Regularity theories of causation are guided by the idea that causes are collectively sufficient for their effects. Following Mackie [1974], that idea is typically refined to distinguish collections that include redundant members from those that do not. Causes must be collectively sufficient for their effects without redundancy. While Mackie was surely right that the regularity theory must distinguish collections that are in some sense minimally sufficient for an effect from those that include unnecessary hangers-on, I believe that redundancy is the (...) wrong mark of that distinction. I propose a way to develop the regularity theory without it. Instead of distinguishing minimal from mere sufficiency in terms of redundancy, we should look to the influence that events have in the world. Causes, so construed, must have just enough collective influence to ensure that an effect occurs. I argue that such an account provides a uniform solution to the problem of epiphenomena and to a pair of related problems that aris.. (shrink)

Consider the regularity thesis that each possible event has non-zero probability. Hájek challenges this in two ways: there can be nonmeasurable events that have no probability at all and on a large enough sample space, some probabilities will have to be zero. But arguments for the existence of nonmeasurable events depend on the axiom of choice. We shall show that the existence of anything like regular probabilities is by itself enough to imply a weak version of AC sufficient to (...) prove the Banach–Tarski Paradox on the decomposition of a ball into two equally sized balls, and hence to show the existence of nonmeasurable events. This provides a powerful argument against unrestricted orthodox Bayesianism that works even without AC. A corollary of our formal result is that if every partial order extends to a total preorder while maintaining strict comparisons, then the Banach–Tarski Paradox holds. This yields an argument that incommensurability cannot be avoided in ambitious versions of decision theory. (shrink)

The notion of internalization put forth by Roger Shepard continues to be appealing and challenging. He suggests that we have internalized, during our evolutionary development, environmental regularities, or constraints. Internalization solves one of the hardest problems of perceptual psychology: the underspecification problem. That is the problem of how well-defined perceptual experience is generated from the often ambiguous and incomplete sensory stimulation. Yet, the notion of internalization creates new problems that may outweigh the solution of the underspecification problem. To support (...) this claim, I first examine the concept of internalization, breaking it down into several distinct interpretations. These range from well-resolved dynamic regularities to ill-resolved statistical regularities. As a function of the interpretation the researcher selects, an empirical test of the internalization hypothesis may be straightforward or it may become virtually impossible. I then attempt to cover the range of interpretations by drawing on examples from different domains of visual event perception. Unfortunately, the experimental tests regarding most candidate regularities, such as gravitational acceleration, fail to support the concept of internalization. This suggests that narrow interpretations of the concept should be given up in favor of more abstract interpretations. However, the latter are not easily amenable to empirical testing. There is nonetheless a way to test these abstract interpretations by contrasting internalization with the opposite concept: externalization of body dynamics. I summarize evidence for such a projection of body constraints onto external objects. Based on the combined evidence of well-resolved and ill- resolved regularities, the value of the notion of internalization has to be reassessed. Key Words: event perception; evolution; internalization. (shrink)

Regularities in event timing allow for the allocation of attention to critical time-points when an event is most likely to occur, leading to improved visual perception. Results from recent studies indicate that similar benefits may extend to memory for scenes and objects. Here, we investigated whether benefits of temporal regularity are evident when detailed, item-specific representations are necessary for successful recognition memory performance. In Experiments 1 and 2, pictures of objects were presented with either predictable or randomized (...) event timing, in separate encoding blocks. In the test phase, old and new objects were presented, intermixed with perceptually similar exemplars of encoded objects. In Experiment 3 we attempted to replicate previously reported memory enhancements for scenes. In contrast to predictions, temporal regularity did not affect response times or improve recognition memory accuracy in any of our experiments. These results suggest that any effects of temporal expectation on memory are subtle and may be sensitive to minor changes in task parameters. In sum, indirect upregulation of attention through imposed temporal structure may not be sufficient to have downstream effects on memory performance. (shrink)

Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones—they are both represented by credence 0, which violates a principle known as “regularity.” Following Skyrms 1980 and Lewis 1980, they recommend that we should instead use a much richer set of numbers, called the “hyperreals.” This essay argues that this popular (...) view is the result of two mistakes. The first mistake, which this essay calls the “numerical fallacy,” is to assume that a distinction that isn't represented by different numbers isn't represented at all in a mathematical representation. In this case, the essay claims that although the real numbers do not make all relevant distinctions, the full mathematical structure of a probability function does. The second mistake is that the hyperreals make too many distinctions. They have a much more complex structure than credences in ordinary propositions can have, so they make distinctions that don't exist among credences. While they might be useful for generating certain mathematical models, they will not appear in a faithful mathematical representation of credences of ordinary propositions. (shrink)

