A crow sat in a tree holding in his beak a piece of meat that he had stolen. A fox which saw him determined to get the meat. It stood under the tree and began to tell the crow what a beautiful big bird he was. He ought to be king of all the birds, the fox said, and he undoubtedly would have been made king, if only he had a voice as well. The crow was so anxious to prove (...) that he had a voice, that he dropped the meat and croaked for all he was worth. Up ran the fox, snapped up the meat, and said to him: ‘If you added brains to all your other qualifications you would make an ideal king.’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Literature as Fable, Fable as ArgumentLester H. HuntIIn an ancient Chinese text we find the following exchange between the Confucian sage Mencius and one of his adversaries:Kao Tzu said, "Human nature is like whirling water. Give it an outlet in the east and it will flow east; give an outlet in the west and it will flow west. Human nature does not show any preference for either good or (...) bad, just as water does not show any preference for either east or west.""It certainly is the case," said Mencius, "that water does not show any preference for either east or west, but does it show the same indifference to high and low? Human nature is good just as water seeks low ground. There is no man who is not good; there is no water that does not flow downwards."1The subject of this colloquy is a familiar one in philosophy as we know it in the West. Its form and style are also vaguely familiar: it is a clashing exchange of theories, in which the speakers do not seem to be speaking merely to express themselves, but in order to persuade others that they are right. Yet at the same time it seems quite alien to us. It would be hard to find anything in it that a Western philosopher since the time of Plato would recognize as an argument. The participants seem to be speaking entirely in illustrative analogies and clever aphorisms, not in arguments at all. The style seems to be literary rather than philosophical. Yet what they are doing does look curiously like arguing. There is a rhythm of statement and counter-statement, in which each speaker seems to be answering the claims of the other.A related, though different, sort of ambiguity, in which the author [End Page 369] really does seem to be both arguing and not arguing, can be found in the following text, traditionally attributed to a Westerner of the sixth century B.C.:Between the North Wind and the Sun, they say, a contest of this sort arose, to wit, which of the two would strip the goatskin from a farmer plodding on his way. The North Wind first began to blow as he does when he blows from Thrace, thinking by sheer force to rob the wearer of his cloak. And yet no more on that account did he, the man, relax his hold; instead he shivered, drew the borders of his garment tight about him every way, and rested with his back against a spur of rock. Then the Sun peeped forth, welcome at first, bringing the man relief from the cold, raw wind. Next, changing, he turned the heat on more, and suddenly the farmer felt too hot and of his own accord threw off the cloak, and so was stripped.Thus was the North Wind beaten in the contest. And the story means: "Cultivate gentleness, my son; you will get results oftener by persuasion than by the use of force."2Here Aesop, to use the traditional name for the author of this ancient fable, is plainly doing something "literary": he is telling a story. But narration in the Aesopian mode is never simply telling a story, and in this case what is present in addition to the story seems to have something logical about it. Personally, I read this fable with a certain sense, however faint, that I am being enlightened by it. That of course is Aesop's aim. He is not merely expressing his opinion, but in some way showing us the truth of it. This is the sort of thing that, in philosophy, is done through argument. However, as in the text from the Mencius, it seems there may be no argument here.Clearly, we are dealing with forms of persuasion that are common at certain times in the development of a culture: namely, those periods when the philosophical muse is a mere suckling babe. We are looking, one might think, at a level of development so rudimentary that the distinction between argument as we think of it today and other forms of persuasion has not been made... (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche’s writing, which is distinguished by a wide variety of forms and ongoing beginnings, bears an unmistakable imprint of Plato’s writing-in-becoming. The work begins with the area of correspondence, primarily from the philologist Erwin Rohde’s recognition of Plato as a model for Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but also from Nietzsche’s testimony that his Zarathustra is platonizing, the work points to the motif of death as a place where Plato’s and (...) Nietzsche’s poetics meet, given their transformations of the Homeric idea of the hero’s fate. The illuminating power of the atmosphere of death also points to Aesop’s character as a foundation upon which Plato bases his Socrates, which directs this paper toward demonstrating that Nietzsche’s assessment of Plato’s writing as an “infinitely accentuated Aesopian fable” turns out to be a self-assessment. (shrink)

RESUMO O uso de linguagem codificada e esópica nos trabalhos dos semioticistas que integraram a Escola Semiótica de Tártu-Mosou foi motivado pelo desejo de serem compreendidos pelo círculo e não compreendidos por possíveis intrusos indesejáveis dos órgãos de controle soviéticos. Um dos termos centrais utilizados pela Escola - os “sistemas modelizantes secundários” - foi sugerido por Vladímir Uspiénski com o objetivo de substituir a palavra "semiótica", associada à semiótica ocidental. Ao cotejar o artigo de Iúri Lotman Sobre o problema da (...) tipologia da cultura, de 1967, com a tradução para o português do Brasil de Lucy Seki, que integrou a coletânea Semiótica Russa, organizada por Boris Schnaiderman, objetivo verificar se as peculiaridades do texto original, que surgiram devido às condições histórico-políticos da sua criação, foram preservadas na tradução. ABSTRACT The use of codified and Aesopian language in the works of the semioticians who were members of the Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School was motivated by the desire to be understood by the School members and notunderstood by possible unwanted intruders from Soviet control organizations. One of the key terms they used was secondary modeling systems, which Vladimir Uspensky suggested to replace the word semiotics, associated with Western semiotics. By comparing Yuri Lotman’s essay Problems in the Typology of Culture to Lucy Seki’s translation of the essay into Brazilian Portuguese, which is part of the book Semiótica Russa [Russian Semiotics], edited by Boris Schnaiderman, I intend to verify if particularities of the original text, which resulted from the historical and political context in which the essay was produced, were maintained in the translation. (shrink)

