Abstract

The article argues that young infants’ felt needs are articulated and discernible experiences. So, instead of undifferentiated feelings, young infants have some sort of variety of need-experiences. In the article, infantile needs are specified as feelings of dissatisfaction. The article argues against the view that instances of dissatisfying feelings would be initially experienced by the infants as undifferentiated feelings of discomfort despite corresponding to a variety of observable behaviors and postures (related to, for instance, hunger, thirst, restlessness, or seeking attachment). Two arguments are brought forth in the article. The embodiment argument claims that feelings of dissatisfaction must be thought as embodied experiences. The experiential sense of these feelings involves as a constituent part a proprioceptive sense of one’s body. As embodied experiences, then, these feelings are specific and varying. The ontogenetic argument suggests that the development of the feelings of dissatisfaction issued by care-interventions can be better understood, if these feelings entail a sort of rudimentary experiential organization from the start. Thus, the article suggests that there is no “single general-purpose model” of the infant’s need-experiences, as some emotion theorists suggest with respect to emotions. This has implications with respect to developmental theories which account for young infants’ experiences of needs and their satisfaction, such as that of Donald Winnicott.