Lectures on Inductive Logic

Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2017)
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Abstract

Logic is a field studied mainly by researchers and students of philosophy, mathematics and computing. Inductive logic seeks to determine the extent to which the premises of an argument entail its conclusion, aiming to provide a theory of how one should reason in the face of uncertainty. It has applications to decision making and artificial intelligence, as well as how scientists should reason when not in possession of the full facts. In this work, Jon Williamson embarks on a quest to find a general, reasonable, applicable inductive logic (GRAIL), all the while examining why pioneers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap did not entirely succeed in this task.

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Author's Profile

Jon Williamson
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.
Justifying the principle of indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.
Calibration for epistemic causality.Jon Williamson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):941-960.
Justifying the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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