The current work investigated whether differences in phonological overlap between the past- and present-tense forms of regular and irregular verbs can account for the graded neurophysiological effects of verb regularity observed in past-tense priming designs. Event-related potentials were recorded from 16 healthy participants who performed a lexical-decision task in which past-tense primes immediately preceded present-tense targets. To minimize intra-modal phonological priming effects, cross-modal presentation between auditory primes and visual targets was employed, and results were compared to a companion intra-modal (...) auditory study (Justus, T., Larsen, J., de Mornay Davies, P., Swick, D. (2008). Interpreting dissociations between regular and irregular past-tense morphology: evidence from event-related potentials. Cognitive, Affective, Behavioral Neuroscience, 8, 178–194.). For both regular and irregular verbs, faster response times and reduced N400 components were observed for present-tense forms when primed by the corresponding past-tense forms. Although behavioral facilitation was observed with a pseudopast phonological control condition, neither this condition nor an orthographic-phonological control produced significant N400 priming effects. Instead, these two types of priming were associated with a post-lexical anterior negativity (PLAN). Results are discussed with regard to dual- and single-system theories of inflectional morphology, as well as intra- and cross-modal prelexical priming. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the relationship between the “Humean” regularity view of causation, the view that a cause is a necessary condition of its effect, and the asymmetry of causation—the principle that if an event e1 causes e2, then it is false that e2 causes e1. I argue that the regularity view, in combination with the view that a cause is a necessary condition of its effect, is inconsistent with the asymmetry of causation, and that the inconsistency can (...) be removed by a modification of the view that a cause is a necessary condition of its effect that captures what is plausible in that view. I defend Hume, then, against the objection that he cannot accommodate a cause as being a necessary condition of its effect without absurdly denying the asymmetry of causation. This is only a limited defense, though, for I do not address the issue on which the tenability of the regularity view ultimately depends: viz., whether it can distinguish between causal laws and accidental generalizations without appealing to natural necessity. (shrink)

A probability distribution is regular if no possible event is assigned probability zero. While some hold that probabilities should always be regular, three counter-arguments have been posed based on examples where, if regularity holds, then perfectly similar events must have different probabilities. Howson (2017) and Benci et al. (2016) have raised technical objections to these symmetry arguments, but we see here that their objections fail. Howson says that Williamson’s (2007) “isomorphic” events are not in fact isomorphic, but Howson is (...) speaking of set-theoretic representations of events in a probability model. While those sets are not isomorphic, Williamson’s physical events are, in the relevant sense. Benci et al. claim that all three arguments rest on a conflation of different models, but they do not. They are founded on the premise that similar events should have the same probability in the same model, or in one case, on the assumption that a single rotation-invariant distribution is possible. Having failed to refute the symmetry arguments on such technical grounds, one could deny their implicit premises, which is a heavy cost, or adopt varying degrees of instrumentalism or pluralism about regularity, but that would not serve the project of accurately modelling chances. (shrink)

Prediction of daily rainfall is important for flood forecasting, reservoir operation, and many other hydrological applications. The artificial intelligence algorithm is generally used for stochastic forecasting rainfall which is not capable to simulate unseen extreme rainfall events which become common due to climate change. A new model is developed in this study for prediction of daily rainfall for different lead times based on sea level pressure which is physically related to rainfall on land and thus able to predict unseen rainfall (...) events. Daily rainfall of east coast of Peninsular Malaysia was predicted using SLP data over the climate domain. Five advanced AI algorithms such as extreme learning machine, Bayesian regularized neural networks, Bayesian additive regression trees, extreme gradient boosting, and hybrid neural fuzzy inference system were used considering the complex relationship of rainfall with sea level pressure. Principle components of SLP domain correlated with daily rainfall were used as predictors. The results revealed that the efficacy of AI models is predicting daily rainfall one day before. The relative performance of the models revealed the higher performance of BRNN with normalized root mean square error of 0.678 compared with HNFIS, BART, xgBoost, and ELM. Visual inspection of predicted rainfall during model validation using density-scatter plot and other novel ways of visual comparison revealed the ability of BRNN to predict daily rainfall one day before reliably. (shrink)

In standard probability theory, probability zero is not the same as impossibility. But many have suggested that only impossible events should have probability zero. This can be arranged if we allow infinitesimal probabilities, but infinitesimals do not solve all of the problems. We will see that regular probabilities are not invariant over rigid transformations, even for simple, bounded, countable, constructive, and disjoint sets. Hence, regular chances cannot be determined by space-time invariant physical laws, and regular credences cannot satisfy seemingly reasonable (...) symmetry principles. Moreover, the examples here are immune to the objections against Williamson’s infinite coin flips. (shrink)

c causes e iff i. c is spatiotemporally contiguous to e; ii. e succeeds c in time; and iii. all events of type C (i.e., events that are like c) are regularly followed by (or are constantly conjoined with) events of type E (i.e., events like e).

Neuropsychological dissociations between regular and irregular English past-tense morphology have been reported using a lexical decision task in which past-tense primes immediately precede present-tense targets. We present N400 event-related potential data from healthy participants using the same design. Both regular and irregular past-tense forms primed corresponding present-tense forms, but with a longer duration for irregular verbs. Phonological control conditions suggested that differences in formal overlap between prime and target contribute to, but do not account for, this difference, suggesting a (...) link between irregular morphology and semantics. Further analysis dividing the irregular verbs into two categories (weak irregular and strong) revealed that priming for strong verbs was reliably stronger than that for weak irregular and regular verbs, which were statistically indistinguishable from one another. We argue that, although we observe a regular-irregular dissociation, the nature of this dissociation is more consistent with single- than with dual-system models of inflectional morphology. (shrink)

