Wittgenstein on Thinking as a Process or an Activity

Wittgenstein-Studien 10 (1):73-104 (2019)
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Abstract

In this paper I focus on a major aspect of the later Wittgenstein’s investigation of thinking – his discussion of the idea of thinking as a process or an activity. I shall show that Wittgenstein’s remarks, apart from some concerning the methodology and conception of philosophy, are grammatical remarks, meaning that they describe the use of the word “thinking” and can be agreed to by every competent speaker. I thus show that Wittgenstein’s investigation of thinking is a grammatical one, and hence that there is no inconsistency between his conception of philosophy and his philosophical practice. In the process of doing so, I shall also review previous studies on this topic and point out their deficiencies.

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Citations of this work

Wittgenstein on the impossibility of following a rule only once.Francis Y. Lin - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (1):134-154.
Wittgenstein on Understanding as a Mental State.Francis Y. Lin - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (4):367-395.

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