At his death in 2010, the Anglo-American analytic philosopher John Haugeland left an unfinished manuscript summarizing his life-long engagement with Heidegger’s Being and Time. As illuminating as it is iconoclastic, Dasein Disclosed is not just Haugeland’s Heidegger—this sweeping reevaluation is a major contribution to philosophy in its own right.

The following examines Heidegger’s analysis of world and Dasein from a transcendental perspective. It is argued that Heidegger’s reflections on the interconnected themes of world and Dasein reveal the tensions that exist between the transcendental claims before and after Being and Time and the analysis of worldliness. It begins by looking at Heidegger’s early analysis of Husserl’s critique of psychologism and naturalism, assessing what this tells us about Heidegger’s analysis of world and nature. It subsequently addresses Heidegger’s transformation (...) of Husserlian phenomenology, and intentionality in particular, arguing against interpreters who claim Heidegger’s interconnected concepts of Dasein and world are reducible to one another and hence phenomenologically problematic. In order to respond to this reading, the article examines the twin themes of, on the one hand, transcendental constitutive analysis in Heidegger’s work, Dasein as disclosive and ‘world entering’, and, on the other hand, the centrality of the world and the realm of nature as always more than Dasein’s constitutive relationship to it. In order to understand what Heidegger means by worldliness, the article will look at Heidegger’s reflections on nature as the world’s other, which nonetheless needs to be understood on the basis of worldliness. (shrink)

Philosophie fragt nach dem Verhältnis von Sein und Denken, von Dasein und Bestimmung. Der frühe Kant begegnet diesem Grundproblem der Philosophie in der Form, wie sie durch die rationalistische Schulmetaphysik geprägt wurde. Ausgehend von der Erkenntnis, dass Dasein keine Bestimmung, kein Prädikat ist, sondern die absolute Position einer Sache, greift er in die onto-theologische Diskussion seiner Zeit ein und entwickelt aus der Differenzierung zwischen Real- und Erkenntnisgründen seinen eigenen philosophischen Ansatz. Der Autor zeichnet Kants Ringen um diese philosophische (...) Grundproblematik von den vorkritischen Schriften bis zu den Kritiken auf. In einem Exkurs beschäftigt er sich mit dem Opus postumum sowie mit der Wiederkehr des Ansatzes in Schellings Spätphilosophie und ihrer Wendung zum unvordenklichen Sein. (shrink)

RESUMEN El texto explora, en mujeres mayores de 80 años, la experiencia vivida durante el pe ríodo conocido como La Violencia en Colombia. Se examina el "trauma" que, según la autora, se manifiesta como "rayones", lo que hace difícil traducirlo o interpretarlo, porque solo se percibe a través de la escucha. Se estudia lo que M. Heidegger exploró como "ser-ahí" y "ser-en-el-mundo", esto es, el estar lanzados al mundo en un de terminado contexto donde construimos nuestra subjetividad y aprendemos a (...) vivir, para entenderlo mediante estas experiencias femeninas singulares. ABSTRACT The text explores the experience lived during the period known as The Violence in Colombia by women now over 80. It examines the "trauma" that, according to the author, manifests itself in the form of "scratches", thus making it difficult to translate and interpret given that it is only perceptible through listening. The article discusses M. Heidegger's notions of Dasein and being-in-the-world, that is, our thrownness into the world in a specific context in which we construct our subjectivity and learn how to live, in order to understand them through these singular feminine experiences. (shrink)

Äußerliche Argumente für die Behauptung, daß es gar keiner Beweise für das Dasein Gottes bedürfe . . . Leichtigkeit, mit der die Kinder den Glauben an Gott annehmen, und Übereinstimmung aller Völker in ihm deuten darauf, daß er priori ...

