Abstract

Abstract:Peirce held a convergence theory of moral truth, as James Liszka persuasively argues in Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics, and the Normative Sciences (2021). Here I emphasize: (1) that Peirce's convergence theory follows from the application of the maxim of pragmatism to the concept of moral goodness or rightness; (2) that in connection with Peirce's account of the ethical summum bonum, morally right action can be understood as action that conforms or contributes to the growth of concrete reasonableness; and (3) that, for Peirce, the growth of concrete reasonableness seems to be a movement or development toward "God". While I broadly agree with Liszka's approach, I highlight some disagreements. As do many readers of Peirce, Liszka seems to regard the convergence of beliefs and habits as necessarily a convergance among the "indefinite community" of distinct persons or inquirers; however, there is sufficient evidence that Peirce came to think that, if any given person were to live long enough, they would come to the same conclusions or rest in the same habits on their own. With respect to morality, even the most evil person would eventually come around to the moral truth.