Cardinality arguments against regular probability measures aim to show that no matter which ordered field ℍ we select as the measures for probability, we can find some event space F of sufficiently large cardinality such that there can be no regular probability measure from F into ℍ. In particular, taking ℍ to be hyperreal numbers won't help to guarantee that probability measures can always be regular. I argue that such cardinality arguments fail, since they rely on the wrong conception (...) of the role of numbers as measures of probability. With the proper conception of their role we can see that for any event space F, of any cardinality, there are regular hyperreal-valued probability measures. (shrink)

Central passages: Cicero On Fate 11–17; Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate 208.15–21. Critics of the Stoics tried to show up an inconsistency between Chrysippus’ acceptance of divination, on the one hand, and his conception of contingency, on the other. The argument claims that, since theorems of divination connect, in a conditional, a proposition about the past with one about the future, and since the necessity of the former is transferred to the latter, future occurrences—as far as covered by divination—are all (...) necessary. In the first part of this chapter, the argument is analysed in detail, and several logical difficulties contained in it are unravelled. The second part is concerned with Chrysippus’ counter‐argument. By determining that divinatory theorems are correctly expressed as negated conjunctions rather than conditionals, Chrysippus successfully blocks his opponents’ argument: what is genuinely predicted by diviners is not necessitated through the prediction, because the relation between sign and predicted future event does not ‘transmit’ necessity. Universal regularity between sign and predicted event does not suffice to make a future event necessary. There is no ‘causal chain’ connecting them. Theorems of other sciences, for example, medical theorems that express an empirical connection between things/events, make true Chrysippean conditionals. However, human freedom as conceived by the Stoics is not thereby threatened. (shrink)

It is a crucial issue for history to determine a cause or a causal relation between two events. The regularity theory of causation is one of the most popular approach to this problem. The paper analyzes mainly how this approach deals with the determination of a causal condition and with the choice of the main cause from the remaining causal conditions. It examines also Mackie’s conception of cause as an INUS condition, which is in fact only one version of the (...) regularity theory. The paper not only outlines and illustrates these approaches, using a concrete causal statments, but also presents the criticism of their shortcomings. It points to their difficulties springing from their inability to distinguish between the laws and accidental generalizations. This is important, because a genuine causal relation cannot be based on the second type of statments. (shrink)

We address how listeners perceive temporal regularity in music performances, which are rich in temporal irregularities. A computational model is described in which a small system of internal self‐sustained oscillations, operating at different periods with specific phase and period relations, entrains to the rhythms of music performances. Based on temporal expectancies embodied by the oscillations, the model predicts the categorization of temporally changing event intervals into discrete metrical categories, as well as the perceptual salience of deviations from these categories. (...) The model's predictions are tested in two experiments using piano performances of the same music with different phrase structure interpretations (Experiment 1) or different melodic interpretations (Experiment 2). The model successfully tracked temporal regularity amidst the temporal fluctuations found in the performances. The model's sensitivity to performed deviations from its temporal expectations compared favorably with the performers' structural (phrasal and melodic) intentions. Furthermore, the model tracked normal performances (with increased temporal variability) better than performances in which temporal fluctuations associated with individual voices were removed (with decreased variability). The small, systematic temporal irregularities characteristic of human performances (chord asynchronies) improved tracking, but randomly generated temporal irregularities did not. These findings suggest that perception of temporal regularity in complex musical sequences is based on temporal expectancies that adapt in response to temporally fluctuating input. (shrink)

Bayesians since Savage (1972) have appealed to asymptotic results to counter charges of excessive subjectivity. Their claim is that objectionable differences in prior probability judgments will vanish as agents learn from evidence, and individual agents will converge to the truth. Glymour (1980), Earman (1992) and others have voiced the complaint that the theorems used to support these claims tell us, not how probabilities updated on evidence will actually}behave in the limit, but merely how Bayesian agents believe they will behave, suggesting (...) that the theorems are too weak to underwrite notions of scientific objectivity and intersubjective agreement. I investigate, in a very general framework, the conditions under which updated probabilities actually converge to a settled opinion and the conditions under which the updated probabilities of two agents actually converge to the same settled opinion. I call this mode of convergence deterministic, and derive results that extend those found in Huttegger (2015b). The results here lead to a simple characterization of deterministic convergence for Bayesian learners and give rise to an interesting argument for what I call strong regularity, the view that probabilities of non-empty events should be bounded away from zero. (shrink)

It has been suggested that damage to anterior regions of the left hemisphere results in a dissociation in the perception and lexical activation of past-tense forms. Specifically, in a lexical-decision task in which past-tense primes immediately precede present-tense targets, such patients demonstrate significant priming for irregular verbs (spoke–speak), but, unlike control participants, fail to do so for regular verbs (looked–look). Here, this behavioral dissociation was first confirmed in a group of eleven patients with damage to the pars opercularis (BA 44) (...) and pars triangularis (BA 45) of the left inferior frontal gyrus (i.e., Broca's area). Two conditions containing word-onset orthographic–phonological overlap (bead–bee, barge–bar) demonstrated that the disrupted regular-verb priming was accompanied by, and covaried with, disrupted ortho-phonological priming, regardless of whether prime stimuli contained the regular inflectional rhyme pattern. Further, the dissociation between impaired regular-verb and preserved irregular-verb priming was shown to be continuous rather than categorical; priming for weak-irregular verbs (spent–spend) was intermediate in size between that of regular verbs and strong verbs. Such continuous dissociations grounded in ortho-phonological relationships between present- and past-tense forms are predicted by single-system, connectionist approaches to inflectional morphology and not predicted by current dual-system, rule-based models. Event-related potential data demonstrated that N400 priming effects were intact for both regular and irregular verbs, suggesting that the absence of significant regular-verb priming in the response time data did not result from a disruption of lexical access, and may have stemmed instead from post-lexical events such as covert articulation, segmentation strategies, and/or cognitive control. (shrink)

