Abstract

This article is devoted to a critical analysis of the epistemology of virtues as a relatively new philosophical trend, the interest in which is noticeably increasing. This analysis is based on the author's concept of rational skepticism, which offers a justification for scientific knowledge. In the course of solving this problem, it turns out that the concepts of the epistemology of virtues do not support the division of cognition into cognitive practices and do not indicate which of them should include the good cognitive character that this direction seeks to establish. A comparison of the requirements of these concepts with the cognitive norms of science reveals a violation of its principles such as veritism, evidentialism, internalism, skepticism and deontological rationing. At the same time, the standards of the aretic approach developed by the epistemology of virtues are insufficient for the implementation of scientific norms, degenerating into the trivial idea that the cognitive success of cognition is conditioned by the application of the intellectual virtues of the subject and is its merit. As applied to science, the solution to the problem of the value of knowledge proposed by the epistemology of virtues is refuted; it is shown that the famous analogy of cognition with a coffee machine is incorrect here, and scientific truth in no way “absorbs” (swamp) its justification. In addition, it is revealed that the solution to the Gettier problem, based on the intersubjective definition of knowledge, gets to the supporters of the aretic approach at an unacceptably high price of turning their cognitive concepts into an empty formalism. As an alternative, solutions to these problems are discussed, supported by rational skepticism, which are free from the identified shortcomings; thus, the validity of scientific knowledge gives value to its validity, and the Gettier problem does not arise if this knowledge is considered to be the knowledge of a particular subject that allows revision. The main conclusion of the article is the refutation of the “value turn” in cognition, the necessity of which the epistemology of virtues insists on.