Aleksandras Shtromas (1931-1999), a British-American scholar, became an eminent figure in his native Lithuania, yet Westem social scientists have yet to discover this human rights activist, Soviet dissident, and political thinker. Shtromas had no doubts about the inexorable collapse of the Soviet Union, resting his analysis on the assumption that communism was unable to provide any viable social and moral order. The vast majority of the Soviet intelligentsia had become skilled at the ideological cat-and-mouse games, wrestling wth Soviet Newspeak and (...) censorship, and employing an Aesopian language in order to survive and remain as decent as possible in a world of brainwashing and lies. A gifted prophet of post-communism, Shtromas was the only political scientist in the world who took the disintegration of the Soviet Union as early as the late 1970s as an ongoing process. This essay links Shtromas' legacy to the great East European dissenters. (shrink)

CONTENTS Carlo Ierna: The Beginnings of Husserl's Philosophy. Part 1: From ber den Begriff der Zahl to Philosophie der Arithmetik Robin Rollinger: Scientific Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Logic: The Standpoint of Paul Linke\ Nicholas deWarren:The Significance of Stern's "PrSsenzzeit" for Husserl's Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness Sen Overgaard: Being There: Heidegger's Formally Indicative Concept of "Dasein" Panos Theodorou: Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl's Analysis of 'Nature-Thing' in Ideas II Nam-In-Lee: Phenomenology of Feeling in Husserl and Levinas Wai-Shun Hung:Perception and Self-Awareness in (...) Merleau-Ponty:The Problem of the Tacit Cogito in the Phenomenology of Perception Ivan Chvatfk: Plato's Phaedo as an Aesopian Fable about the Immortal Soul Joshua Kates: Two Versions of Husserl's Late History: Jacob Klein and Jacques Derrida and the Problem of Modernity L. William Stern: Mental Presence-Time Edmund Husserl: Lecture on the Concept of Number Martina Stieler: Memories of Edmund Husserl Sen Overgaard: Transcendental Phenomenology and the Question of Transcendence: A Discussion of Damian Byers's Intentionality and Transcendence Damian Byers: Method and Discovery in Phenomenology: A Reply to Sen Overgaard Sen Overgaard: Inside Phenomenology: A Reply to Damian Byers. (shrink)

At a recent rally, Donald Trump resumed a habit he had developed during his election-rallies and read out the lyrics to a song. It tells the Aesopian fable of The Farmer and the Snake: A half frozen snake is taken in by a kind-hearted person but bites them the moment it is revived. Trump tells the fable to make a point about Islamic immigrants and undocumented immigrants from Southern and Central America: He claims the immigrants will cause problems and (...) much stricter immigration-policies are needed. I assume that Trump treats the fable as an argumentative device for supporting his stance on immigration. He uses it as a source-analogue both for the conclusion that immigrants will cause problems and for changing the frame in which immigrants and those willing to let them enter are seen. This gives me opportunity to examine the effect fables have as argumentative devices. Fables are a popular and effective choice for political argumentation. They are slimmed down, semi-abstract narratives, well suited for directing the audience's attention to a few properties of an otherwise complex situation. However, this also makes it easy to use them for manipulating an audience into oversimplifying complex contexts and stereotyping human beings. (shrink)