Is it in any way remarkable, and requiring explanation, that events fall into those orderly sequences which we call causal? The alleged problem of causal ordering often presents itself as follows. Of all conceivable universes, the vast majority would be scenes of chaos; why, then, is ours so well-regulated? Why does any situation change predictably, rather than in any one of the alternative logically possible ways? Scientific orderliness must, it is said, reflect metaphysical factors acting to filter out disorder, for (...) otherwise the systematic connection between events would be a matter of extraordinary coincidences. (shrink)

Research and practice of Voluntary Earnings Disclosure (VED) as a strategy are limited, notwithstanding its evidenced contribution to firm value. An emerging VED profile is identified, characterised and evaluated. Firms applying it regularly provide VED between quarterly earnings announcements. This profile is compared with the prevailing approach of issuing VED when warranted by events and/or when serving firm or management ad hoc interests. These firms' VEDs are found to be more regular, frequent, timely, and often with confirming content. Their VED (...) events, usually midquarter updates, are often prescheduled and specifically named using period-related terms. These controllable characteristics qualify it as a strategy, termed 'Period-Driven VED', in distinction from 'Event-Driven VED'. The period-driven VED strategy is found to improve a firm's information environment through a reduced information gap, measured by abnormal stock returns, lower analysts' forecast error and dispersion, and fewer surprises around earnings-release dates. The firm's improved information environment leads to lower cost of capital, as evidenced by prior theoretical and empirical research, enhancing firm value. (shrink)

Minimally, causal realism (as understood here) is the view that accounts of causation in terms of mere, regular or probabilistic conjunction are unsatisfactory, and that causal phenomena are correctly associated with some form of de re necessity. Classic arguments, however, some of which date back to Sextus Empiricus and have appeared many times since, including famously in Russell, suggest that the very notion of causal realism is incoherent. In this paper I argue that if such objections seem compelling, it is (...) only because everyday expressions concerning causal phenomena are misleading with respect to certain metaphysical details. These expressions generally make reference to the relations of events or states of affairs, but ignore or obscure the role played by causal properties. I argue that on a proposed alternative, an analysis in terms of causal processes, more refined descriptions of causal phenomena escape the charge of incoherence. Causal necessity is here located in the relations of causal properties. I distinguish this view from the recent process theories of Salmon and Dowe, which are disinterested in causal realism. (shrink)

Bayesian epistemology has struggled with the problem of regularity: how to deal with events that in classical probability have zero probability. While the cases most discussed in the literature, such as infinite sequences of coin tosses or continuous spinners, do not actually come up in scientific practice, there are cases that do come up in science. I shall argue that these cases can be resolved without leaving the realm of classical probability, by choosing a probability measure that preserves “enough” regularity. (...) This approach also provides a resolution to the McGrew, McGrew and Vestrum normalization problem for the fine-tuning argument. (shrink)

Events employed in natural language semantics are characterized in terms of regular languages, each string in which can be regarded as a motion picture. The relevant finite automata then amount to movie cameras/projectors, or more formally, to finite Kripke structures with par- tial valuations. The usual regular constructs (concatena- tion, choice, etc) are supplemented with superposition of strings/automata/languages, realized model-theoretically as conjunction.

The present paper analyzes the regularities referred to via the concept 'self.' This is important, for cognitive science traditionally models the self as a cognitive mediator between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. This leads to the assertion that the self causes action. Recent findings in social psychology indicate this is not the case and, as a consequence, certain cognitive scientists model the self as being epiphenomenal. In contrast, the present paper proposes an alternative approach (i.e., the event-control approach) (...) that is based on recently discovered regularities between perception and action. Specifically, these regularities indicate that perception and action planning utilize common neural resources. This leads to a coupling of perception, planning, and action in which the first two constitute aspects of a single system (i.e., the distal-event system) that is able to pre-specify and detect distal events. This distal-event system is then coupled with action (i.e., effector-control systems) in a constraining, as opposed to 'causal' manner. This model has implications for how we conceptualize the manner in which one infers the intentions of another, anticipates the intentions of another, and possibly even experiences another. In conclusion, it is argued that it may be possible to map the concept 'self' onto the regularities referred to in the event-control model, not in order to reify 'the self' as a causal mechanism, but to demonstrate its status as a useful concept that refers to regularities that are part of the natural order. (shrink)

