Abstract

It is argued that perceptual experience, at its most basic levels, has a nonconceptual representational content. The first task undertaken is to argue that a representationalist account of the content of perceptual experience is required. The strategy employed is to both criticize and dismiss competing positions, particularly sense-datum theories, and build a positive case on behalf of representationalism by focusing on the transparency of experience and the connection between perceptual experience and belief. It is then demonstrated that representationalist accounts that take the content of perceptual experience to be propositional in nature are inadequate because they cannot accommodate the rich detail included in the representational content of experience. John McDowell's claim that our capacity for demonstrative thought provides us with the resources required to conceptually capture the fine-grained features presented in experience is also examined and rejected. Acceptance of the idea that perceptual experience includes a nonconceptual form of representation is motivated by arguing that not only does it offer a means of accounting for the fine-grained features represented in perceptual experience, but that it also provides a way of fixing the possession conditions for a basic and important group of concepts. A statement of how the nonconceptual representational content of experience is to be specified is also presented, and an account of the mental representation of the nonconceptual representational content of perceptual experience is included. The dissertation concludes with an argument for the claim that perceptual experiences with nonconceptual representational contents can be legitimately attributed only to creatures having at least a minimally sophisticated mental life, which includes a self-concept and a conception of the objective world.