The Swampman Puzzle and Diachronic Holism

Philosophical Forum 47 (2):171-193 (2016)
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10.1111/phil.12113

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Yujian Zheng
Shenzhen University

Citations of this work

Retrospective necessity and the first person.Yujian Zheng - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (3):245-261.

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References found in this work

Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Teleological theories of mental content.Peter Schulte & Karen Neander - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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