Base property exemplification and mixed worlds: remarks on the Shafer-Landau/Mabrito exchange

Philosophical Studies 138 (3):429-434 (2008)
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Abstract

In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic view.

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Jeff Wisdom
Joliet Junior College

References found in this work

Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Does Shafer-Landau have a problem with supervenience?Robert Mabrito - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):297 - 311.

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