R and Relevance Principle Revisited

Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):767-782 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper first shows that some versions of the logic R of Relevance do not satisfy the relevance principle introduced by Anderson and Belnap, the principle of which is generally accepted as the principle for relevance. After considering several possible (but defective) improvements of the relevance principle, this paper presents a new relevance principle for (three versions of) R, and explains why this principle is better than the original and others

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Citations of this work

Varieties of Relevant S5.Shawn Standefer - 2023 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 32 (1):53–80.
What is a Relevant Connective?Shawn Standefer - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (4):919-950.
Variable-Sharing as Relevance.Shawn Standefer - 2025 - In Andrew Tedder, Shawn Standefer & Igor Sedlar, New Directions in Relevant Logic. Springer.
The philosophy of logical practice.Ben Martin - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):267-283.

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References found in this work

Relevant Logics and Their Rivals.Richard Routley, Val Plumwood, Robert K. Meyer & Ross T. Brady - 1982 - Ridgeview. Edited by Richard Sylvan & Ross Brady.
Logical Pluralism.J. C. Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.
Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Neccessity, Vol. I.Alan Ross Anderson & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Edited by Nuel D. Belnap & J. Michael Dunn.
Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.

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