Abstract

Many fragments show that Heraclitus was interested in epistemological issues. However, scholars have been reluctant to attribute a theory of knowledge to Heraclitus, presumably because to do so would be anachronistic. This study shows that Heraclitus did, in fact, have a theory of knowledge, by describing Heraclitus' epistemology, and by showing that it was a response to skepticism. Early skepticism had claimed that "seeming" obscures the nature of things--but Heraclitus claimed to know the nature of "each thing." Early skepticism held that only the gods had knowledge: Heraclitus denied this view by positing a "logos" that was at the same time a principle of rationality, a universal law, and a component of all psychai. Early Greek thought assumed a principle of "like-to-like," according to which only "similar" things may interact. Xenophanes appears to have based his skepticism in part upon like-to-like: he stated that the cosmos is "utterly unlike" mortals, and that the nature of the cosmos is unknowable. Heraclitus was careful to build "similarity" into his views: psychai could become fiery, like the logos, which informs the fiery cosmos; hence, psychai could, in principle, interact with the logos. The Greek view of knowledge is based on "direct acquaintance"; hence, knowledge is impossible if "seeming" precludes direct acquaintance with reality. Heraclitus countered the "veil of seeming" by holding that logos is universal, and that all psychai have a share in logos; hence, knowledge is possible via introspection. Heraclitus retained "seeming"--as was necessary, to account for the possibility of error--but transferred it from the cosmos to persons who fail to understand the cosmos