Sumner on Abortion: Utilitarian Abortion

Dialogue 24 (4):671- (1985)
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Abstract

In Abortion and Moral Theory, L. W. Sumner develops a moderate view of abortion, having dispatched as “indefensible” “two equally prominent and extreme positions: the liberal view … and the conservative view”. It is a distinctive feature of the book that, having formulated what he regards as the correct intuitive position, the author seeks for it “the needed foundation for a moderate view of abortion”, since “the defense of a moderate position must ultimately be grounded in moral theory”, in which the position acquires “theoretical depth”, and without which it would lack “philosophical justification”. The moral theory in which Professor Sumner seeks to lodge his moderate position is the “classical version of utilitarianism”, which “can serve as the deep structure of a moderate view of abortion”. Thus, a central task for the appraisal of Abortion and Moral Theory is to ascertain whether classical utilitarianism can be made to accommodate “common-sense morality [which] plainly regards murder as wrong principally because of its central effects …”, that is, because murder causes “its victim some form of harm”.

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