Indeterminate Oughts

Ethics 127 (3):645-673 (2017)
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Abstract

Sometimes it is indeterminate what an agent morally ought do. This generates a Decision Ought Challenge—to give moral guidance to agents in such a scenario. This article is a field guide to the options for a theory of the decision ought for cases of indeterminacy. Three categories of view are evaluated, and the best representative for each is identified.

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Robert Williams
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Materialism and the Moral Status of Animals.Jonathan Birch - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):795-815.
Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596.
Belief and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13523-13542.

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References found in this work

Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy.Elizabeth Barnes & J. Robert G. Williams - 2011 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 6. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 103-148.
The self and the future.Bernard Williams - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (2):161-180.

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