Moral Responsibility and Intersubjectivity: A Reflection on the Concept of Moral Responsibility from the Perspective of Marcel’s Intersubjectivity

Marcel Studies 2 (1):23-35 (2017)
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Abstract

In this paper, I shall attempt to understand a passage from Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov which raises the idea that we are responsible others. I shall begin with an examination of the main contemporary theories on moral responsibility and I shall argue that these theories fail to help us understand the Dostoyevsky passage. I shall then venture to suggest that Gabriel Marcel's idea of intersubjectivity may provide us with a key to understanding the passage. I believe that a reflection on the Dostoyevsky passage and Marcel's idea of intersubjectivity would greatly enrich our understanding of the concept of moral responsibility, along with the concept of self—I am convinced that how we see ourselves largely determines what we think we are responsible for. More specifically, I shall suggest that the idea of an “intersubjective self,” as opposed to the idea of an “egoistic” or “monadistic self” that is prevalent in contemporary culture, may be more appropriate for understanding who we are and may shed light on our concept of moral responsibility.

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Yu Ling
University of Hong Kong

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References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Human Freedom and the Self.Roderick Chisholm - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.

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