Wittgenstein's Nonsense Objection to Russell's Theory of Judgment

In Michael Campbell & Michael O'Sullivan, Wittgenstein and Perception. New York: Routledge. pp. 126-151 (2015)
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Abstract

I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that Russell's theory of judgment fails to show that it's not possible to judge nonsense.

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José L. Zalabardo
University College London

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References found in this work

The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Portland, OR: Home University Library.
Principles of mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1931 - New York,: W.W. Norton & Company.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 12 (1):109-110.

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