Simple Ideas

In Berkeley: An Interpretation. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK (1989)
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Abstract

Many empiricists, among them Locke and Hume, make a distinction between simple and complex ideas. Berkeley refuses to do so, because he finds connections—objective connections incompatible with simplicity—even among the ‘simplest’ of ideas. Simple ideas, in his view, are illegitimately abstract.

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