Abstract

Psychological Sequentialism holds that no causal constraint is necessary for the preservation of what matters in survival; rather, it is sufficient for preservation if two groups of mental states are similar enough and temporally close enough. Suppose one’s body is instantaneously dematerialized and subsequently, by an amazing coincidence, a group of molecules are configured to form a qualitatively identical human body. On this view, these events preserve what matters in survival. Despite its unpopularity, several philosophers have argued for this view. One of the main arguments is that a psychologically sequential person is bound to have the same psychological traits and inclinations, and thus preserves what matters in the original person’s survival. In this paper, I argue that this argument fails to establish that no causal constraint is necessary. I also argue that if sequentialism is true, I should be content with the prospect of my bodily destruction followed by the creation of a series of short-lived beings whose mental states are sequential to mine. I suggest that the implausibility of this implication is sufficient to reject the view.