Intentions are mental states

&
Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1080/13869790600641954

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,394

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

The ‘mental state’ theory of intentions.Richard Scheer - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (1):121-131.
The volitive and the executive function of intentions.Christoph Lumer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):511-527.
Absichten und Ziele – eine Zeitanalyse zielgerichteter Handlungen.Stefan Gerlach - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (3):337-364.
We-Intentions and How One Reports Them.Kyle Ferguson - 2023 - In Jeremy Randel Koons & Ronald Loeffler (eds.), Ethics, practical reasoning, agency: Wilfrid Sellars's practical philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 37–61.
Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees.Angelica Kaufmann - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):745-760.
Intention.Luca Ferrero - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Blackwell. pp. 75-89.
On Whether we Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2):150-170.
Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.
Rorty's mark of the mental and his disappearance theory.Richard I. Sikora - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (September):191-93.
Interpretive sensory-access theory and conscious intentions.Uwe Peters - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):583–595.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
142 (#158,042)

6 months
4 (#1,249,987)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Citations of this work

On the principle of intention agglomeration.Jing Zhu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

View all 22 references / Add more references