A New Way to Block a Dutch Book Argument, or The Stubborn Non-probabilist

Abstract

We point out a yet unnoticed flaw in Dutch Book arguments that relates to a link between degrees of belief and betting quotients. We offer a set of precise conditions governing when a nonprobabilist is immune to the classical Dutch Book argument. We suggest that diachronic Dutch Book arguments are also affected.

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Leszek Wroński
Jagiellonian University

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References found in this work

Distorted reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.
Dynamic coherence and probability kinematics.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):1-20.
Fair bets and inductive probabilities.John G. Kemeny - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):263-273.
Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 229--251.
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.

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