Dasein’s struggle is an investigation of the writings of Martin Heidegger to consider whether his thoughts and beliefs would be useful and / or insightful in addressing contemporary society and its discriminatory practices towards disabled people. Heidegger‟s basic existential being Dasein, is in constant interaction and interconnection with others as it negotiates its best possibilities of Being-in-the-world. This pursuit of an „authentic‟ existence is interpreted as a struggle for individuality, acceptance, engagement and resistance to social conformity and anonymity. (...) Developing the analysis through the theme of „Being‟ the paper‟s discussion is centred on Critical Disability Studies and the evolving Studies in Ableism. The interpretation is underpinned by the contemporary voice of disability, predominantly by autobiographical insights of Nancy Mairs‟ Waist-high in the world; A life among the nondisabled, together with other autobiographical, biographical and narrative texts. The paper presents an alternative perspective in the “endeavour to know” using Heidegger‟s philosophy to think differently about the experience of disability. (shrink)

The article answers the question: “How does the agathos of Dasein-psyche and Dasein-Intelligent-Matter come into being?” or “How does the meaningful-presence of Dasein-psyche and Dasein-Intelligent-Matter come about?” The author turns to the philosophy of Plato and Heidegger and presents Dasein-psyche as an elementary structure or a Dasein-Intelligent-Matter actor. The Dasein-psyche’s meaningful presence is significantly conditioned by the focus and limits of the arete potency, set by Dasein-Intelligent-Matter. The anthropologization of Dasein transforms (...) the individual discourse and a way of life in accordance with the arete potency. The arete potency is the source of Dasein-psyche’s meaningful presence. The anthropologization of Dasein sets free arete, providing the transforming of the arete existentials potency into the energy of Dasein-psyche’s meaningful presence. The disclosedness of arete is an “ideal” state of the Dasein-psyche sustainable development and prosperity, the agathos of Dasein-psyche and Dasein-Intelligent-Matter. (shrink)

The thorny problem, which we are confronted with in translating the term of “Sein”(Being) from western Philosophy into Chinese, highlights the ambiguity, paradoxy and vagueness of the issue of Sein from a specific viewpoint. Although there is no exact equivalent in Chinese for the word of “Sein”, we use several different words to express the meanings consisted in the issue of “Sein”. By comparison we may find that what is discussed by Zhuang Zi using the terms of “Shi” and “Fei” (...) are just in a considerable degree the same issue discussed by Heidegger using the terms of “Sein” and “Dasein”. However, they gave different opinions to the issue, which show their divergence in their philosophic thinking. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Dasein und Raum" verfügbar.

The “destructive” appropriation of the Aristotelian concepts of δύναµις and ἐνέργεια played a central role in Martin Heidegger’s own reflection on the meaning of being. While this has been generally known for some time, it is only now that we can understand the full scope, complexity and evolving character of this appropriation. One reason is the fairly recent publication of notes and protocols for seminars Heidegger led on Aristotle as late as the 1940s and 1950s. Another is the existence of (...) student transcripts in the Special Collections Department of Stanford University for a number of unpublished seminars on Aristotle that Heidegger led during the 1920s. Considering all of this material enables us to see both the significance of Heidegger’s interpretation of the δύναµις/ἐνέργιεα pair as well as how this interpretation evolved along with his own “Kehre”: from a “pandynamic” conception of being to being as “Ereignis.”. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to reveal the anthropologization of Dasein-psyche’s being by methods of neurophilosophy. The anthropologization of Dasein-psyche’s being by methods of neurophilosophy allows considering the noogenesis from the perspective of philosophical traditions, which is much richer in comparison with the history of scientific knowledge about the psychology of meanings. The being of Dasein-psyche in the meaning of "philosopher’s soul" was firstly mentioned by Plato in "Phaedo". The anthropologization of Dasein-psyche’s being reveals the (...) ontological orientation and limits of the being of Dasein-psyche within the being of Dasein-the-One, as well as the intellect, knowledge and techne, as the arete existentials. Theoretical basis of the study is built on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and methods of neurophilosophy. Originality lies in exploring Dasein-psyche through the neurophilosophical approach. In the context, Dasein-psyche is revealed as a part of the whole or the image, created from Dasein-Y-Matter as a paradigm. It is formed by the factors and causes of complication, as well as by the experience of being of the previous states of matter. Conclusions. In conclusion, the anthropologization of Dasein-psyche’s being by methods of neurophilosophy allows considering the noogenesis from the perspective of philosophical traditions. The essence of a person is revealed as the arete existentials, which require further rethinking and clarification. (shrink)

