Kant's Conception of Fact in Practical Reason and Its Demonstration of Freedom

Modern Philosophy 6:74-79 (2008)
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Abstract

Kant's practical reason is the fact that the concept refers to the moral law or moral law of consciousness, but the moral law itself is actually a sense of moral law. Moral law is a sure thing itself, as a pure practical reason is certainly the fact that the objective reality, and by reason of this positive concept proved itself in practice the objective reality. It is through the fact that the moral law, there is only the speculative philosophy of freedom has a negative reason for the concept, the philosophy in practice to obtain a positive provisions, has become a "fact." Kant's conception of fact in practical reason refers to the moral law or the consciousness of the moral law, while in fact the moral law itself is the very consciousness of the moral law. As something self-affirmed, the moral law affirms the objective reality of pure practical reason, and, by the very positive conception of reason, demonstrates its objective reality in practice. It is exactly through the fact of the moral law that the conception of the free causality, which is nothing but negative in speculative philosophy, acquires its positive determination in practical philosophy and also becomes a "fact"

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