Traditionally, in the literature on robustness analysis objects are classified as genuine phenomena (natural objects, events, and processes) or artifacts (results produced in error). But much of biological measurement requires the manipulation of local experimental conditions in order to produce new effects. These types of intervention-based regularities are neither natural objects nor artifacts; characterizing them as either fails adequately to address key ontological properties as well as their role in scientific practice. It is argued that a new classification, based (...) on methodological considerations, can be useful in order to characterize experimental productions. Experimentally-useful context-sensitive objects are referred to as ‘artefacts’. To show how the new classification works and why it is instructive for scientific practice, two case studies are discussed. First, the puzzle of arsenic-consuming living organisms is analyzed, where under a set of specific experimental conditions a given organism was found to replace phosphorous with arsenic in its DNA. Second, ecological epigenetic measurement is discussed to show the complexity of variant effects in the context of lab, field, and computer measurements. It is argued that the line between artifacts and artefacts is fluid because theoretical, experimental, and practical considerations vary. (shrink)

The aim of this paper was to analyze the relationship between attitudes toward physical activity and participation in water sports events and to recognize the main motives for involvement in these kinds of events. A written paper–pencil diagnostic survey was conducted among 394 participants in two traditional and two modern sports events on water held in Poland to ascertain whether innovative events are needed in society, and whether they cause an increase in interest in physical activity. The research results showed (...) that modern sports events on water did not have any more power to attract physically inactive people than traditional water events, did not produce a greater desire to lead an active lifestyle, and did not encourage people to more regularly practice water sports. Moreover, modern events, compared to traditional events, were only a one-time experience and the people who completed survey often wanted to return to traditional sports events which provided participants with greater positive emotions than a modern event. In the case of socio-demographical variables, there was no statistically significant relationship between gender and choice of modern or traditional event, but older people were more likely to choose a traditional event than younger people; modern water events were an attractive option primarily for young people under 30 years of age, furthermore, modern events more often attracted people who had completed higher education. However, it turned out that a modern event on water often attracted more people who had had no experience in this sport discipline rather than people who chose traditional water events. In a sense, modern events are therefore effective in promoting water sports in Polish society. We also distinguished five main groups of participants: healthy lifestyle managers, lovers of sports emotions, water sports malcontents, water sports enthusiasts, and neutrals to water sports. Additionally, we looked into gender-related motives for participation in modern and traditional water events: social and health-related motives proved to be more important for women and men who participated in modern water events. The research results presented in the article expand on the current state of knowledge about mass participation in sport, the impact of sporting events on the promotion of physical activity, and show the motivation behind participation in modern and traditional water sporting events. (shrink)

The present paper analyzes the regularities referred to via the concept 'self.' This is important, for cognitive science traditionally models the self as a cognitive mediator between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. This leads to the assertion that the self causes action. Recent findings in social psychology indicate this is not the case and, as a consequence, certain cognitive scientists model the self as being epiphenomenal. In contrast, the present paper proposes an alternative approach (i.e., the event-control approach) (...) that is based on recently discovered regularities between perception and action. Specifically, these regularities indicate that perception and action planning utilize common neural resources. This leads to a coupling of perception, planning, and action in which the first two constitute aspects of a single system (i.e., the distal-event system) that is able to pre-specify and detect distal events. This distal-event system is then coupled with action (i.e., effector-control systems) in a constraining, as opposed to 'causal' manner. This model has implications for how we conceptualize the manner in which one infers the intentions of another, anticipates the intentions of another, and possibly even experiences another. In conclusion, it is argued that it may be possible to map the concept 'self' onto the regularities referred to in the event-control model, not in order to reify 'the self' as a causal mechanism, but to demonstrate its status as a useful concept that refers to regularities that are part of the natural order. (shrink)

Rational agents seem more confident in any possible event than in an impossible event. But if rational credences are real-valued, then there are some possible events that are assigned 0 credence nonetheless. How do we differentiate these events from impossible events then when we order events? de Finetti (1975), Hájek (2012) and Easwaran (2014) suggest that when ordering events, conditional credences and subset relations are as relevant as unconditional credences. I present a counterexample to all their proposals in (...) this paper. While their proposals order possible and impossible events correctly, they deliver the wrong verdict for disjoint possible events assigned equal positive credence. (shrink)

In this paper I articulate RVC with an eye to two things: first, its conceptual development; second, its basic commitments and implications for what causation is. I have chosen to present RVC in a way that respects its historical origins and unravels the steps of its articulation in the face of objections and criticism. It is important for the explication and defence of RVC to see it as a view of causation that emerged in a certain intellectual milieu. RVC has (...) been developed as an attempt to remove efficiency from causation and hence, to view causation not as a productive relation but as a relation of dependence among discrete events. In particular, the thought that causation is regularity is meant to oppose metaphysical views of causation that posit powers or other kinds of entity that are supposed to enforce the regularities that there are in the world or to explain the alleged necessity that there is in causation. (shrink)

It is the ambition of natural science to provide complete explanations of reality. Collingwood argues that science can only explain events, not actions. The latter is the distinctive subject matter of history and can be described as actions only if they are explained historically. This paper explains Collingwood’s claim that the distinctive subject matter of history is actions and why the attempt to capture this subject matter through the method of science inevitably ends in failure because science explains events, not (...) actions. It argues that Collingwood’s defence of the methodological autonomy of history vis-à-vis natural science is not based on a commitment to human exceptionalism, i.e. the exclusion of human beings and their doings from the rest of nature, but on the view that explanations which appeal to norms are different in kind from explanations which appeal to empirical regularities. Given the close relationship between the method and the subject matter of a form of inquiry, actions elude any attempt to explain them through the scientific method because the application of this method entails that what is thus explained is not an action but an event. (shrink)