En este artículo nos gustaría analizar en detalle la transformación del sentido del Dasein como esencia del ser humano, particularmente en los escritos privados de los años 1930-1940. Nuestra hipótesis de trabajo es que, a través de la relectura de su propia obra, y para enfrentarse a las interpretaciones más “antropológicas” de su filosofía, Heidegger radicaliza sus conceptos en el marco de la historia de la ser y del pensar del Ereignis. Por esta vía, y en vistas a pensar (...) al ser humano únicamente en su relación con el ser, mostraremos cómo el pensador alemán usa el concepto de Da-sein de manera ambivalente: a la vez humano, a la vez algo no-humano. Esto le lleva a un concepto problemático, alejado de las intuiciones fenomenológicas que la primera parte de su obra desarrolló. (shrink)

In recent work Irigaray has continued to meditate on the myopic (we might say ‘monadic’) focus of the Western tradition when it comes to its failure to acknowledge sexuate difference. Irigaray has successfully diagnosed the patriarchally over-determined nature of that tradition masquerading behind a façade of objectivity and neutrality in ways that continue to open up interpretive and critical possibilities in terms of reading the canon today. In some of her work, Irigaray levels a powerful challenge against Heidegger’s conception of (...) Dasein and his point of entry into ‘phenomenological ontology’. Thus, Heidegger, the thinker that Irigaray, arguably, engages with most positively in some of her recent work is charged not just with the ‘exsanguination’ of his conception of Dasein, as it were, but with having neutered Dasein in a way that is all too characteristic of the monadic tendencies of the Western tradition and its enduring suppression of sexuate difference. Part of what we will examine in some depth in this section of the book is a blindspot in Heidegger’s account of Dasein which, for all of his insights concerning the social constitution of Dasein, leaves him open to some of the criticisms which Irigaray has successfully levelled against an entire tradition. As part of our efforts to tease these issues out in some detail, we will consider Derrida’s first Geschlecht essay where he looks to exonerate Heidegger from the charge of phallogocentrism (a charge he had levelled against him in a 1982 interview), along with more recent efforts to artificially cross-pollinate between Heidegger, Derrida and Irigaray. We will further examine the problematic ways that Heidegger looks to ‘neutralise’ Dasein in 1928 as well as his attempts in a series of 1930s texts to introduce a distinction between Dasein and the being of the human being. These attempts dovetail with a series of bizarre and illegitimate moves to exclude “whole peoples and races” from the domain of meaningful historical existence in the 1930s in particular. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone exponer el fenómeno del existir humano, denominado por Heidegger “Dasein”, en íntima relación con el problema de la constitución de la realidad. Para ello, se entenderá lo real como aquella multiplicidad de entes con los que la vida se confronta diariamente. En este sentido, se plantea que esta multiplicidad no pertenece a lo percibido, sino que deviene más bien de la estructura de la percepción sensible. Mediante advertencias de Heidegger en torno a la filosofía kantiana (...) y a través del uso de ejemplos propios, se realzarán los momentos trascendentales de la sensibilidad: el espacio y el tiempo, hasta llegar al cuidado como ser del Dasein. Así, comprendiendo al cuidado en su sentido temporal, advertiremos que lo real se origina desde el futuro perteneciente al existir mismo. Con lo anterior, el estudio expondrá cómo es que el “Dasein” puede ser entendido como aperturidad o de-velamiento de nuestra realidad. (shrink)

The existential analytic of Being and Time is set within the frame of the Seinsfrage. This question arises for Heidegger out of his critical engagement with Husserl's phenomenology. More careful attention to Heidegger's project as a phenomenological one reveals that Dasein, the entity who asks the Seinsfrage and who always has a pre-ontological understanding of Being, is also intentional. Dasein's existentiality is an intentionality. I will argue that inauthenticity and authenticity may be fruitfully understood in terms of the (...) phenomenological notions of empty intention and intentional fulfillment, respectively. Such an approach opens up the possibility of understanding Dasein's subjectivity in a way which challenges more traditional existentialist and voluntarist interpretations. (shrink)

