Induction, Conjunction Introduction, and Safety

Philosophy 98 (4):477-483 (2023)
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Abstract

Depending on whether we are somewhat tolerant of nearby error-possibilities or not, the safety condition on knowledge is open to a strong reading and a weak reading. In this paper, it is argued that induction and conjunction introduction constitute two horns of a dilemma for the safety account of knowledge. If we opt for the strong reading, then the safety account fails to account for inductive knowledge. In contrast, if we opt for the weak reading, then the safety account fails to accommodate knowledge obtained via the method of conjunction introduction.

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Bin Zhao
Peking University

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References found in this work

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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.

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