Pragmatism Revisited

Idealistic Studies 6 (3):218-238 (1976)
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Abstract

The publication of Professor Rescher’s Methodological Pragmatism marks his most recent attempt to articulate his version of pragmatism. It also constitutes, with his The Primacy of Practice and Conceptual Idealism, a sustained modernization of an indigenous American philosophy. The Primacy of Practice is subtitled “Essays Towards a Pragmatical Kantian Theory of Empirical Knowledge.” It contains chapters on practical reason, the justification of induction, laws, noumenal causality in Kant, and instrumental reasoning in ethics. Conceptual Idealism attempts to place some of these same topics in a specifically ontological context, an ontology both Kantian and, Rescher claims, pragmatic. The new book, Methodological Pragmatism, A Systems-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, is a more systematic, more ambitious examination of pragmatism, together with chapters which develop a defeasible concept of knowledge and an instrumentalist view of logic. There are also chapters outlining an evolutionary, Darwinian theory of the development of knowledge and of methodologies. Not since the days of James and Dewey has there been such a systematic presentation of this philosophy. A study of American pragmatism cannot now be made without a careful examination of Professor Rescher’s contribution.

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