Direction of fit and normative functionalism

Philosophical Studies 91 (2):173-203 (1998)
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Abstract

What is the difference between belief and desire? In order to explain the difference, recent philosophers have appealed to the metaphor of

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Nick Zangwill
University College London

Citations of this work

The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
Semantic normativity.Åsa Maria Wikforss - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (2):203-26.
On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit.Kim Frost - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (4):429-484.
Faith is Weakly Positive.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2025 - Synthese 205 (17):1-19.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael R. Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.

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