Can Infinitists Handle the Finite Mind Objection and the Distinction Objection?

Philosophia 49 (5):2275-2291 (2021)
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Abstract

This paper examines two objections to the infinitist theory of epistemic justification, namely “the finite mind objection” and “the distinction objection.” It criticizes Peter Klein’s response to the distinction objection and offers a more plausible response. It is then argued that this response is incompatible with Klein’s response to the finite mind objection. Infinitists, it would seem, cannot handle both objections when taken together.

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Bin Zhao
Peking University

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References found in this work

Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The inescapability of Gettier problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.
The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.

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