature on economic statecraft and political theory and constructs an incentive model with seven distinct parameters attached to its definition of incentives. Finally, the article provides a real-world example, of how to concretely implement the incentive mechanism. (shrink)

This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning, or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. The author considers methods involving feedback iterative controls which require the prior selection of a 'criterion function', but no prior calculation of optimal quantities. The target is adjusted as the results for each step become data for the criterion function. Implementation is built in by (...) the incentive structure, and all controls rely on consistency with the self-interest of individuals. The applicability of all the methods is shown to be independent of the form of ownership of enterprises: examples are given for industries which are wholly privately owned, wholly nationalized, mixed and labour-managed. (shrink)

The U.S. Constitution employs a utilitarian view in authorizing Congress to establish patents and copyrights. Let us refer to this way of justifying copyright as the Incentives Argument, or more extensively, the Incentives Argument for Intellectual Property Rights. While seemingly straightforward, the Incentives Argument has been widely criticized in philosophical literature on intellectual property. Scholars have come to prefer Neo-Lockean labor-desert accounts, grounding intellectual property rights in the author's natural ownership claims over his creations. Neo-Lockean accounts are (...) thought to avoid some of the problems classically associated with utilitarian arguments, such as vulnerability to empirical evidence and an inability to make sense of rights or duties morally prior to consequential considerations. Fortunately, many criticisms articulated by opponents of the Incentives Argument can be answered by a strategic retreat to the version of utilitarianism found in the work of John Stuart Mill. I argue that not only does a Millian account of the Incentives Argument prove less vulnerable to oft-cited criticisms, but also allows for a more robust account of how the audience benefits from a proliferation of creative works. Mill's focus on the importance of critical self-development allows for a deeper analysis of how creative works benefit members of the audience as individuals and as a community. Within a Millian framework, viewing the audience as mere passive consumers of media fails to take into account the impact of expressive acts on an individual's critical self-development. Instead, one must see members of the audience as active participants in the creation of meaning and the common culture. Construing the community that receives creative works as an Active Audience alters the landscape of copyright, and the Incentives Argument, making balancing the desires of creators and the desires of audience members a key priority. (shrink)

I discuss a game-theoretic model in which scientists compete to finish the intermediate stages of some research project. Banerjee et al. have previously shown that if the credit awarded for intermediate results is proportional to their difficulty, then the strategy profile in which scientists share each intermediate stage as soon as they complete it is a Nash equilibrium. I show that the equilibrium is both unique and strict. Thus rational credit-maximizing scientists have an incentive to share their intermediate results, as (...) long as this is sufficiently rewarded. (shrink)