Straipsnio tikslas aptarti Martino Heideggerio veikale Būtis ir laikas nagrinėtas pagrindines idėjas. Knygos analizėje pirmiausia susitelkiama ties klasikinės ontologijos problemomis. Autorius susikoncentruoja ties pasaulio samprata ir pagrindinių apriorinių čiabūties (Dasein) egzistencialumo struktūrų analize. Šio veikalo egzistencinių struktūrų analizė atskleidžia čiabūčiai būdingus buvimo būdus. Supratimo ratas priklauso būties prasmės struktūrai, kuri yra pagrindinė ašis šioje filosofijoje. M. Heideggerio tvirtinimu, supratimo objektas gali būti aptinkamas pasaulyje. Tai reiškia, kad objektas gali turėti prasmę čiabūčiai tik tada, jei jis gali būti suvokiamas kaip (...) turintis funkcinius santykius su kitais objektais santykių tinkle, kuris sudaro pasaulį. Būties prasmė skleidžiasi supratimo kelyje, kuriame buvimo kategorijos steigiamos remiantis egzistencine patirtimi ir sąvokiniais apmatais. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall show how Heidegger’s notions of Dasein’s “Being-with” (Mitsein), “discourse” (Rede), and “solicitude” (Fursorge) illustrate how he has a conception of the dialogical in Being and Time. There are at least three advantages to proposing that Heidegger is a dialogist in Being and Time. First, this paradigm offers an alternative, and more perspicuous, vocabulary for describing the discursive nature of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world as a Being-with others. Second, it provides a better way of recognizing and (...) understanding the normative dimensions of “solicitude.” And third, it helps to underscore the ineliminable sociality of Dasein’s understanding of itself and of others, such that its identity remains social even in the seemingly individualizing initial moment of becoming authentic. (shrink)

Interpretations of Heidegger’s discussion of space in Being and Time have predominantly focused on two related themes: Heidegger’s attempt to ground spatiality in temporality and the problem of embodiment. Little direct attention, however, has been given to the role Heidegger’s discussion of spatiality plays in his analysis of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. This paper pursues the thesis that Heidegger’s account of Being-in-the-world, which is meant to avoid a subject-object dichotomy by representing a unitary phenomenon, falls prey to a charge of subjectivism (...) lacking an adequate account of spatiality. I support this claim in three steps. In the first section, I show how Heidegger’s discussion of spatiality is aimed at deflecting a charge of subjectivism. The second section argues that Heidegger’s account of spatiality fails to go beyond the system of relations that defines worldhood and Being-in. In the final section, I will define what I consider to be a necessary condition for a non-subjectivist system of relations: an encounter between Dasein and entities in which the latter are not determined entirely according to the system of relations. I discuss the two instances where Heidegger discusses the idea of encounter, arguing that his account falls short of the criterion I propose. (shrink)

In Being and Time Heidegger analyses the structure of Dasein, making transparent how and what we are in the world. Yet Heidegger’s writing becomes increasingly vague the closer he comes to describing what Dasein actually is. It seems the possibility of authentic Being grounds in the state-of-mind of anxiety, confronting us with a meaningless world and making Dasein transparent to itself. In three grammatically ambiguous sentences, Heidegger explains that we experience nothingness, yet not ‘total’ nothingness, in moments (...) of anxiety. This short passage seems of utmost importance to me. I argue that only in experiencing nothingness are we able to lead an authentic and self-owned life, independent of interpretations of others. From this insight I turn to Bernhard Waldenfels’ work Phenomenology of the Alien, my idea being that experiencing nothingness is an alien experience par excellence. Waldenfels analyses how we answer to alien experiences​, and what type of answers we can give. My thesis is that the possibility of authentic Being lies in an answer from nothingness, which does not just repeat what has already been said but must give new answers. (shrink)

