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Base property exemplification and mixed worlds: remarks on the Shafer-Landau/Mabrito exchange
Philosophical Studies 138 (3):429-434 (2008)
Abstract
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic view.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Exaggerating the Importance of Diachronic Base Property Exemplification in Moral Supervenience.Jorn Sonderholm - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (1):45-50.
Why a Diachronic View of Base Property Exemplification is Necessary in Metaethics.Jeff Wisdom - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):43-50.
References found in this work
Does Shafer-Landau have a problem with supervenience?Robert Mabrito - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):297 - 311.
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