This study proposes a new quadrat method that can be applied to the study of point distributions in a network space. While the conventional planar quadrat method remains one of the most fundamental spatial analytical methods on a two-dimensional plane, its quadrats are usually identified by regular, square grids. However, assuming that they are observed along a network, points in a single quadrat are not necessarily close to each other in terms of their network distance. Using planar quadrats in such (...) cases may distort the representation of the distribution pattern of points on a network. The network-based units used in this article, on the other hand, consist of subsets of the actual network, providing more accurate aggregation of the data points along the network. The performance of the network-based quadrat method is compared with that of the conventional quadrat method through a case study on a point distribution on a network. The χ2 statistic and Moran's I statistic of the two quadrat types indicate that (1) the conventional planar quadrat method tends to overestimate the overall degree of dispersion and (2) the network-based quadrat method derives a more accurate estimate on the local similarity. The article also performs sensitivity analysis on network and planar quadrats across different scales and with different spatial arrangements, in which the abovementioned statistical tendencies are also confirmed. (shrink)

Infants use statistical information in their environment, as well as others’ emotional communication, to understand the intentions of social partners. However, rarely do researchers consider these two sources of social information in tandem. This study assessed 2-year-olds’ attributions of intentionality from non-random sampling events and subsequent discrete emotion reactions. Infants observed an experimenter remove five objects from either the non-random minority (18%) or random majority (82%) of a sample and express either joy, disgust, or sadness after each selection. Two-year-olds inferred (...) the experimenter’s intentionality by giving her the object that she had previously selected when she expressed joy or disgust after non-random sampling events, but not when she expressed sadness or sampled at random. These findings demonstrate that infants use both statistical regularities and discrete emotion communication to infer an agent’s intentions. In particular, the present findings show that 2-year-olds infer that an agent can intentionally select a preferred or an undesired object from a sample as a function of the discrete emotion. Implications for the development of inferring intentionality from statistical sampling events and discrete emotion communication are discussed. (shrink)

Multidrug resistance (MDR) is developed in a population of somatic mammalian cells in vivo or in vitro when they are selected for resistance to each of a large group of drugs (colchicine, adriamycin, actinomycin D, etc.). It is produced by the amplification of some unknown gene(s) whose product(s) evidently change(s) the plasma membrane permeability of a cell to a selective agent and to other unrelated compounds. A large specific genomic region (150–250 kbp) undergoes amplification in MDR cells selected for the (...) resistance to different drugs. Amplified DNA is located in homogeneously staining regions of chromosomes, double minute chromosomes and small chromatin bodies – episome‐like structures that replicate out of the S‐phase of a cell cycle. The selection of MDR cell variants is accompanied by regular karyotypic evolution specific for this type of drug resistance. (shrink)

Predictions during language comprehension are currently discussed from many points of view. One area where predictive processing may play a particular role concerns poetic language that is regularized by meter and rhyme, thus allowing strong predictions regarding the timing and stress of individual syllables. While there is growing evidence that these prosodic regularities influence language processing, less is known about the potential influence of prosodic preferences on neurophysiological processes. To this end, the present electroencephalogram study examined whether the predictability (...) of strong and weak syllables within metered speech would differ as a function of meter. Strong, i.e., accented positions within a foot should be more predictable than weak, i.e., unaccented positions. Our focus was on disyllabic pseudowords that solely differed between trochaic and iambic structure, with trochees providing the preferred foot in German. Methodologically, we focused on the omission Mismatch Negativity that is elicited when an anticipated auditory stimulus is omitted. The resulting electrophysiological brain response is particularly interesting because its elicitation does not depend on a physical stimulus. Omissions in deviant position of a passive oddball paradigm occurred at either first- or second-syllable position of the aforementioned pseudowords, resulting in a 2-by-2 design with the factors foot type and omission position. Analyses focused on the mean oMMN amplitude and latency differences across the four conditions. The result pattern was characterized by an interaction of the effects of foot type and omission position for both amplitudes and latencies. In first position, omissions resulted in larger and earlier oMMNs for trochees than for iambs. In second position, omissions resulted in larger oMMNs for iambs than for trochees, but the oMMN latency did not differ. The results suggest that omissions, particularly in initial position, are modulated by a trochaic preference in German. The preferred strong-weak pattern may have strengthened the prosodic prediction, especially for matching, trochaic stimuli, such that the violation of this prediction led to an earlier and stronger prediction error. Altogether, predictive processing seems to play a particular role in metered speech, especially if the meter is based on the preferred foot type. (shrink)

I agree with Paul Lewis that mathematics has a valuable but not all-encompassing role in economics, that event regularities must be supplemented with a persuasive narrative, and that inferences can inform our understanding of economic behavior. However, Lewis's full-throated defense of critical realism does little to allay my original concerns. It is absurd to maintain, as critical realists do, that mainstream economics has nothing valuable to offer heterodox economists, as their critique of the quantity theory of money tries (...) to demonstrate. More crucially, critical realists—unlike Austrian economists—neglect to provide an epistemological explanation of economic actors’ perceptions, which is necessary if we are to bridge critical realism's own division of the social world into the “actual,” “empirical,” and “non-actual real.”. (shrink)