ArgumentIn his Philosophia practica universalis, Christian Wolff proposes a “mathematical” theory of moral action that includes his statements on the Aesopian fable. As a sort of moral example, Wolff claims, the fable is an appropriate means to influence human conduct because it conveys general truths to intuition. This didactic concept is modeled on the geometrical figure: Just as students intuit mathematical demonstrations by looking at figures on a blackboard, one can learn how to execute complex actions by listening to (...) a fable. Wolff's “scientific” fable theory met with an ambivalent reception. Lessing, who in his fable treatises re-translates Wolff's suggestions into the conceptual framework of poetics, interprets the geometric model as a stylistic ideal. The famous passage on Homer's successive descriptions in Lessing's Laokoon can be seen as another attempt to apply the representational model of geometry to literature. Herder, reading Wolff in a way that might be called deconstructive, replaces Wolff's geometric theory of poetry by a poetic anthropology of geometry. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Power of “Pliant Stuff”: Fables and Frankness in Seventeenth-Century Dutch RepublicanismArthur WeststeijnIn the preface to his 1609 collection of classical fables entitled De sapientia veterum (On the Wisdom of the Ancients), Francis Bacon vindicated his choice for such a playful genre. Although the writing of fables might seem just an “exercise of pleasure for my own or my reader’s recreation,” Bacon stressed that that was not the case. (...) On the contrary, he argued that “beneath no small number of the fables of the ancient poets there lay from the very beginning a mystery and an allegory.” Therefore, he continued, through such fables, “as sacred relics and light airs breathing out of better times,” hidden meanings can be exposed and made understood to unskilled ears and eyes. Indeed, “the employment of parables as a method of teaching, whereby inventions that are new and abstruse and remote from vulgar opinions may find an easier passage to the understanding,” shows that the fable serves as a very appropriate expedient for instruction and persuasion, the higher goals of rhetoric beyond simple entertainment and delight.1 [End Page 1]Yet, for all these noble purposes, Bacon could not hide his unease with those aspects of the fable which seemed to escape his pen’s command. Embarrassed by the “levity and looseness with which people indulge their fancy in the matter of allegories,” he acknowledged himself to have trod slippery ground. As he asserted: “I know very well what pliant stuff fable is made of, how freely it will follow any way you please to draw it, and how easily with a little dexterity and discourse of wit meanings which it was never meant to bear may be plausibly put upon it.” For Bacon, this intrinsic ambivalence of the fable gave rise to discomfort, and from the start he sought to remove any potential misunderstandings about his intentions. However, not all seventeenth-century writers of fables shared his concerns. Instead, the very nature of the fable as “pliant stuff,” as a genre which necessarily conveys meanings in an ambiguous, suggestive, and indirect manner, made it a particularly useful rhetorical device for those who would not or could not articulate their opinions openly.This article shows that a number of seventeenth-century authors deliberately employed the fable for its political expediency as an opaque prism to diffuse unconventional ideas that could undermine authority. Central in this overview are the Dutch merchants and fervent republican theorists Johan and Pieter de la Court, the main representatives of the radicalization of Dutch republicanism in the decades following the Peace of Westphalia. While most mainstream republicans in the Netherlands emphasized the need of a monarchical figure, a Stadholder, in the ideally balanced republican regime, the brothers De la Court claimed that such a monarchical element would necessarily entail tyranny.2 Their writings employed two different types of fables to substantiate this fundamental claim: the first based on the political allegories of the Italian satirist Traiano Boccalini, the second following the Aesopian tradition as exemplified by the famous [End Page 2] Dutch poet and playwright Joost van den Vondel. Through an analysis of the rhetorical role of these fables, this article attempts to shed more light on the reasons why fables were used in seventeenth-century republican thought. It will argue that the literary aspects of the fable cannot be separated from its political function, a function that eventually can be characterized as highly paradoxical: not in spite but because of its openness to different readings, the fable involved a disguised rhetorical plea for frankness and liberty of speech.Rhetoric and Fables: The Standing of an Emblematic GenreIn classical antiquity, when authors such as Aesop and Phaedrus had created a distinct genre of allegorical tales, the use of such fables had been as much reproved as their particular rhetorical force had been recognized. According to Quintilian, fables should not be a part of the linguistic armory of the truly decent orator, for fables “are specially attractive to rude and uneducated minds, which are less suspicious than others in their receptions of fictions and, when pleased, readily agree with the arguments from which their pleasure is derived... (shrink)

Volume 22 of _The Annual of Psychoanalysis_ begins with the provocative reflections of Jane Flax and Robert Michels on the current status and future prospects of psychoanalysis a century after Freud. Flax believes that analysis will not survive in the postmodern West if analysts cling to the medical model and the notion of analysis as a clinical science; Michels believes analysis will be revivified in the next century by reorganizing its training institutes within universities. A section on "Psychoanalysis and the (...) Visual Arts" includes John Gedo's probing examination of the inner world of Paul Gauguin and William Meissner's reflections on Vincent van Gogh as artist. Johann Michael Rotmann's examination of the transferential meanings of third-party payment within Germany's health insurance system is a timely consideration of issues that are increasingly salient for American analysts and therapists. A rich harvest of theoretical and clinical papers rounds out this volume of _The Annual_. In "A Time of Questioning," Leon Wurmser responds to the inner and outer challenges before analysis in a closely reasoned defense of the applicability of classical analytic technique to severely disturbed patients. Michael Hoit examines the noninterpretive, interactive aspects of the analytic relationship, arguing that the analyst's noninterpretive activities are intrinsic to treatment and must be incorporated into the theory of therapeutic action. In "Fables as Psychoanalytic Metaphors," Elaine Caruth describes some psychoanalytic metaphors contained within the lessons of the Aesopian fables, proposing that the fables address interpersonal and group conflicts that often involve moral issues. Wilma Bucci offers her "multiple code theory" as a new model of emotion and mind, based on current theory and research in cognitive science, that can account for clinical concepts and provide coherent framework for empirical research. And Ralph Roughton uses the case history of Laura to underscore the central role of repetition and interaction in the analytic process. Volume 22 will not disappoint readers of this distinguished continuing series. Like its predecessors, it is a thoroughly assembled collection responsive to the conceptual, clinical, and institutional challenges now before the field. (shrink)