Abstract

Kirk Lougheed argues that active euthanasia (here ‘euthanasia’) is impermissible for people who are extremely sick and cannot exercise their vital forcei because (1) exercising vital force does not require volition but only being an object of caring relationships and (2) African philosophy entails other-regarding deontological duties to stay alive.1 In this commentary, we point out an implication of Lougheed’s view that is morally problematic and offer a revision that avoids this implication. We also argue for an additional advantage of this revision. Lougheed’s view implies that a person who is the object of very few relationships has a much weaker duty to stay alive than a person who is well-loved and the object of many relationships. This is because he seems to think that duties to stay alive are derived entirely from one’s relationship with other people. While he is clear that a person, even if terminally ill or permanently unconscious, has a duty to stay alive so that they could remain the object of harmonious relationships, he is silent on whether duties to stay alive could be grounded in reasons that have to do with oneself. Plausibly, on this view, the strength of one’s duty to stay alive depends solely …