Relativism and absolutism: How both can be right

Metaphilosophy 27 (3):324-326 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper makes a small point concerning the contraposition of relativism and absolutism. Relativism need not be vulnerable to the self‐refutation argument; as for internal consistency both positions can be equally right. They are asymmetric, however, in that according to the absolutist only one of the two positions can be right, whereas from the relativist's viewpoint they can both be right.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Relativism, Absolutism, and Tolerance.Hye-Kyung Kim & Michael Wreen - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (4):447-459.
Pragmatism Versus Social Construction: A Reply to Shahryari.David J. Stump - 2024 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 55 (1):153-157.
Absolutism, Relativism, and Pragmatic Fallibilism: A Reply to Stump.Shahram Shahryari - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (2):331-338.
Relativism, Fallibilism, and the Need for Interpretive Charity.Nadine Elzein - 2022 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 92:253-270.
Relativism and reflexivity.Robert Lockie - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (3):319 – 339.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
40 (#560,724)

6 months
8 (#580,966)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Thoroughly Relativistic Perspectives.Mark Ressler - 2012 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (1):89-112.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism.H. Siegel - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):419-427.
On the paradox of cognitive relativism.Jack W. Meiland - 1980 - Metaphilosophy 11 (2):115–126.

Add more references