Diese Arbeit wirft neues Licht auf das Verhältnis zwischen dem späten Husserl und dem frühen Heidegger. Der Schwerpunkt liegt in den Rückbezügen auf die epistemische Position Husserls, die den Vergleich vorbereiten. Der Autor liefert vor allem in der Analyse des Evidenzproblems besondere Ansatzpunkte für weitere Untersuchungen. Grundlegend ist die Unterscheidung zwischen der auf das Ur-Ich bezogenen epistemischen Genesis und der auf das Vor-Ich bezogenen ontologischen Genesis, denen entsprechend zwei gegensätzliche Verhältnisse zwischen dem Zweitbewußtsein und dem kinästhetischen Bewußtsein entstehen. Konsequent gelangt (...) die Arbeit zum Resultat: Das Vor-Ich kann sich in der epistemischen Position Husserls zum Ur-Ich, aber in der ontologischen Position Heideggers zum Dasein entwickeln. (shrink)

Jesuha, Thomas | : Dans cet article nous cherchons à montrer comment, dans sa pensée des années 1925-30, Heidegger déploie une philosophie transcendantale de l’existence qui absolutise des catégories contingentes. En ce sens, il s’agit de comprendre en quoi le Dasein est constitué par une réceptivité ontologique, c’est-à-dire une assignation au sens dans toutes les modalités de sa structure. Ainsi, la reprise du projet kantien puis husserlien d’une analyse a priori de l’homme et de sa structure phénoménologique conduit Heidegger (...) à une pensée qui fige l’homme dans un réseau de modalités existentiales définitives, fermées à toute transformation qui proviendrait soit d’une évolution naturelle, soit d’une praxis. Cette immobilité de la forme de l’existence du Dasein est alors décelable aussi bien dans sa structure auto-renvoyante et réticulaire, que dans la façon dont sa finitude soumet toute puissance ontologique à une impuissance première. (shrink)

Although Heidegger's philosophical complicity with National Socialism has been the focus of virtually all discussions of his politics, little to no attention has been placed on how the conception of human existence developed in Being and Time might shed light on debates about the self between contemporary liberals and communitarians. By situating Heidegger's early work within these ongoing debates, the author will show how his descriptions of Dasein—especially the descriptions of the relationship between Dasein and its community—are actually (...) more consistent with liberal views of the self than with communitarian interpretations. Heidegger helps to clarify how a thickly constituted, social self may nevertheless stand back from its community in ways that communitarians are hard pressed to explain. In the final section, the author will comment on the compatibility of Heidegger's conception of Dasein with liberalism as a political philosophy, focusing in particular on Heidegger's conception of Mitsein or being-with. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:'Psychiatric Dasein'Christopher Heginbotham (bio)Fulford and Colombo's pioneering work (2004)in linguistic analysis offers valuable insights and 'deconstructs' the often inter-related concepts of mental disorder and treatment. Their paper describes a combined philosophical and empirical research program developed to study "the role models of disorder in the community care of people with long-term schizophrenia" (2004, 130). They claim that the approach supplies a key explanatory insight into the nature of (...) the problem presented by models of disorder, a characterization of models, contributions to research design, a theoretical framework—a 'models-grid,' and a basis for turning theory into practice. These claims are not unreasonable in the context of the specific objectives of the research design, but do not necessarily cover everything of importance in the way models are used to describe mental disorder. In particular, this brief response proposes the need to develop an understanding of psychiatric Dasein—mental disorder as presented in the world.Fulford and Colombo are surely right in their claim that representations of mental disorder are high-level concepts not dissimilar to other high-level concepts such as time. These are concepts that we seem to have little difficulty using in day-to-day practice but have great difficulty defining. In their discussion of this point, they suggest that little progress has been made in relation to models of mental disorder over the previous fifty years, that there is a considerable volume of theoretical literature that has had little impact on practice.This assertion does not appear to do justice to the significant progress that might be argued to have occurred in psychoanalytic theory, psychodynamic therapy, and other metapsychological developments of the last fifty to one hundred years. Many of these developments have changed markedly our perceptions of mental disorder. Some treatments, it is true, may not have direct relevance or applicability to serious psychotic behavior, although that is contentious; there are psychoanalytic psychotherapists working with people with schizophrenia who would claim success. Recent developments in cognitive-behavioral therapy allied to other treatment modalities, such as careful use of low-dosage medication, have had therapeutic impact in enabling people with schizophrenia to 'manage their voices' and to understand the complex nature of their own thought processes.Fulford and Colombo also suggest that after this half century of work much of the development of practice has been largely abortive. Is this correct? It is true that we continue to struggle with an understanding of what we mean by mental disorder, which is made much worse, as the authors say, by the multiplicity of definitions of mental illness, models of mental disorder and practical approaches to treatment and management. Multidisciplinary and multi-agency developments of the last twenty years especially have, on the one hand, been a powerful approach to recognizing the multifaceted nature of mental disorder, but, on the other, have tended to a potential fragmentation of effort that has undermined [End Page 147] the necessary focus on the needs of the individual patient.Threefold ExpansionIt is here that perhaps an addition or expansion can be made to Fulford and Colombo's approach. That addition is, to borrow a phrase used by Hilary Putnam for the title of one of his books, a 'three fold cord.' The term comes originally from Ecclesiastes 4.12: "..a threefold cord is not quickly broken." (Putnam subtitles his book, Mind, Body and World, echoing, probably unintentionally, Heidegger's threefold structure of 'Being-In' [Dreyfus 1991. 163]).First, there have been many attempts 'informally' to understand the interplay of differing mental disorders in the operation of multidisciplinary teams. The development of community mental health teams and more recently Crisis Resolution and Out-Reach teams has required staff from varying professional backgrounds and agencies to find some common ground and to negotiate across their various professional, philosophical, and nosological boundaries. These negotiations have not been easy. A first element of the threefold expansion may be to incorporate (or strengthen) an organizational and group dynamic in the model (see, for example, de Board 1978; Hinshelwood 1987)Second, theoretical and practical work by professionals trained in psychoanalytic disciplines have sought to understand the nature of multidisciplinary community provision for people... (shrink)

