Concepts are not beliefs, but having concepts is having beliefs

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):89-89 (1998)
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Abstract

We applaud Millikan's psychologically plausible version of the causal theory of reference. Her proposal offers a significant clarification of the much-debated relation between concepts and beliefs, and suggests positive directions for future empirical studies of conceptual development. However, Millikan's revision of the causal theory may leave us with no generally satisfying account of concept individuation in the mind.

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