Abstract
This chapter revisits Nishida Kitarō’s moral philosophy from the perspective of moral sentimentalism and the knowing-to approach, addressed by Michael Slote and Huang Yong respectively, with specific attention given to the concept of the “feeling of happiness” 幸福の感情. While the metaphysics and epistemology that lie behind the concept of “pure experience” 純粋経験 have been treated as the starting point or even the foundation of Nishida’s philosophy, I would like to argue that moral philosophy plays a more important role. Nishida wrote his first “academic” essay (though it was an answer to an examination given by Nakajima Rikizō 中島力造 (NKZ 11: 557), “Kantian Ethics” 韓図倫理学, at the age of 23 (in 1893) while he was studying at Tokyo Imperial University. From that point, Nishida published at least seven essays on ethics (NKZ 24: 181–183), but only two on pure experience, before assuming his office in the Department of Ethics 倫理学講座 at Kyoto University in 1910. Having been influenced by Aristotle, Kant, and Thomas Hill Green in particular, Nishida advocates energetism for moral philosophy, which is a comparatively neglected area. Nishida dedicated tremendous effort to researching British moral philosophy and published a number of articles on the subject, including A History of British Ethics 英国倫理学史. While it remains unclear when exactly this particular work was written, Klaus Riesenhuber and Murai Norio 村井則夫 claim it was completed before 1896 (NKZ 14: 659–659). By (re)defining philosophy as the study of life 人生問題 (NKZ 5: 139), praxis or moral philosophy became a lifelong project for Nishida. Apart from his publications on moral philosophy up to the publication of Zen no Kenkyū (An Inquiry into the Good) in 1911, Nishida’s concern with one’s internal life can also be seen in his last completed essay, The Theory of Place and the Religious Worldview 場所の論理と宗教的世界観, which was completed in 1945. By defining religion as de facto of mind 心霊上の事実, Nishida stresses that philosophers should not fabricate such facts (NKZ 10: 295). Although Nishida argues religion and morality should be differentiated (NKZ 10: 312), moral philosophy can be treated as the beginning as well as the consummation of Nishida philosophy.