In Being and Time, Heidegger explicitly defers any consideration of ourselves (Dasein) as embodied. I try to account for Heidegger's reluctance to talk about 'the body' in connection with his explication of Dasein, by arguing that doing so would be at odds with the kind of investigation his 'phenomenology of everydayness' is meant to be. That Heidegger omits discussion of the body in Being and Time might lead one to think of the human body in terms of the (...) other categories Heidegger deploys: readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand (Being and Time) and biological organisms (Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics). I argue that any such identification ought to be resisted, as these categories serve only to deprive our bodies of their specifically human dimension. Indeed, by surveying the failure of these categories as proper to the human body, we gain further insight into Heidegger's initial deferral: only given the existential analytic can one begin to offer a proper account of ourselves in bodily terms. (shrink)

In the Shuowen, one of the earliest comprehensive character dictionaries of ancient China, when discussing where the Chinese characters derive their structural components, Xu Shen proposed the dual constitutive principle of “adopting proximally from the human body, and distally from things around.” This dual emphasis of “body” and “things around” corresponds largely to the phenomenological issues of body or corporeality on the one hand, and lifeworld on the other. If we borrow Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as Being-in-the world, we (...) can easily arrive at a reformulation of Xu Shen’s constitutive principle of the Chinese script as one that concerns “bodily Dasein.” By looking into various examples of script tokens we can further elaborate on how the Chinese make use not only of the body in general but various body parts, and how they differentiate their life world into material nature, living things, and a multifaceted world of equipment in forming a core basis of Chinese characters/components, upon which further symbolic manipulation such as “indication”, “phonetic borrowing”, semantic combination, and “annotative derivation”, etc. can be based. Finally, examples will be cited to show how in the Chinese scripts the human body might interact with other’s bodies or with “things around” in various ways to cover the social, environmental, ritual, technical, economical, and even intellectual aspects of human experience. Bodily Dasein, so to speak, provides us with a new perspective of understanding and appreciating the entire scope of the Chinese script. (shrink)

