Descartes on certainty in deduction

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 105 (C):158-164 (2024)
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Abstract

This article examines how deduction preserves certainty and how much certainty it can preserve according to Descartes’s Rules for the Direction of the Mind. I argue that the certainty of a deduction is a matter of four conditions for Descartes. First, certainty depends on whether the conjunction of simple propositions is composed with necessity or contingency. Second, a deduction approaches the certainty of an intuition depending on how many “acts of conceiving” it requires and—third—the complexity or difficulty of the acts of thinking, which is determined by the content of the thoughts and on external factors. Fourth, certainty depends on the intellectual aptitude of the person using the deduction. A deduction lacks certainty when it relies on memory such that it is not apprehended with immediacy. However, the mental capacity and speed of a mind can be increased by training the special mental faculties of perspicacity and discernment. Increasing one’s intellectual aptitude allows for more steps of a deduction to be inferred in fewer acts of conceiving, thereby helping preserve the certainty of a deduction.

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Jacob Zellmer
University of California, San Diego

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References found in this work

Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.
Cartesian intuition.Elliot Samuel Paul - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (4):693-723.
Scientia, diachronic certainty, and virtue.Saja Parvizian - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9165-9192.
How (not) to study Descartes' Regulae.Bret Lalumia Doyle - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (1):3-30.

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