The critical realist conception of open and closed systems is not about systems: it is about regularities in the flux of events and states of affairs. It has recently been criticised on the grounds that critical realists should take on board ideas about the general nature of systems; recognise that genuinely open social systems would be impossible; avoid polarities or dualisms where either there are event regularities and open systems, or there are no event regularities (...) and closed systems and accept partial regularities and partially open systems; and understand that orthodox economics is not based upon event regularities, laws or Humean empiricism. The objective of this paper is to ‘take stock’ of these recent criticisms. (shrink)

A probability distribution is regular if it does not assign probability zero to any possible event. Williamson argued that we should not require probabilities to be regular, for if we do, certain “isomorphic” physical events must have different probabilities, which is implausible. His remarks suggest an assumption that chances are determined by intrinsic, qualitative circumstances. Weintraub responds that Williamson’s coin flip events differ in their inclusion relations to each other, or the inclusion relations between their times, and this can (...) account for their differences in probability. Haverkamp and Schulz rebut Weintraub, but their rebuttal fails because the events in their example are even less symmetric than Williamson’s. However, Weintraub’s argument also fails, for it ignores the distinction between intrinsic, qualitative differences and relations of time and bare identity. Weintraub could rescue her argument by claiming that the events differ in duration, under a non-standard and problematic conception of duration. However, we can modify Williamson’s example with Special Relativity so that there is no absolute inclusion relation between the times, and neither event has longer duration except relative to certain reference frames. Hence, Weintraub’s responses do not apply unless chance is observer-relative, which is also problematic. Finally, another symmetry argument defeats even the appeal to frame-dependent durations, for there the events have the same finite duration and are entirely disjoint, as are their respective times and places. (shrink)

Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) can reveal online processing differences between native speakers and second language (L2) learners during language comprehension. Using the P600 as a measure of native-likeness, we investigated processing of grammatical gender agreement in highly proficient immersed Romance L2 learners of Dutch. We demonstrate that these late learners consistently fail to show native-like sensitivity to gender violations. This appears to be due to a combination of differences from the gender marking in their L1 and the relatively opaque (...) Dutch gender system. We find that L2 use predicts the effect magnitude of non-finite verb violations, a relatively regular and transparent construction, but not that of gender agreement violations. There were no effects of age of acquisition, length of residence, proficiency or offline gender knowledge. Additionally, a within-subject comparison of stimulus modalities (written vs. auditory) shows that immersed learners may show some of the effects only in the auditory modality; in non-finite verb violations, an early native-like N400 was only present for auditory stimuli. However, modality failed to influence the response to gender. Taken together, the results confirm the persistent problems of Romance learners of Dutch with online gender processing and show that they cannot be overcome by reducing task demands related to the modality of stimulus presentation. (shrink)

Paul Davidson's critique of O'Driscoll and Rizzo is based on an “official” philosophical position that turns on an opposition between knowledge and ignorance and a corresponding opposition between ergodic and nonergodic processes. But Davidson's substantive analysis reveals a very different “unofficial” position, based on “sensible expectations” and a realist ontology of enduring social structures. While O'Driscoll and Rizzo have the edge on Davidson in terms of their characterization of agents’ beliefs, their ontology of event regularities is ultimately the (...) same, and suffers from the same drawbacks, as Davidson's official ontology. The solution to some of these problems may lie in adopting an ontology similar to the one Davidson invokes in his unofficial capacity. (shrink)

Cybernetics promoted machine-supported investigations of adaptive sensorimotor behaviours observed in biological systems. This methodological approach receives renewed attention in contemporary robotics, cognitive ethology, and the cognitive neurosciences. Its distinctive features concern machine experiments, and their role in testing behavioural models and explanations flowing from them. Cybernetic explanations of behavioural events, regularities, and capacities rely on multiply realizable mechanism schemata, and strike a sensible balance between causal and unifying constraints. The multiple realizability of cybernetic mechanism schemata paves the way to (...) principled comparisons between biological systems and machines. Various methodological issues involved in the transition from mechanism schemata to their machine instantiations are addressed here, by reference to a simple sensorimotor coordination task. These concern the proper treatment of ceteris paribus clauses in experimental settings, the significance of running experiments with correct but incomplete machine instantiations of mechanism schemata, and the advantage of operating with real machines ??? as opposed to simulated ones ??? immersed in real environments. (shrink)

Though causality seems to have a natural place in chemical thought, the analysis of the underlying causal concepts requires attention to two different research styles. In Part One I attempt a classification and critical analysis of several philosophical accounts of causal concepts which appear to be very diverse. I summarize this diversity which ranges from causality as displayed in regular concomitances of types of events to causality as the activity of agents. Part Two is concerned with the analysis of contrasting (...) chemical discourses, comparing the classical atomist style of Boyle, and Lavoisier and von Liebig with the later energeticist style of van’t Hoff and Hinshelwood. In detail different clusters of causal concepts can be abstracted from these discursive styles, yet they all approximate the Realist format for causal discourse. By way of summary I make an attempt to map the vernacular distinctions of Part Two onto the philosophical territory of Part One. The argument is rounded off with a brief analysis of a chemical publication of 2008. (shrink)

