Abstract

Two condemning species of criticism of Kant's transcendental idealism have recently emerged. Each identifies Kantian claims regarding logic, mathematics or physics and argues the apparent inconsistency of these claims with modern advances in these disciplines. The first species holds that Kant's claims in these disciplines either serve as premises for, or are drawn as conclusions from, transcendental idealism. If the former, the apparent inconsistency with modern advances thereby demonstrates the explanatory inadequacy of transcendental idealism. If the latter, then a simple inference by modus tollens renders transcendental idealism incoherent. The second species of criticism is often disguised as an attempted defence of specific arguments of transcendental idealism. The usually tacit assumption made by proponents of this species is that Kant's arguments can be only defended by reference to their historical context; it remains that advances in contemporary logic, mathematics and physics do clearly demonstrate the explanatory inadequacy of transcendental idealism. Hence, at best, though Kant may make some important and possibly lasting contributions to philosophy, his transcendental idealism, as a whole, fails; at worst, transcendental idealism becomes little more than an historical curiosity. In either case, transcendental idealism does not represent a defensible philosophical position. ;This dissertation comprises a dual program. I argue not only that some of the alleged inconsistencies are based upon misrepresentations of Kant' s position but also that many of the alleged inconsistencies reveal the explanatory inadequacy of the systems against which Kant's arguments are being measured. The latter program entails the identification of certain theses of transcendental idealism which are revisionistic with respect to currently accepted logical, mathematical and physical dogma. Hence, the task is both to defend Kant against various species of condemning criticism and to defend the theses of transcendental idealism identified. In descending order of generality, I defend: the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as representations, not as things in themselves, the doctrine that the isolation of certain species of universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience is possible, and the doctrine that logic and mathematics need to be revised and that proof is central to a theory of meaning. This, I argue, is a necessary prolegomenon to any thoroughgoing defence of transcendental idealism