La libertad es el concepto fundamental de la “metafísica del Dasein”, que Heidegger desarrolló a finales de los años 20 en continuidad con la ontología fundamental de Ser y tiempo, y que se articula junto a otros dos conceptos: trascendencia y fundamento de la existencia. En ese periodo Heidegger realizó sobre el tratado de la libertad (Freiheitsschrift) de Schelling una temprana y positiva interpretación, diluida en sus relecturas posteriores y más críticas de la obra. Según la tesis de este (...) trabajo, gracias a esta temprana lectura de la concepción de la libertad en Schelling, al hilo de la idea de libertad en la filosofía práctica kantiana, superando el poso idealista-trascendental del Freiheitsschrift, y descubriendo en él la prefiguración de la “diferencia ontológica” y de la “temporalidad” del Dasein, Heidegger formula el sentido metafísico y último de la esencia de la existencia, cuya posibilidad de ser es la libertad. (shrink)

In his 1937 lectures, Heidegger searches for Nietzsche’s initial thought of “the Moment”. This paper mimics Heidegger’s pursuit of Nietzsche’s Moment by tracing Heidegger’s own early arrival at the Moment in Being and Time, published 10 years prior to his lectures on Nietzsche. Both Zarathustra and Dasein are chased in and out of an authentic relationship with the Moment by their own shadows, which disappear at midday. Dasein’s shadow is the being that is always closest-at-hand, the being in (...) whom I lose myself in everyday care. Dasein forgets itself in inauthentically securing its identity in that which it cares for and that which it is not, darkness. Yet Dasein also confronts its own finitude in its negative double as it witnesses the daily dwindling of its shadow—the everyday passing away of time. (shrink)

How does everyday, inauthentic Dasein dominated by das Man become authentic? The aim of this article is to answer this and other questions about Dasein's authenticity by carrying out an analysis of the 'call of conscience'. This analysis, in turn, provides insights about Dasein's possibility for ethical existence. We will see that even though there are some puzzling issues in Heidegger's explanation of Dasein in its everydayness and its authenticity, the Heideggerian Existential Analytic is not 'anti-ethical' (...) as some have claimed. We will also see that the Existential Analytic's commitment to the ontic raises doubts about Heidegger's claim that the Analytic is prior to any ethics and examine how reading Being and Time as a project of 'metontology' may dissolve these doubts. Finally, the paper offers a suggestion about the importance of 'authentic historicality' in a factical account of the moral life. (shrink)

We are currently in the middle of the transformation from Martin Heidegger’s modern society to a society based on digital technology. In the developing digital society, humans in their current state of ‘Being’ are increasingly surrounded by systems that are networked and run based on algorithms, software, and data. These interconnected systems function, communicate, and interact in networks and driven by these algorithms, software, and data, which give them the ability to connect, calculate, and reveal. Jointly, these systems thus create (...) a new and actual reality based on their mathematical and scientific background. In the present-day digital society, humans’ actual ‘state of Being’ is increasingly framed by what the digital technology reveals to us and enables. The transition to this new digital reality conjures up more and more questions as to whether we as humans sufficiently understand the essence of digital technology and whether we as humanity have sufficient knowledge and insight to be able to analyze and fathom the essence of the new digital ecology around us. In this article, I will use Heideggerian phenomenology as a philosophy to create a framework that will allow us to, based on phenomenological research into our current ‘Dasein’ or ‘being there’, gain deeper insight into the ‘Being’ of digital technology and the ensuing development of a digital reality for humanity as a whole. (shrink)

Las presentes discusiones intentarán acceder a aquel campo inmediato de la existencia en dónde nuestro cuerpo efectivamente se presenta como nuestro en una íntima relación con nuestra vida. Así, el objetivo del presente trabajo será delimitar los rasgos centrales de la cotidianeidad a partir del pensamiento de Martin Heidegger, de modo que el ámbito del despliegue concreto del fenómeno de la corporalidad pueda ser esbozado de modo existencial. En este contexto, y a partir del fenómeno de la caída, el presente (...) escrito se propondrá bosquejar cómo es que el fenómeno del cuerpo humano se manifiesta enraizado en la inmediatez de la vida fáctica. (shrink)