Abstract

The higher-order desire theory of pain states that pain’s unpleasantness is constituted by the subject’s desire not to feel pain. The theory faces the Euthyphro problem: it fails to accommodate the intuitive datum that pain’s unpleasantness explains and justifies the desire not to feel pain. To avoid this problem, the first-order desire theory proposes that pain’s unpleasantness is constituted by the subject’s desire not to be in the bodily condition represented by the feeling of pain. This paper aims to show that the Euthyphro problem, originally leveled against the higher-order theory, arises equally for the first-order theory. In particular, it either leaves the first-order desire rationally ungrounded or collapses into one of its rival theories — namely, evaluativism. I conclude that desire theories of pain misconstrue the justificatory relationship between desire and pain’s unpleasantness.