It has been nearly a decade and a half since Fred Dretske, David Armstrong and Michael Tooley, having each rejected the Regularity theory, independently proposed that natural laws are grounded in a second-order relation that somehow binds together universals.' (l shall call this the ‘DTA theory’). In this way they sought to overcome the major - and notorious — shortcomings of every version of the Regularity theory: how to provide truth conditions for laws that lack instances; how to distinguish laws (...) from accidental generalizations; how to provide truth conditions for the counterfactuals and disposition statements that laws apparently ‘support’; how to justify inductive inferences from past events to laws and future events. For each of these puzzles, an apparently key element in the solution seems to be missing from Regularity theories. That missing element is a genuine connection, a relation with more than merely spatial and/or temporal content, linking the antecedent of a law to its consequent. Once such an additional objective element - however understood — is admitted to be essential to the analysis of laws, one is forced to give up the idea that the logical form of laws can be given in terms of quantifiers ranging over events or states of alfairs, and truth-functions. (shrink)

Many events that humans and other species experience contain regularities in which certain elements within an event predict certain others. While some of these regularities involve tracking the co‐occurrences between temporally adjacent stimuli, others involve tracking the co‐occurrences between temporally distant stimuli (i.e., nonadjacent dependencies, NADs). Prior research shows robust learning of adjacent dependencies in humans and other species, whereas learning NADs is more difficult, and often requires support from properties of the stimulus to help learners notice (...) the NADs. Here, we report on seven experiments that examined NAD learning from various types of visual stimuli, exploring the effects of dynamic motion on adults' NAD learning from visual sequences involving human and nonhuman agents. We tested adults' NAD learning from visual sequences of human actions, object transformations, static images of human postures, and static images of an object in different postures. We found that dynamic motion aids the acquisition of NADs. We also found that learning NADs in sequences involving human agents is more robust compared to sequences involving nonhuman objects. We propose that dynamic motion and human agents both independently result in richer representations that provide a stronger signal for NAD learning. (shrink)

Physicists regularly invoke universal laws, such as those of motion and electromagnetism, to explain events. Biological and medical scientists have no such laws. How then do they acquire a reliable body of knowledge about biological organisms and human disease? One way is by repeatedly returning to, manipulating, observing, interpreting, and reinterpreting certain subjects—such as flies, mice, worms, or microbes—or, as they are known in biology, “model systems.” Across the natural and social sciences, other disciplinary fields have developed canonical examples that (...) have played a role comparable to that of biology’s model systems, serving not only as points of reference and illustrations of general principles or values but also as sites of continued investigation and reinterpretation. The essays in this collection assess the scope and function of model objects in domains as diverse as biology, geology, and history, attending to differences between fields as well as to epistemological commonalities. Contributors examine the role of the fruit fly Drosophila and nematode worms in biology, troops of baboons in primatology, box and digital simulations of the movement of the earth’s crust in geology, and meteorological models in climatology. They analyze the intensive study of the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory, ritual in anthropology, the individual case in psychoanalytic research, and Athenian democracy in political theory. The contributors illuminate the processes through which particular organisms, cases, materials, or narratives become foundational to their fields, and they examine how these foundational exemplars—from the fruit fly to Freud’s Dora—shape the knowledge produced within their disciplines. Contributors Rachel A. Ankeny Angela N. H. Creager Amy Dahan Dalmedico John Forrester Clifford Geertz Carlo Ginzburg E. Jane Albert Hubbard Elizabeth Lunbeck Mary S. Morgan Josiah Ober Naomi Oreskes Susan Sperling Marcel Weber M. Norton Wise. (shrink)

Temporal stability and change in neutral contexts can transform continuous experiences into distinct and memorable events. However, less is known about how shifting emotional states influence these memory processes, despite ample evidence that emotion impacts non-temporal aspects of memory. Here, we examined if emotional stimuli influence temporal memory for recent event sequences. Participants encoded lists of neutral images while listening to auditory tones. At regular intervals within each list, participants heard emotional positive, negative, or neutral sounds, which served as (...) “emotional event boundaries” that divided each sequence into discrete events. Temporal order memory was tested for neutral item pairs that either spanned an emotional sound or were encountered within the same auditory event. Encountering a highly arousing event boundary led to faster response times for items encoded within the next event. Critically, we found that highly arousing sounds had different effects on binding ongoing versus ensuing sequential representations in memory. Specifically, highly arousing sounds were significantly more likely to enhance temporal order memory for ensuing information compared to information that spanned those boundaries, especially for boundaries with negative valence. These findings suggest that within aversive emotional contexts, fluctuations in arousal help shape the temporal organisation of events in memory. (shrink)

This paper considers the possibility of prediction in land use planning, and the use of statistical research methods in analyses of relationships between urban form and travel behaviour. Influential writers within the tradition of critical realism reject the possibility of predicting social phenomena. This position is fundamentally problematic to public planning. Without at least some ability to predict the likely consequences of different proposals, the justification for public sector intervention into market mechanisms will be frail. Statistical methods like regression analyses (...) are commonly seen as necessary in order to identify aggregate-level effects of policy measures, but are questioned by many advocates of critical realist ontology. Using research into the relationship between urban structure and travel as an example, the paper discusses relevant research methods and the kinds of prediction necessary and possible in spatial planning of urban development. Finally, the political implications of positions within theory of science rejecting the possibility of predictions about social phenomena are addressed. (shrink)