Immediacy in Aristotle’s Epistemology

Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 66 (2):111–138 (2021)
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Abstract

This article discusses immediate premises in Aristotle’s epistemology. The traditional interpretation identifies immediacy with indemonstrability: immediate truths are the indemonstrable principles of science from which the theorems are derived by demonstration. Against this common reading, I argue that Aristotle’s recognition of two kinds of epistemic priority (priority by nature and priority to us) commits him to the existence of two types of immediacy, only one of which is equivalent to indemonstrability. As a result, my interpretation offers a better understanding of a puzzling passage (APo. 1.13, 78a22–b4) that seems to contradict the standard view.

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Breno Andrade Zuppolini
Universidade Federal de São Paulo