Autonomy and Paternalism

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (sup1):47-66 (1982)
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Abstract

Paternalism has generally been thought of as forcible or coercive interference with a person's liberty of action which is justified because it will prevent harm to that person's welfare interests or the like. Opposition to paternalistic interference with adults, whether it involves the intervention of the state or another adult individual, has usually been based on a concern to preserve human autonomy or self-determination. More strictly it is opposition to so-called ‘strong’ paternalism - interventions to protect or benefit a person despite the person's informed voluntary consent to the contrary- which has been grounded on such a commitment to self-determination. ‘Weak’ paternalism involves interference where there is a defect in the decision-making capacities of the person interfered with. It is claimed to be justifiable insofar asconsentto the interference would be forthcoming were these capacities restored.

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original Young, Robert (1982) "Autonomy and Paternalism". Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 8(n/a):47-66

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References found in this work

Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.
Mill versus paternalism.Richard J. Arneson - 1980 - Ethics 90 (4):470-489.
Paternalistic behavior.Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver - 1976 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1):45-57.
Mill on Liberty.Daniel Little - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (3):434.

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